The statement from Tadesse Werede (Lt. Gen.) was issued after the TPLF-controlled regional council conducted an executive session in the regional cabinet meeting hall in Mekelle under armed protection.

According to information and images released by regional media streams on Friday, TPLF commenced a meeting inside the Interim Administration’s cabinet meeting hall after declaring itself “elected” earlier this week.

The move follows the TPLF’s rejection of the federal government’s decision to extend the TIA’s mandate for one year to ensure regional stability.

The TPLF leadership opposed this renewal, instead reinstating its pre-war regional council and nominating Debretsion as the regional president, maintaining that the pre-war council holds legitimacy based on previous regional elections, which were held nearly six years ago.

In a social media post on May 8, 2026, President Tadesse Worede described the TPLF’s entry into the cabinet hall as a “destructive movement and the start of a dangerous chapter for the region.”

“I want to express that the body itself, which is attempting to seize the administration’s power by force, is responsible for all-encompassing destruction and danger that befalls our people following this illegal act,” stated Tadesse.

The President noted that the group [Debretsion led TPLF] ignored prior calls to desist and instead utilized armed protection to occupy government infrastructure.

“The body [TPLF] that recently declared itself elected released information and images today showing it has started a cabinet meeting inside the Tigray Interim Administration cabinet meeting hall,” Tadesse’s post read.

The current situation creates a dual-administration claim in Mekelle.

While the federal government previously justified the TIA extension as a measure to facilitate the transition toward permanent elections, observers warn the move to reinstate the former council risks undoing the fragile peace that ended the two year’s war in the region.

In contrast to the Interim Administration’s stance, Sebhat Gebreegziabher, a former member of Tigray’s pre-war regional council currently working with an aid organization near the Ethiopia-Eritrea border, challenged the legality of the federal mandate extension.

He argued that because the TIA resulted from an agreement between two negotiating parties—the TPLF and the federal government—any extension required a bilateral decision at the negotiating table rather than a unilateral decree from Addis Ababa.

He framed the current standoff as a result of the federal government attempting to force subservience rather than addressing the legal and democratic questions raised by the regional council.

The Rights Commission presented its assessment of the proceedings ahead of the June 1 vote to election and security officials on Thursday. The Commission deployed 55 teams to 1,007 polling stations in highly contested constituencies and those that have seen the most complaints from political parties, voters, and candidates.

The assessment, which did not cover Tigray, uncovered a number of glaring issues that sparked debate and contention from the meeting’s participants, which included NEBE officials, regional security heads, police chiefs, and representatives of the Political Parties Joint Council.

Among the concerning findings was the establishments in police stations, inside military camps, and alongside liquor stores.

“Some polling stations are in areas prohibited by law. In some areas, more than one polling station is duplicated. Some polling stations are located where they cannot be seen clearly,” said Mekdes Amenu, civil and political rights director at EHRC, who presented the findings.

Election officials argued that some polling stations are sited in police barracks, not police stations. They also stated stations located in and around military camps are legal, and are intended for the use of voters in the ENDF.

As for the liquor store accusations, officials said they were taking measures.

The Commission also found that the location of some polling stations does not match with GPS data provided by the Board, citing such cases in Ambo, West Shewa. Election officials said GPS coordinates are only available for around half of the 49,000 polling stations set to host voters in a few weeks.

The major bone of contention during the meeting, however, was alleged interference from security  and government officials, and members of the ruling party, in election preparations.

“Security forces and members must refrain from involvement in the election process. Government officials must refrain from interfering in the election process,” the Commission recommended based on its findings, though it declined to specify instances of interference.

“We recommended security officials and government officials should refrain from interfering in the election process. But this does not mean they are interfering now. For instance, when the ruling party rallies, some police members might join. That is human nature and individual incidents. We do not include such individual incidents in this report. For instance, in some cases, security officers also might proceed to detain some individuals. At such points, we interfere, explain the issue and tell them to release them. Such issues happen due to lack of awareness,” said Berhanu Adello, EHRC chief. “In general, we are not hiding any findings. There is nothing we hide from the public in fear of anyone. We are not secretive. We will give all evidence of this finding to NEBE, but not to political parties.”

The Commission did, however, note gaps in the equal treatment of political parties, citing opposition party complaints about a lack of resources and access to constituents.

“For instance, EPRP [Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Party] was denied rallies and campaigns in Addis Ababa. EPRP also planned to conduct rallies in 10 other cities and towns, but was denied,” read documents from the presentation.

The Commission notes that the Ethiopian Social Democratic Party’s plans for rallies in Dawro Zone met a similar fate, and so did campaign efforts from the Benishangul People’s Freedom Movement, the Freedom and Equality Party, and ONLF.

Opposition parties also say they are being denied their right to use public spaces.

On the other hand, the report found that the citizens were pushed to join rallies organized by the ruling Prosperity Party in places like Mizan Tepi. 

Election officials say they have facilitated the opposition’s access to public spaces, and attempted to pin the complaints on regional administrations.

The report also noted shortcomings in the participation of civil society organizations (CSOs), 169 of which have been accredited by NEBE to carry out programs on awareness, literacy, and access to information.

“CSOs reported they are unable to conduct election education and civic literacy activities owing to a lack of funding,” said Berhanu, noting the troubles are linked to foreign funding cuts.

The Commission noted that media involvement in the lead up to elections has been limited.

Response from Security Agencies

The heads of several regional peace and security bureaus, police commanders and commissioners, and other senior security officials were present during the discussions on EHRC’s findings.

Kasaye Gemechu of the Oromia peace and security bureau, said there have been “no major problems.”

“We are working hard and making every effort to make sure the election will take place without security problems. We are protecting and facilitating election kits and materials to arrive safely. Citizens have registered freely without fear. We conducted election preparations successfully. On election day, we are working to ensure the vote takes place without security problems,” said Kasaye. “We are also working to make sure all security forces equally serve all parties. We are making sure security forces in Oromia are neutral. So far, there is no major problem.”

Kasaye stated that over 25 million voters registered in Oromia. This figure is half of the over 50 million total voters registered, as per the report.

Zerihun Duguma, from the Oromia Police Commission, had another take.

“Oromia is vast. There are insurgents who are working to make obstacles so that the election does not take place successfully. A command post is working hard to counter these peace forces. There are also social media actors trying to obstruct the election; we are handling them cautiously,” said Zerihun.

EHRC monitoring covered almost all of Oromia, except some parts of Wollega.

Other security officials, including from Addis Ababa, also stated the pre-election process is proceeding peacefully.

“The entire government and the Prosperity Party is working to ensure a peaceful and democratic election,” said Meles Alemu, an executive member of the incumbent and member of the Political Parties Council. “We are ready to act on all the gaps mentioned in the EHRC monitoring findings. All stakeholders must discharge their roles to make the election successful.”

The new framework also expands restrictions on serious crimes, strengthens reconciliation requirements, and introduces stricter procedural standards for pardon applications.

The Directive for the Submission and Granting of Pardon Requests for Convicts replaces a three year old directive which previously governed federal pardon procedures. According to the directive, the reforms are intended to establish a “clear, fair, efficient, and consistent” pardon system while addressing implementation gaps identified in the earlier framework.

One of the directive’s most significant additions is Article 13, which permits the Federal Pardon Board to recommend pardons on a conditional basis. Prisoners who qualify for higher education may receive pardons to pursue their studies, while individuals with special professional skills may be released to continue serving in their professions. The Board may also impose additional conditions it considers necessary to protect public and state interests.

Responding to a question from The Reporter on whether the provision disadvantages prisoners without educational or professional qualifications, Ephrem Abinet, a legal consultant and lawyer, said the primary objective of imprisonment is rehabilitation and reintegration.

“The main goal of putting criminals in correctional facilities is to make them feel remorse about their wrongdoing and reintegrate into society after their release,” Ephrem said, adding that the provision mainly targets young prisoners with university entrance qualifications or ongoing studies who could later contribute professionally to society.

The directive states that conditional pardons must specify obligations beneficiaries are required to fulfill within a set timeframe, while foreign nationals without legal residence permits may receive pardons on the condition that they leave Ethiopia or are deported.

In another major departure from the previous directive, the Board may now recommend revoking pardons if beneficiaries violate imposed conditions without convincing reasons or commit another intentional crime within five years of release.

Ephrem said the new directive also addresses transparency gaps in the previous framework, particularly regarding evidence submission for pardon requests.

“In the previous directive, the correctional facility would simply state whether it opposed or did not oppose the inmate’s pardon,” he said. “The current directive improves this by specifying that the facility provides evidence strictly from an ethical and behavioral standpoint.”

The directive also clearly specifies who may submit pardon requests, including close relatives such as adult and adopted children, and requires proof that court-imposed fines have been paid before applications proceed.

The revised framework further broadens the list of crimes requiring stricter eligibility thresholds. Convicts sentenced for specified serious offenses must serve at least half of their prison term and demonstrate good conduct before becoming eligible to request a pardon.

The directive adds money laundering, crimes against constitutional order, armed rebellion, inciting civil war, aggravated murder, kidnapping, hostage-taking, aggravated robbery or banditry, crimes against historical heritage, and grave treason to the previous list.

“Given the gravity of these crimes, requiring the completion of half the sentence as a prerequisite for a pardon is appropriate,” Ephrem said.

The directive also formally introduces a “recidivist” standard, defining repeat offenders as individuals who intentionally commit another offense within five years after serving a sentence or receiving a pardon for a prior crime punishable by at least six months imprisonment. Absence of recidivism is now explicitly listed as a condition for pardon eligibility.

The new framework additionally places greater emphasis on reconciliation between offenders and victims. Prisoners convicted of homicide, attempted homicide, bodily harm, aggravated robbery causing serious injury or death, and intentional arson causing serious injury or death must now provide written evidence showing reconciliation with victims or victims’ families, or demonstrate genuine but unsuccessful efforts to reconcile.

The directive also formally recognizes traditional reconciliation systems practiced within ethnic and community structures. Under the rules, reconciliation conducted through tribal or community-based systems is acceptable if it includes the consent of victims or victims’ relatives.

Ephrem welcomed the recognition of traditional reconciliation mechanisms but argued the directive should have provided broader standards for proving unsuccessful reconciliation attempts.

“An inmate might find the victim and attempt to compensate them, but the victim may simply refuse. That refusal itself should count as a documented effort,” he said, adding that reconciliation attempts in Ethiopia are often carried out through elders, or shimagle, whose testimony could serve as evidence.

In politically sensitive cases involving crimes against constitutional order, armed rebellion, or inciting civil war, the directive requires written confirmation from the president or head of government of the region where the crime occurred stating that the prisoner’s release is necessary for regional peace and that reconciliation through elders has taken place.

The 16-page strategy identifies Somalia as one of the areas where ISIS remnants and Al-Shabaab continue operations after the collapse of the ISIS caliphate in Iraq and Syria. The document states that surviving extremist networks relocated to parts of Africa and Central Asia following what it describes as failures in counterterrorism policy under former President Joe Biden.

The strategy states that the US has two goals in Africa: preventing jihadist groups from establishing operational bases capable of targeting American interests and responding to attacks against Christian communities by extremist organizations.

Under the framework, the administration plans to maintain what it describes as a “light military footprint” in Africa while requiring regional partners to take greater responsibility for frontline counterterrorism operations.

The US government intends to provide intelligence support, counterterrorism training, surveillance capabilities, and targeted operations against militant networks. The document also states that Washington is rebuilding bilateral counterterrorism relations with African governments and expanding intelligence-sharing arrangements with countries facing threats from ISIS and al-Qaeda affiliates.

“In Africa, we will maintain a light military footprint and expect regional and nearby partners to accept a greater portion of the CT burden, share effective intelligence, and degrade common threats as they arise,” reads the document.

It identifies Somalia, Sudan, Mozambique, the Sahel region, and the Lake Chad Basin as areas facing extremist threats. It also links security cooperation with expanded trade and commercial relations between the United States and African countries.

Washington’s 2026 Counterterrorism Strategy signals a structural shift in the Horn of Africa, mandating regional partners like the Ethiopian National Defense Force (ENDF) and the African Union Support and Stabilization Mission (AUSSOM) mission in Somalia to assume lead responsibility for frontline combat operations

The ENDF currently operates in Somalia under the AUSSOM and through bilateral security agreements with the Somali federal government.

Experts at the Information Network Security Administration (INSA) have tabled a draft proclamation as a framework to guide efforts to curb increasingly frequent cyber threats on Ethiopia’s growing digital visibility of sensitive national data and information.

The ‘Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity Proclamation,’ which has been under legal review at the Ministry of Justice for more than two years, was tabled to Parliament this week.

The legislation comes as more and more of Ethiopian citizens’ data is being uploaded to the cloud via the National ID program, banking and mobile money platforms, electronic procurement process, single window government services and others.

These fast growing databases become more vulnerable to cyber threats as they expand in size. The Administration reported 8,000 cyberattacks on Ethiopia in 2023/4, up from under 100 attacks a year on average two decades ago.

In order to avoid complications during implementation, the proclamation identifies 11 sectors as key areas that should be protected as key infrastructure. At present, INSA primarily focuses on cybersecurity relating to financial institutions and electric power infrastructure.

The draft proposes to expand its purview to include transport, health, education, water, agriculture, trade, government services, and communications.

If approved, institutions categorized as critical infrastructure will be subject to periodic cybersecurity audits by INSA. Both public and private institutions can qualify as critical infrastructure, which the draft defines as “any infrastructure or institution the disruption or compromise of which due to a cyberattack would have a significant negative impact on national security or national interests.”

A key provision added in the final drafting stages proposes to allow third-party IT firms to provide cyber security services and conduct these audits in addition to INSA itself.

However, third-party service providers will need to fulfil several stringent requirements and pass a screening process before they can offer their services.

Anyone who provides cybersecurity services without proper licensing will face penalties of up to two million Birr, while repeat offenders can be fined three times as much, according to the draft.

Lawmakers are currently reviewing the proclamation, which is widely expected to be ratified in the near future.

The group emphasized that the window for saving these detainees is rapidly closing as the kingdom accelerates its use of the death penalty.

The warning, published in an April 28 report, follows the recent execution of three Ethiopian nationals who were caught transporting khat, a stimulant plant that is legal and culturally significant in Ethiopia but strictly prohibited under Saudi law.

According to the findings, many of those currently on death row faced brief group trials without legal representation or adequate translation services.

HRW maintains that these imminent executions highlight a systemic failure to provide due process to vulnerable migrants fleeing conflict and poverty.

Based on the information extracted from three informed sources, the executed individuals were refugees, having fled from Tigray during the two year’s armed conflict in the region, citing the dire situation in the region still continues.

According to the report, human traffickers operating in the area forced migrants to carry the plant [khat] from Yemen into Saudi Arabia as a condition of facilitating the journey.

The report added that it has documented a wide range of human rights abuses against migrants taking the same route for years.

Denouncing executions for drug-related offenses as “incompatible” with international human rights law, the group urged Saudi authorities to reinstate a moratorium on the death penalty for such crimes, emphasizing the executions represent a clear violation of international legal standards.

“Saudi Arabia’s use of the death penalty is tied to systemic due process violations,” said Nadia Hardman, senior refugee and migrant rights researcher at Human Rights Watch. “The death sentences should be commuted and the death penalty abolished.”

While demanding the Saudi officials to immediately commute the death sentences issued to Ethiopian migrants, it also calls for the Ethiopian diplomatic representatives in the kingdom to intervene urgently before authorities move forward with the judicial proceedings.

The surge in irregular migration from Ethiopia reflects a broader crisis that extends far beyond the findings of the HRW report.

According to reports from the International Organization for Migration (IOM) and the Mixed Migration Centre (MMC) published in early 2026, irregular migration from Ethiopia—particularly through the “Eastern Route”—has reached record-breaking levels of volume and risk.

The reports stated that the Eastern Route, which connects the Horn of Africa to the Gulf States via Yemen, remains the most active and dangerous migration corridor for Ethiopians.

It added that outgoing movements along this route increased by approximately 18 percent, rising from 430,200 in 2024 to 506,600 by the end of 2025.

The organizations also documented a record-breaking surge in deaths and disappearances during 2025. This total, according to the reports, reached 922 individuals, nearly doubling the 558 fatalities reported in 2024.

The reports noted that migrants predominantly originate from the Amhara, Oromia, and Tigray regions, which are also the primary destinations for those forcibly returned from abroad.

State Minister Mihretu Shanko (PhD) presented the nominees and the government’s assessment to Parliament, stating that the appointees possess a strong understanding of the organization’s mandate and have demonstrated the professional capacity and work ethic required to provide effective leadership.

Lawmakers endorsed the appointments, noting that the nominees have made meaningful contributions to national development and are well-qualified to guide the institution.

The House approved the board under with a unanimous vote.

The newly appointed board members are: Blaine Mamo (Chairperson), Fedila Biya, Tesfaye Zewde, Mohammed Kassa, Afework Redae, Asma Reddy, Yonas Bekele, and Isayas Casa (PhD).

The appointees were sworn in before Parliament following the approval.

The assessment comes as preparations for the seventh national elections enter their final phase against a backdrop of discontent among opposition parties, glaring security concerns, logistical hurdles, and budgetary concerns.

Melatwork Hailu, NEBE chair, had indicated the taskforce will include representatives from political parties, civil society organizations, and election observers operating in areas identified as security-sensitive.

The teams are tasked with assessing conditions on the ground and providing recommendations aimed at ensuring a safer electoral environment in regions facing heightened risk, according to election officials.

Opposition parties and the NEBE have been in disagreement over official security assessments. Last month, the Board published a map portraying the vast majority of constituencies as safe and ready to conduct voting. Opposition figures responded by saying they have not been able to field candidates or conduct campaigns in many of the constituencies the Board had highlighted in green on the map.

Meanwhile, election officials say more than 50 million citizens (27.4 million men and 23.1 women) have registered to vote on June 1, 2026. Five million of them registered online.

A total of 195,000 electoral administrators have been deployed nationwide, and around 70,000 of them have already received payments totaling one billion Birr, according to the NEBE. They are deployed at nearly 49,000 polling stations across 614 constituencies.

The government has allocated 10 billion Birr for the election process; however, officials stated that the amount is insufficient under current operational demands, prompting a formal request for additional funding, which is still pending a response.

Political parties have received a total of 81 million Birr to facilitate their engagement in the election process, and the Board confirmed that 37 media organizations have been accredited for election coverage, with 1,131 journalists issued official press badges.

In addition, 169 civil society organizations have been registered as election observers. International observation missions from the African Union and IGAD are also expected to monitor the electoral process.

Officials acknowledged that electoral activities have faced challenges in parts of Oromia, Amhara, Harar, and Sidama regions, where some polling sites were disrupted due to alleged irregular voter registration practices.

Nationwide, 22 polling stations have been closed following reported irregularities.

Regarding Tigray, officials say they have no open communication lines with the TPLF, which itself is no longer qualified to take part in an election.

With preparations accelerating, officials confirmed that the 7th national election will be held in less than six weeks, marking the final stretch toward election day as the newly announced security review committee prepares to begin its assessment work next week.

The new package will bring the EU’s total support to successive AU-led missions to Somalia to nearly 2.8 billion since 2007. The AU is currently leading the Support and Stabilization Mission in Somalia, which replaced ATMIS in January 2025 and has since been extended to last through 2026.

The funding will primarily cover troop allowances for personnel deployed in Somalia, as well as non-lethal equipment and related services, according to a statement from the EU.

Despite the EU package, AUSSOM struggles with a persistent funding gap, creating significant arrears in payments to Troop Contributing Countries (TCCs), including Uganda, Kenya, Ethiopia, and Djibouti. TCCs are expected to deploy up to 11,800 uniformed personnel, inclusive of 680 police personnel, to AUSSOM until December 2026.

The estimated budget for the year leading up to June 2026 period is approximately USD 190 million.  

The funding constraints are compounded by a resurgence of Al-Shabaab militants, and while the mission has secured some donor funding (including from the UK, AU Peace Fund, China, Japan, and South Korea), it is not enough to cover the full operational costs

Although the EU package provides short-term relief, the mission’s long-term financial situation remains precarious as it relies on fragmented, non-sustainable funding. 

The EPF was established in March 2021 for the financing of actions under the common foreign and security policy to prevent conflicts, preserve peace and strengthen international security and stability.

The EU remains the largest direct contributor to successive missions in Somalia led by the AU. The first of these was the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), which began in January 2007 and was supposed to last just six months.

AMISOM remained in place, with Ethiopia joining in 2014, until April 2022, when it was replaced by the AU Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS).

ATMIS ended in December 2024.

Massad Boulos, US senior advisor for Arab and African Affairs, has indicated the Trump administration’s intentions to begin lifting sanctions on Eritrea, according to an article published in The Wall Street Journal this week.

The developments come as Yemen’s Iran-allied Houthis threaten to close the Red Sea’s Bab Al-Mandeb strait to maritime traffic in response to the US-Israeli war in Iran.

The plans are not yet official, but Boulos told Egyptian President Abdel Fattah El Sisi on Monday that the US would begin lifting sanctions on Eritrea soon, The Wall Street Journal quoted US officials as saying.

El-Sisi is facilitating talks between Isaias Afwerki’s government and Washington, which has maintained targeted financial sanctions on the ruling PFDJ and other Eritrean entities since 2021, largely due to Asmara’s involvement in the two-year war in Tigray.

Although Eritrea has a long history of sanctions, the UN and European Union (EU) lifted their embargoes on the country in 2018, amid what appeared then to be a normalization of relations with Ethiopia and other neighboring countries.

Normalization, however, did not last long. The governments of Abiy Ahmed and Isaias Afwerki had a falling out in the immediate aftermath of the Tigray war, in which the Eritrean military took an active role and is reported to have committed grave rights violations.

In October 2024, Eritrea, Egypt, and Somalia forged an alliance aimed at bolstering regional security and checking Ethiopian influence. The agreement came as Ethiopia and Somalia were caught in a dispute over the former’s maritime access-for-recognition agreement with breakaway Somaliland.

Egypt has since deployed troops in Somalia, while the Ethiopian government’s push for sea access via the port of Asseb has pushed tensions with Eritrea to the brink of another conflict.