He calls for new regional elections, questions the legal standing of the TPLF, critiques the structure and inclusiveness of the Interim Administration, and reflects on the political consequences of the Pretoria Agreement.

The interview also explores shrinking civic space in Tigray, media restrictions, alleged tactical alignments with Eritrea, and the broader geopolitical tensions shaping the Horn of Africa. EXCERPTS:

The Reporter: How do you assess the current situation in Tigray and the region’s political condition after the war?

Haftu Kiros: Tigray today is a region whose condition is clear to everyone. There is very little hidden about what is happening there. Historically, Tigray has been known as a place distinguished by adherence to law and constitutional order, especially in implementing systems of governance. It was also known as a region where people of different faiths coexisted with mutual respect.

The people traditionally possessed a strong sense of statehood, constitutional culture, and civic morality. However, despite that history, what we see today in Tigray is a situation dominated by lawlessness. It has become a place where any gangster can come and claim governmental authority, confiscate citizens’ property, violate their rights, or declare territory as their own. If there is any place today where the fundamental rights of people are openly violated, it is Tigray.

At this point, Tigray has become a place where it is difficult to think confidently about tomorrow because people are uncertain about today’s reality. Tigrayan youth are leaving the region almost entirely. Except for those who may have no means of escape, very few people genuinely wish to remain living in Tigray under the current conditions.

What is your view of the 2020 Tigray regional election and the legitimacy of the government formed through it?

Elections were held in Tigray in 2012 E.C., and I was personally there at the time. If I remember correctly, around 2.8 million Tigrayans participated in that election. I considered that election legitimate because it was conducted constitutionally.

The Ethiopian Constitution clearly states that citizens must renew the mandate of a governing authority every five years through elections. That is the constitutional contract between citizens and government. Therefore, any government elected through that process receives a mandate only for five years. There is no constitutional provision allowing that mandate to continue indefinitely or to be renewed automatically without another election.

The conflict that later emerged in Tigray had many causes. It is difficult to identify a single fundamental cause because there were political, economic, and security-related problems both nationally and within Tigray itself. However, disputes surrounding governance legitimacy and elections became one of the immediate causes of the conflict.

What is your interpretation of the Pretoria Agreement and its political implications?
The Pretoria Agreement was signed only after immense destruction had already occurred, after many Ethiopian and Tigrayan youths had died, and after extensive property damage. The fundamental result and purpose of the agreement was peace—stopping the war and ending hostilities. Beyond that, it did not create an entirely new political arrangement.

In my view, the agreement effectively dissolved the government that had been elected in 2012 E.C. There is no such thing as a government being stored somewhere for four or five years and later “reactivated.” Sometimes even the TPLF itself refers to the matter as “unfinished” or “suspended” work, but I do not understand that characterization.

A governmental mandate is limited to five years. There is no constitutional mechanism that allows a government to pause its authority and later resume it after years have passed. Therefore, it is not possible to say that the government elected in 2012 E.C. can now simply be restored or reactivated.

As far as I understand, some people wanted to extend the TPLF’s mandate by another five years, but the question is: until when would that continue? The election was held six years ago. The political context has now completely changed.

What should happen politically in Tigray now?
What should happen now is very clear: a new election must be conducted in Tigray.

Even if we assume that the Pretoria Agreement never existed, the legal mandate of the previous administration has already expired. Therefore, constitutionally, a fresh election is necessary.

An election is not merely a formality or a procedural exercise. Elections are meant to capture new political voices, new alternatives, and the evolving interests of the people. Over the course of five years, major socioeconomic and political transformations take place, especially in a country like Ethiopia.

Generational changes also occur. Young people who were not eligible to vote five years ago are now voters. That means new political voices have emerged. Elections at both the federal and regional levels are supposed to reflect these changing realities and allow the public’s evolving interests and political preferences to be heard.

You have argued that Tigray’s current political structure no longer reflects public opinion. Why do you believe the existing administration lacks legitimacy and representation?

Whether at the federal or regional level, elections are meant to hear new political voices, alternatives, and the interests of the people; they are not merely procedures.

Let me state one fact. I was formerly the administrator of the Southern Tigray Zone, before I was forced out at gunpoint. I was literally removed under the barrel of a gun. Prior to that, I was serving there.

At the time, there were 16 representatives from that zone. How many of them are still participating now? Fewer than four; definitely fewer than four. As far as I know, only two are still there. The remaining 12 elected public representatives have either been replaced by other individuals, and that is precisely why I said lawlessness exists. They can appoint or select whomever they want—it doesn’t matter—but it is not the voice of the people. They are simply filling seats with individuals to occupy positions.

I am certain that if we examine the other zones, the situation is no better. First of all, Tigray currently has no rule of law and no functioning system. If there is any region today where someone can arrive carrying a gun and strip you of your rights through force, it is Tigray.It saddens me deeply.

What is your assessment of the Tigray Interim Administration and its ability to function independently?
Even from the beginning, the Interim Administration was never an independent institution. That was one of our main criticisms. According to the Pretoria Agreement, the Interim Administration was supposed to be inclusive. It was meant to incorporate different political voices and stakeholders.

But the reality on the ground was different. The Interim Administration was not inclusive at all. In fact, the same group—the TPLF—completely dominated it. For example, if you were to tell Debretsion today to continue in power, there would be nothing difficult about simply continuing with the same cabinet that exists under the current Interim Administration. That is because the Interim Administration itself functioned like a puppet structure from the start.

What I mean is that it was the TPLF leadership that determined the cabinet. They would say, “appoint this person as deputy,” and it would happen; “appoint that person as bureau head,” and it would happen. So even previously, the Interim Administration was never truly alive or independent, and now its weaknesses have become even more apparent.

Was this also the case during Getachew Reda’s presidency?

Not entirely. It is true that even during that period the group created many difficulties. However, during Getachew’s time, there were many new developments inside Tigray. For example, there was greater freedom of speech. Media outlets expanded significantly. Leaders could be criticized, evaluated, and questioned publicly. Different sectors could openly discuss issues. These were developments that had not existed under the previous system in Tigray.

Previously, such things were simply not allowed. Power was concentrated within the TPLF central committee and executive committee–and I say this as someone who was also part of the TPLF Central Committee myself. That is where the problems began.

When you are a leader in public administration, you are supposed to be a servant of the people. I have said this before: some people think being a president is something grand. It is not. Literally, being a president means carrying the people’s chair. It means serving the public and delivering services to society. Before Getachew, the system did not function in that spirit.

So during Getachew’s period, there were meaningful changes. But now, the media outlets that had newly emerged and opened up have all relocated to Addis Ababa because they were told there would be “zero tolerance.” Most independent media have left. The only outlets remaining there now are DimtsiWeyane and Television Tigray, which function as instruments of the TPLF.

That said, even during Getachew’s presidency, I cannot say the administration was inclusive to the extent it should have been. There were signs and indications of change, yes, but I would not describe it as fully inclusive. Nor can I say it was fully functional. From the lower levels up to the top leadership, the institutional structure was still not operating at the level it was supposed to.

Ethiopia is located in a highly turbulent region marked by proxy conflicts and shifting alliances. There are also discussions surrounding historical ties between the TPLF and Eritrea, as well as what some describe as emerging regional alignments. At the same time, the TPLF appears to send mixed signals, on one hand expressing willingness to negotiate with the federal government, while on the other advancing narratives that seem to regionalize the issue beyond Ethiopia. What is your assessment of these developments?

What you said is true. First of all, we need to clarify what kind of force this actually is. For that matter, I do not even call it the TPLF anymore, because the TPLF is no longer a legally recognized political organization. It no longer has legal standing. They may claim to be legal, but they are not, and that is precisely why I say lawlessness exists in Tigray today.

Fundamentally, we are one country. I believe Tigray is a regional state within Ethiopia, and Ethiopia is its country. Tigray is part of the federation. Since we are governed under a federal system, every region operates within that framework. Even if the system were unitary rather than federal, Ethiopia would still be one country and Tigray would remain part of it.

When the TPLF was a legal political actor and occupied a strong position within Ethiopia’s political order, it operated under the Constitution adopted at that time. That constitutional framework legally defined the political system. But now, they are no longer operating within that constitutional framework.

Under the Constitution, there are institutions established at the national level, and every regional state is part of those institutions. The Pretoria Agreement itself also says governance should proceed according to law and the Constitution. Some political ideas were included in the agreement, but fundamentally it is centered on constitutional order and legality. That is where legitimacy comes from. One cannot simply stand up and declare oneself a legal organization.

Whether it is a political organization or even a business organization, legitimacy in Ethiopia comes through Ethiopian law and legal procedures. What currently exists in Tigray does not derive its legitimacy from that framework. That is why I refer to the TPLF as a “group.”

You seem to suggest that the group now views itself as operating outside Ethiopia’s constitutional framework. Why do you believe that?

What this group is doing now reflects a mindset in which Ethiopia, a country it once embraced while it held strong political influence, is now being treated almost like a neighboring state rather than its own country.

The Ethiopian public needs to understand this clearly. In the thinking of this group today, Ethiopia is viewed as a neighbor, while Tigray is being treated as though it were already a sovereign state.

One reason for this is the statements they themselves have made. They have said they have “suspended” relations with the federal government, while simultaneously saying, “if the federal government wants to talk to us, we are ready.” There are many contradictions in these positions.

This group currently lacks legal legitimacy. Political authority must come from a legitimate legal body, and political power ultimately originates from the people. The TPLF’s authority today no longer comes from the people.

Even the so-called regional council currently operating in Tigray is illegal. I have already explained how people are inserted into the council arbitrarily rather than through lawful representation. The group claims legal status both as a governing body and as a political organization, but where does that legality come from?

You also raised concerns about the group’s external engagements and regional posture. What specifically worries you?

This issue goes beyond internal politics. One cannot simply declare statehood overnight. Sovereignty involves international legal and diplomatic dimensions.

What the TPLF is effectively doing now is behaving as though Tigray can independently suspend relations with the federal government and function as a separate entity. But foreign policy is a matter of state sovereignty; it is the responsibility of a country, not a regional administration.

Some TPLF elites attempt to frame Tigray’s situation through comparisons with Somaliland, but I do not believe Tigray should be viewed through a Somaliland lens. Tigray must be seen through the lens of Ethiopia.

Historically, invasions into Ethiopia have largely come through the northern corridor, and the people of Tigray have historically fought and sacrificed in defense of Ethiopian sovereignty and identity. Yet now, the TPLF is effectively telling the people that Tigray may not continue within Ethiopia if the group decides otherwise.

The group now signals that it can simultaneously maintain relations with Eritrea, Sudan, Egypt, and others, while also negotiating with the Ethiopian federal government whenever it chooses.

What is your view of the alleged alignment between the TPLF and Eritrea despite the destruction caused during the war?

When we observe current developments, there appears to be some form of alignment emerging between the TPLF and the Eritrean government. As both an Ethiopian and a Tigrayan, this deeply saddens me.

During the conflict, I myself was a combatant. Tigray experienced immense destruction during the war. I do not say this to compare suffering, but serious abuses and destruction occurred in Tigray. Those responsible, whether the TPLF itself, the federal government, Eritrea, or any other actor, should all be held accountable.

However, I do not believe any external actor caused more destruction in Tigray than Eritrea did. That is why I find the current relationship so troubling.

Even those advocating for the current alignment admit privately that the relationship is tactical rather than genuine. Their reasoning is essentially that the alliance with Eritrea exists only as long as it serves the purpose of weakening the federal government and influencing power in Addis Ababa. Beyond that, they themselves believe Eritrea would not remain aligned with them permanently.

Even Eritrea’s own history does not support the idea of a stable or lasting alliance of this kind.

The region of vast plain land with approximately seven million people still struggles with accessibility, droughts, and other climate-related problems, but conditions appear to have improved markedly from the insecurity and instability of previous decades. The region also hosts major natural gas and fertilizer production projects positioned to play a key role in the government’s development ambitions.

As the country prepares to head to the polls, The Reporter’s Ashenafi Endale sat down with Mustafe to get his take on the region’s progress and future plans. The wide-ranging conversation touches on development, security, investment, elections, relations with Somaliland, the region’s role in Ethiopia’s pursuit for maritime access, and other pertinent topics. EXCERPTS:

The Reporter: A large number of public projects are underway in towns, villages, and cities across the Somali Regional State. How do you evaluate the peace dividend?

President Mustafe Omer: After the 2018 political change, we primarily focused on ensuring peace and then developing infrastructure and critical public provisions, which were completely missing at the time. Because the Somali region is so vast and lowland, developing infrastructure and providing basic services is very expensive.

When we came to office eight years ago, only 20 percent of the Somali population had access to water. Since then, we have developed over 360 underground water wells. Dams, reservoirs, and pipelines that connect villages and households have been developed; for areas where there is very scarce rain and where underground water is not available.

In the health sector, there were only nine hospitals in the region. Most of them have been serving for the past 50 years. We have renovated them and expanded them. We have built 21 new hospitals since we came to power. In general, we have over 30 hospitals now.

In the education sector, we have built over 700 new schools, of which over 100 are secondary schools. We built 12 boarding schools.

Several rural and urban roads have been developed to connect not only communities but also economic value chains and business areas. These are strategically selected roads for livestock markets. But because the Somali region is so vast, the roads built so far are relatively few.

Since Somali is mostly pastoralist, the shift to farming was very minor at 350,000 hectares when the political change took place in Ethiopia. Imagine, the Somali region has over 10 million hectares of arable land. Last year, 1.6 million hectares of land was cultivated and our plan is to reach two million hectares this year.

In general, there are significant improvements in the life of the people of the region. But the pillar of all these achievements is peace and stability. The private sector, especially the service sector, is highly active now. Hospitality, trade, and agro-processing are top investment sectors now. Over the past years, over 70 billion Birr in investment has been injected into the region by the private sector.

In a nutshell, the Somali region is a national model now. In terms of human rights, the region has substantially improved the bad situation before the political change. There is no public discontent in Somali now. The public can ask, demand anything and hold the government accountable. Regarding the political space, ONLF was the leading opposition party in our region. There are some five regional parties including ONLF. Including national parties, there are 12 parties running in the Somali region for the upcoming election. With ONLF, we have resolved disagreements and geopolitical discontents peacefully. Hence, there is no conflict or instability in the region.

What can you tell us about your administration’s efforts in terms of resource mapping, attracting more private capital, and ensuring productivity and economic transformation?

The government’s role is creating an enabling environment for the private sector to come. The government cannot replace the private sector and bring the capital on its own. Peace, stability and property rights are ensured in Somali. These are key elements for private investors. Our primary work is ensuring nobody should be worried about his life’s safety, and his property. All these are guaranteed in our region.

The rest is promoting the resources and investment potential in the region. We are doing that. Over 4,000 investors have come to the region since we took office, with over 70 billion Birr. This has substantially improved the region’s GDP.

The other thing we are providing is incentive provisions. Investors are seeking to get involved mainly in agriculture, health, education and others. We are providing land and other support. In and around Jijiga, we even provide industrial zones to minimize the initial costs of investors.

Natural gas and fertilizer production projects in the region are said to be making good progress. How will the Somali region and communities in and around the gas deposits in Calub benefit from these projects? Will they receive anything more than the seven percent royalty fee dictated by law?

The Somali region will get its fair share of the profit to be generated by the projects once they are finalized. The profit proceeds are first split between the federal and the producing region. Then the federal pie is again divided to all regions. Hence, the producing region benefits in two ways.

The proclamation gives around fifty percent to the producing region. This will be very huge. In terms of injecting more capital, rebooting the region’s budget, creating jobs, innovation and technology, and infrastructure developments; the natural gas and fertilizer projects will be a big game changer for the Somali region.

Apart from the fertilizer, the natural gas will also generate 1,000MW of electricity. The benefits from these projects will radically change livelihoods in the region and spur development.

During the EPRDF era, certain regional states like Somali, were widely considered as being marginalized and underdeveloped. Do you think this still holds true?

Under the previous regime, the Somali region was not part of the federal decision making process. We were excluded. Past agriculture policies marginalized developing regions. If you go to South Omo, Benishangul, or Afar, they are no different from us. Despite the Somali region having vast resources, the past regime could not capitalize on this. Hence, marginalized states like Somali were underdeveloped.

Due to this marginalization, the sense of Ethiopian nationalism was also loose in the past. We have done a lot of work to reverse this. Now, there is huge aspiration and eagerness in the people of the Somali region. The interest of all Somali now is how to link and integrate with the rest of Ethiopia’s economy. Somali people currently ask what is our share and role in the national economy? They are also asking why there are no industrial parks in the Somali region. All public questions are now linked to development.

Before, there was an attitude that our people were marginalized based on their ethnic identity. Today, our region’s only question is development. There is no other question.

Do you believe you achieved this success as an individual leader or as a senior member of the ruling Prosperity Party? If it is the latter, why hasn’t the peace dividend we see in the Somali region been replicated in other regional states?

I believe the political change is positively impacting all regional states and city administrations. Every part of Ethiopia has benefited from the change. Be it in urban development, industry, or agriculture; all are benefiting. There are regions who are performing better than the Somali region.

But the changes and progress achieved in the Somali region in the past several years were not mine alone. The leadership, from federal to local governments, have worked in unity. The commitment is huge. I might have discharged my duties well, but this success has been realized because all federal and regional leadership have discharged their duties. They work daily. We do it collectively. But for every failure, I take responsibility.

Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed is the leading contributor behind our success. The PM allowed us to work freely. For any challenge and question we raise as government and as a party, the PM provides solutions and support. The PM also provided the leadership to onboard mega projects worth USD 10 billion to the Somali region. The PM also initiated and implemented the Shebelle Resort. This is the first major tourism destination in Somali, and the PM did this to reboot tourist flow to the region. The PM took risks, and acted under the entrepreneurial state concept.

Unless the government takes initiative and starts such projects, the private sector cannot take steps. So in general, the successes have been achieved by all of us.

Recently, the exiled ONLF wing has been threatening to start an armed struggle. The recent release of the former regional president from prison, who was convicted for crimes, is also creating certain narratives. Do you think the revival of such narratives can reverse the progress in the Somali region? Do you condone the release of Abdi Illey?

I have no belief that anyone will drag back the Somali region into another chapter of conflict. No one will return the Somali region to conflict, because there is no Somali person who wants conflict. Different forces have tried in the past several years, but none of them succeeded. In the past seven and a half years, several attempts were made to mobilize the public to get involved in conflict. All of it failed, because the people well understand the value of peace.

Regarding ONLF, from the beginning, there were certain elements based in the diaspora. These diaspora-based ONLF members are very extremist. Most of the ONLF members who were on the ground are integrated into the government. They are now active in agriculture, business, and supporting government security forces. There is a good understanding with them.

I do not expect any such efforts to cause conflict in the region again.

Regarding former Somali leaders, in relation to the upcoming seventh national election, they are trying to cause some issues here and there. They completely deny all the work done in the Somali region. They intentionally paint a bad image of the peace dividends and development progress Somali has seen since the political change in the country.

In general, none of these have substantial power on the ground to threaten the current administration.

The seventh national election is less than two months away. In the meantime, the national dialogue and transitional justice processes are underway. All of them have certain overlaps. How and which initiative can effectively address the challenges the country has been facing, including conflict?

The national dialogue is hoped to bridge differences on major national topics. That will bring everyone together to a shared consensus. For instance, all thoughts and inputs from all regional states are collected. Some of them are polarized. When such a stark difference occurs on a certain agenda, it will be resolved through referendum, elections, or other alternatives. Not all Ethiopian are expected to have the same position and attitude on everything. That cannot happen in the world. But on the main national interest agendas, there is not much difference.

It is ethnic issues and political views that are dividing the elite. The elite argue Ethiopia should be led by this or that idea. The division is among the elite. The Ethiopian population is always united, it is the elite who is divided. The public in every part of Ethiopia is always one. Therefore, the national dialogue will resolve the differences among the elites and bring together everyone. Once a roadmap of the elite is drawn from that national dialogue, then it will be simple for all to come together. Any polarized view will be resolved based on that elite roadmap.

In any part of the world, there are extremists and outliers. In Ethiopia too, I don’t expect everyone to happily accept the outcomes of the national dialogue. But the critical mass will reach consensus through the national dialogue. We don’t have a very deep national division in Ethiopia, for that matter. Political sabotage, extremism, and power interest are being used as instruments for people to kill each other. Except for these, the country is in a very stable, progressive scenario.

The necessity of transitional justice is never questionable in Ethiopia. It is crucial to cleanse any misdeeds. Commissions will be established to lead the transitional justice process.

How do you see the growing presence of Turkiye and Egypt in neighboring Somalia affecting Ethiopia? What are the opportunities and advantages for Ethiopia’s national interests in this scenario of shifting geopolitical alliances?

Foreign powers are competing in our region of the Horn. The primary impact of these foreign forces is disrupting the peace and stability of the Horn region. This is the disadvantage. These foreign forces work to weaken Ethiopia, not to strengthen Ethiopia. It could be deploying proxy armed forces or disrupting trade routes and ports. These foreign forces are working to affect Ethiopia’s national interest, they also lobby other forces to affect Ethiopia. There are no major impacts on the Somali region so far but they are making efforts. At different times, these foreign forces are coming in the form of Al-Shabaab, ISIS and other terrorist forces to affect Somali and the national interest of Ethiopia. But they are neutralized while trying to enter the Somali region. There are still efforts to create ethnic and religious clashes in Somali. The extremists also use media campaigns.

Ethiopia is intent on gaining sea access. What is your take on this?

Having sea access is a huge benefit for Ethiopia. It will be a big pillar, a big legacy of this generation. Ethiopia already has a huge population and economy in the region. With sea access, it will be very influential. We already have a strong state and low corruption compared to other African countries. Having sea access on top of all this will make Ethiopia a very strong economy. As a region, we are ready to provide any support to the sea access pursuit.

What is your take on Somaliland efforts to secure statehood recognition? How will it affect the Somali region?

Our region has a good relationship with Somaliland. Most of our trade goes via Somaliland. The northern part of the Somali region has especially strong relations with Somaliland via trade in livestock and other goods.

Any good thing that comes Somaliland’s way will be good for the Somali region too. However, if other forces who oppose Somaliland recognition resort to conflict, they will try to expand the conflict to the Somali region as well. We already have seen these signs. Two years ago, there were cross border conflicts and clashes. Since it is Foreign Ministry that works on Ethiopia’s foreign policy, our role is providing information to the Ministry. Our main role as a region is preventing cross-border conflicts from happening. We are doing that.

Many still question the ideology of the Prosperity Party, and some argue it is unclear what its plans are for the next term if it wins a majority in June’s elections. What can you tell us about this?

The Prosperity Party has published its manifesto for the upcoming election. Regarding politics, PP aims to bridge the extremist ideologies in Ethiopia’s politics. Our way is the middle road. There are political forces in Ethiopia who run on extremist ethnic politics. On the other end sit political forces who consider ethnic politics as a danger. PP aims to close that extremism.

Our primary and ultimate goal is strengthening national unity. PP has done a lot on this so far. For instance, before, the Adwa Victory was seen as a source of conflict. Today, Adwa is celebrated together by all Ethiopians. It is seen as a victory of all Ethiopians.

PP has done a lot on ethnic politics, to close the differences. But now, we are focusing on strengthening national unity. The key issue is we must work hard on patriotism. Democracy is critical for Ethiopia. Regarding elections and peaceful power transition, there were huge deficits in the past half a century. We must lead these with law, and instill constitutionalism.

PP is working to ensure more opposition party members will be part of the government and work with the government in the next term. The presence of different views in the governance organs is crucial for nation building and development.

Professor Berhanu Nega of Ezema is working with the government. But Berhanu and Ezema still have different ideologies and perspectives from PP. However, both are working for the national interest. This is what would become a culture. Whatever difference we have, we must work together for the interest of our country.

The national dialogue has identified agendas on which different groups have different views and positions. The initiative will draw solutions for these disagreements. Then everyone, every political force, despite any difference, will be able to work together for the benefit of the country.

Regarding economic development, PP has clear principles. We have managed to reduce national debts. Ethiopia is paying its debts. Despite the successes, there can be ups and downs. Due to our economic reform, Ethiopia has departed from dependence on debt and aid. We made the country self-sufficient in forex, food security, and others. Exports especially have grown by a large margin. This is a major outcome of the economic reform. The economic growth sources are diversified to several sectors like manufacturing, tourism, mining, ICT, and others. In social aspects, health, education and other provisions have substantially increased.

The housing problem is identified as a critical challenge. Therefore, one of our next big tasks is in maximizing housing provisions. Several more projects are already in the pipeline currently.

But the ultimate role of PP is protecting Ethiopia’s sovereignty, ensuring that Ethiopia’s national interest agendas like sea access are well accepted among the international community.

The signing represents a significant renewal of a ten-year partnership, aligning directly with the aspirations of Agenda 2063 and the collective vision of “The Africa We Want.”

Following the ceremony, the momentum shifted to a high-level roundtable titled “Fostering a Culture of Transformative Dialogue in the Africa Region.” The discussion convened senior AUC officials alongside representatives from KAICIID’s Board of Directors and host country Member States to explore practical pathways for regional stability.

The collaboration traces its roots back to the original 2013 agreement, a foundation that has allowed both organizations to revitalize the AU Interfaith Dialogue Forum. Over the years, this forum has moved across the continent—from Nigeria in 2016 and Chad in 2018 to Rwanda in 2023 and Namibia in 2025. By creating this structured continental space, the partnership has bridged the gap between religious leaders, policymakers, and civil society, allowing them to engage directly with Africa’s most pressing peace and security challenges.

At the ceremony, KAICIID’s Acting Secretary-General, Ambassador António de Almeida Ribeiro, emphasized that lasting peace and security in Africa require more than just political frameworks. By partnering with the AUC, KAICIID aims to empower religious leaders and local communities who possess the trust and influence necessary to drive “real change.”

Ribeiro noted that the collaboration focuses on shifting dialogue from an abstract concept into tangible, community-level outcomes.

Ribeiro is a Portuguese career diplomat with experience across multiple assignments in Europe and outside the region. Over the course of his diplomatic service, he has held responsibilities in several postings and has overseen a range of key departments within Portugal’s foreign ministry.

Since 2022, he has served as the first Deputy Secretary-General of KAICIID. In January 2025, he assumed the role of Acting Secretary-General.

The Reporter’s Abraham Tekle spoke with Ribeiro to get a better understanding of the partnership between KAICIID and the African Union, emphasizing the shift toward a more practical, “transformative” dialogue to address modern challenges. The discussion also highlighted several critical priorities, including empowering religious leaders as essential partners in diplomacy, engaging youth to foster a long-term culture of tolerance, and collaborating on urgent global issues like human rights and combating hate speech.  EXCERPTS:

The Reporter: Could you provide a comprehensive overview of the recent MoU between the AUC and KAICIID?

Ambassador Antonio de Almeida Ribeiro: We have officially renewed our Memorandum of Understanding with the African Union. While our previous agreement was established in 2016, we recognized the necessity of updating it to address emerging challenges and set new objectives that strengthen our partnership. Given that the regional landscape has changed significantly since 2016, our primary goal was to adapt this new memorandum to reflect the current realities in Africa.

Alongside the signing, we organized a roundtable with African Union officials to address critical thematic areas. The discussion also focused on human rights in Africa, conflict prevention, the promotion of dialogue, and strategies for combating hate speech. These were basically the topics that we have discussed in the roundtable.

If we look back at the last decade, what is the single most successful “on-the-ground” impact KAICIID has had in East Africa, and how does this new agreement improve upon it?

Since KAICIID’s inception in 2012, its founders have designated Africa as a high-priority region. From the very beginning, we have engaged with various African nations and the African Union, leading to our first MoU in 2016. Beyond this formal agreement, we have implemented active programs in countries such as Nigeria, the Central African Republic, and Mozambique, while participating in projects across several other nations. Africa remains central to our mission, and this new MoU further reinforces the priority KAICIID places on the continent.

Ambassador, during the signing ceremony, you highlighted the role of the Interreligious Council of Ethiopia (IRCE) in this mission, as part of the “transformative dialogue” model. In reality, Ethiopia is currently navigating complex internal conflicts and administrative restructuring. How can the model move beyond the conference rooms of the AU and practically assist the IRCE in cooling tensions in Ethiopia’s regional states?

We must recognize that approximately 80 percent of the world’s population identifies with a religion. Whether or not they are active practitioners, this connection means that religious leaders hold significant influence both within and beyond their own communities. When an important religious leader speaks, not only the community listens to him, but his message goes very often beyond its own religious community.

This influence is an essential factor to consider, as religious leaders should serve as close partners to policymakers and civil society. Lasting peace cannot be achieved through diplomacy and political talks alone. However, by engaging religious leaders to work alongside governments, we can better prevent conflict and promote a culture of dialogue between different religions and cultures. This is our primary aim in partnering with the African Union. By aligning with the agenda 2063 goals for peace and security, we are ready to undertake joint actions to achieve these objectives across the continent.

How does this concept of transformative dialogue specifically underpin the goals and objectives of the new MoU?

We view dialogue as the tool for societal transformation, that’s why we call it ‘transformative dialogue.’ In the absence of dialogue, tension and conflict often escalate into war. Our primary mission is to promote engagement among diverse religions, communities, and entities as the most effective means of preventing violence. Nobody wants war and we believe it can only be achieved by listening to, understanding, and tolerating one another. This commitment to fostering mutual understanding serves as the core objective of KAICIID.

As part of your mission, you have also met with Ethiopian Fellows Alumni, CSOs, and youth organizations. Looking at the high youth population in Ethiopia, what specific, scalable projects does the renewed MoU offer to ensure these young people are not just “participants” in workshops, but are leading peace initiatives in their own communities?

Youth are undeniably the future of their countries and communities, making their empowerment absolutely crucial. We believe it is essential to establish close contact with them from the outset, as they are the leaders of tomorrow. By working with them now to foster a culture of tolerance and dialogue, we ensure they become the practitioners of these values in the future. This approach aligns closely with Agenda 2063, and our MoU clearly recognizes this objective.

Were there any other significant positive outcomes from the workshops?

We hosted individuals from various regions of the world representing five major religions. As they conclude their program tomorrow, a key highlight of their experience was visiting various religious sites. This is vital because it allows participants from different backgrounds and faiths to gain a deeper understanding of other religions and their practitioners.

This initiative directly promotes dialogue, and I believe it was a highly valuable experience for them to visit the cathedral, the synagogue, and the Grand Mosque in Addis Ababa. We are confident these visits were beneficial for the participants, and it was equally rewarding for us to facilitate these visits and have everyone engaged in this collective experience.

There was also a cultural program and dinner showcasing Ethiopian heritage. So, beyond the symbolic value, how does KAICIID view Ethiopian cultural and religious “soft power” as a tool for broader continental diplomacy?

As a significant form of soft power, we promote platforms and meetings, participate in conferences, and manage our Fellows cohorts. In Europe, for example, we have the Muslim-Jewish Leadership Council (MJLC), which brings together prominent Rabbis and Imams to engage in dialogue. We believe that all religions share a fundamental commonality: the promotion of peace and human dignity.

By recognizing that these values are common to all religions, we establish the common ground necessary to speak with one another and foster meaningful dialogue.

East Africa is currently facing significant displacement driven by both conflict and climate stress. Your roundtable specifically addressed this intersection. What are the mechanics of KAICIID’s intervention here?

While we do not intervene directly in the various conflicts occurring in East Africa, we work through the African Union to support their initiatives. We remain hopeful that this Memorandum of Understanding will further enable us to assist the African Union in its efforts to promote peace throughout these troubled regions in East Africa.

Are you providing the AU with a new policy blueprint for handling climate-induced migration through a religious lens?

Climate change is another of our primary concerns, and we are eager to cooperate with the African Union in this specific area. We hope to support their projects addressing climate change and its consequences, particularly the social tensions that these environmental shifts are causing in so many societies.

Hate speech and divisive digital narratives are a rising concern in the Horn of Africa. The MoU mentions “countering hate speech through trusted local voices.” How will KAICIID identify and protect these voices in environments where the media landscape, especially the social media platform is often polarized?

Through this MoU, we are ready and eager to cooperate with the African Union on projects dedicated to preventing and addressing hate speech. This is a deeply negative phenomenon occurring not only in Ethiopia but in many other countries, including those in Europe. We hope this agreement provides the opportunity to work closely with African Union officials to implement actions that curb hate speech, given its extremely damaging impact on all societies.

What measurable impact or progress should be anticipated within the communities of the 55 member states following the signing of this MoU, particularly regarding the resolution of long-standing backlogs in peace and security initiatives?

We will now begin implementing specific activities through a joint steering committee composed of KAICIID and the African Union. This committee will monitor the various ways we can cooperate across diverse initiatives, maintaining a permanent dialogue with African Union officials. This ongoing collaboration will allow us to continually assess when, where, and how we can most effectively provide our support and cooperation.

With the recent transition in African Union leadership, how do you anticipate the East African perspective will influence the implementation of the MoU over the coming years?

We had a very productive meeting with the recently appointed Deputy Chairperson of the African Union. I have no doubt that under this new leadership, the African Union will continue its vital work across the continent to promote peace and dialogue while actively countering radicalization and extremism.

The protection of “sacred and cultural heritage” is a key pillar of your strategy. In areas of active conflict within East Africa including Ethiopia, how can KAICIID and the AU practically intervene to protect these sites when they are often targeted as part of the conflict?

You can only protect the religious sites if you have the cooperation from the religious leaders. By engaging them in dialogue, we can identify ways to prevent conflict at these locations. Since every faith has a vested interest in preserving its own sacred spaces, this is a shared objective. Promoting intercommunal dialogue fosters mutual respect for all sacred sites, which aligns with the goals of the African Union. We are committed to bringing communities together to protect these sites, especially where they may be at risk.

As human rights issues become increasingly critical both globally and across East Africa, what specific actions or solutions can KAICIID provide to address the atrocities committed in the region?

We believe that human rights are universal values, as all countries have signed the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Therefore, there is no excuse for failing to respect these fundamental rights. Our objective is to promote a culture of respect and tolerance, grounded in the unique dignity of every individual. Religious leaders play a vital role in this effort, as the respect for human life must be a core objective of every faith; it would be contradictory for it to be otherwise.

Regarding the issue of accountability, what are the expectations for both member states and KAICIID to ensure that perpetrators of human rights violations are held accountable?

This is very much related to the internal justice systems of all countries. What we can do from our side is to put all our interests and pressure through the African Union, which is also a very clear goal that they have, to promote human rights and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. It’s something that is valid everywhere in society.

The African Union’s Agenda 2063 is set with a vision of the “Africa we Want”. However, critics often say these high-level MoUs lack the funding to reach the grassroots. How is the implementation of this agreement being financed to ensure it reaches the village level and doesn’t remain an “Addis-only” initiative?

I am convinced that we can promote activities without a financial burden that would make things impossible to materialize. We must utilize our soft power through our various contacts, the meetings we attend, and our partnership with the African Union. While financial aspects can be important, the primary goal is to initiate dialogue and facilitate encounters between people. The most significant contribution we can make is providing governments, religious leaders, and communities with the right environment to foster dialogue among themselves.

Leveraging your expertise, what steps must be taken to achieve lasting peace in Ethiopia and the wider region, particularly to ensure that ongoing conflicts do not undermine sustainable development and prosperity?

I believe that mutual respect is essential; without it, there will never be peace in Ethiopia or any other country in the region. This is not a problem unique to Ethiopia, but our goal is to convince political leaders that collaborating with religious leaders is vital for the well-being of their nations and societies. That is our core message.

As I mentioned, the key is dialogue—specifically, transformative dialogue. The alternative to dialogue is war and tension, which I believe no one truly wants, as it results in disaster for everyone.

Do you have a message you would like to share with our readers?

I was extremely pleased with this visit to Addis Ababa and the meetings we held at the African Union, including the roundtable discussion. It was clear from all our contacts that these officials are deeply committed to making Africa a continent of peace, respect, and human rights. Additionally, hosting our latest cohort of fellows in Addis Ababa at the same time was a very rewarding moment for both me and KAICIID.

I am certain that the fellows found the program extremely valuable, as it allowed them to meet one another, visit sacred sites, and engage in meaningful exchange. It was a wonderful group that achieved a very fruitful dialogue, perfectly representing what I value most: the promotion of dialogue and diversity.

In an interview with The Reporter’s Sara Solomon, Tian Zhenke, general manager at CCCC First Highway Engineering in Ethiopia, discusses the company’s achievements, investment footprint, and long-term plans. He also reflects on efforts toward localization, knowledge transfer through a newly established research and development center, and the importance of cooperation with local firms amid ongoing industry challenges. EXCERPTS:

The Reporter: CCCC is one of the dominant foreign construction firms in Ethiopia. What is your current market share and what are your major achievements?

Tian Zhenke: CCCC has been active here for over 30 years, beginning with the Ring Road project. To date, we have completed more than 120 projects and currently have over 36 ongoing. We have delivered signature infrastructure such as the Addis Ababa–Adama Expressway, Bole Airport expansion projects, the Woldiya–Mekelle railway, and several industrial parks including Mekelle, Semera, Jimma, and Debre Birhan. Additionally, we have completed 70 percent of the municipal roads in Addis Ababa. Given our extensive portfolio, we play a decisive, dominant role in the sector; we are effectively the number one contractor in both the international and domestic markets in Ethiopia. Our contribution to Ethiopia is significant: we currently employ 10,000 people and have employed over 100,000 throughout our history here. These achievements demonstrate that under the Belt and Road Initiative, we are fulfilling our role effectively. Beyond infrastructure, we contribute to Ethiopian society by enhancing people-to-people cooperation, communication, and diplomatic ties between China and Ethiopia.

How many of those 10,000 employees are Ethiopians, as opposed to expatriates?

Of our current 10,000 employees, more than 9,300 are local, meaning our local content stands at a very high 93 percent. We aren’t just hiring laborers; many local employees hold high-level management positions. Our key personnel are Ethiopian. From management down to the labor level, that 93 percent local representation is something we are very proud of. We are blending with your society to the point that CCCC is practically a local contractor already. We aim to become even more localized; for example, my assistant is Ethiopian and is a key member of our team. We are putting localization into practice every day.

Regarding your achievements, have you registered any patents or do you have plans to do so?

We have already registered many intellectual properties. As a large company, this is essential. We must ensure that these high-level technologies are recognized as property that is properly registered and reserved. We handle this as a company in strict accordance with the norms, rules, and regulations of Ethiopia.

How do you secure projects in Ethiopia? Is it through competitive bidding or direct awards?

We are awarded contracts through international competitive tendering processes. We perform our duties and secure our work according to the established rules, norms, and regulations.

The Adey Ababa Stadium project is nearing completion. What are its key features and what contributed to the delays?

This will be a landmark project for both Ethiopia and the East African region. The stadium can accommodate 65,000 people, making it the largest in the country and the region. The project consists of three phases; we are currently in the second phase. Phase One was completed on time, and we are proceeding with phase two according to the schedule. For phase three, we are currently mobilizing resources with great care. We will complete this project and make the country proud. It will be a landmark that the people will feel a great sense of pride in whenever it is mentioned.

Can you provide an estimated completion date for the stadium?

If I am not mistaken, it should be completed sometime next year. That is a detail I would need to confirm specifically.

CCCC inaugurated a research and development center in Addis Ababa in January 2026. How vital is R&D to your operations?

It is critically important. It is a priority for companies like ours because it facilitates technical and knowledge transfer. This center is the practical application of that goal, as it is a technical hub where we will cultivate and train more people. We intend to train individuals in technical issues and modern construction methods. Many will benefit—specifically local employees—as they gain technical talent and capabilities through knowledge transfer. We are fulfilling our promise to the local community here. It is a strong start that we need to enhance to further deepen this type of development.

How much does your company invest annually in this R&D center?

The investment is substantial. When it comes to social contributions, we don’t focus on the cost. We don’t worry about the specific input or assets. We view this as a necessary investment in the cooperation between our two countries and the betterment of Ethiopian society. Helping people develop their skills is precious and, in my opinion, priceless.

Since CCCC began operations in Ethiopia, what is the total investment to date?

It is approximately ten billion dollars, by my estimation.

Generally speaking, are your projects financed by the Chinese government or through other mechanisms?

As a company, CCCC has its own social responsibilities, so we invest our own resources. We intend to stay here for another 100 years and want to continue working with your country, so we invest ourselves. We believe this is necessary and beneficial for Ethiopia and our employees. We embrace these social responsibilities as a company.

Regarding industry challenges like foreign exchange shortages and workforce constraints—how have these affected the industry and your specific operations?

These are indeed common challenges facing the entire construction industry, not just CCCC. However, where there are challenges, there are also opportunities. As a giant international firm, we view these as opportunities to develop and stabilize the industry. We aim to create standards and benchmarks to help the sector become more sustainable. Ultimately, we are moving in a good direction under this country’s leadership. The government and the people are working efficiently, actively, and energetically. This energy is where we see the most opportunity for the industry.

Local companies often worry about being overshadowed by foreign firms. How do you view the competition between local and international players?

In my view, international and domestic contractors should learn from one another. We should foster more cooperation to achieve mutual understanding and a “win-win” outcome. Local contractors have their own unique advantages, while international contractors bring technical advancements. By joining forces, we can overcome difficulties together. We are currently increasing our cooperation with local firms through joint ventures and consortia for bidding and tendering, such as with Stadia Consultants. Competition should not be the mainstream focus; cooperation should be. We must look at the big picture of boosting one another.

Regarding the R&D center and knowledge transfer, what recommendations do you have for local construction companies?

We should engage in mutual learning; local firms should recognize that technical talent is the priority. Through our CCCC workshops, we are boosting skill transfers. We need more platforms to facilitate this. CCCC is working hard to increase local content—not just by employing local people, but by procuring locally and partnering with local contractors. If we continue to learn from each other, it will boost the entire industry and help local contractors grow. A win-win situation is created when we prioritize local employment and mutual benefit.

How does the construction industry in Ethiopia compare to other countries where CCCC operates?

I have worked in more than 14 African countries over an 18-year career, so I feel qualified to answer. Ethiopia is a wonderful country with smart, friendly people. The industry and the workforce here are developing very well compared to other nations on the continent. I learn a lot from your people; I often tell my employees that I am still learning here. I am very happy to be here and hope to work another 30 years and eventually retire in Ethiopia.

How has the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) contributed to infrastructure growth in Ethiopia and the Horn of Africa?

CCCC operates within the framework of the BRI, engaging in pragmatic cooperation. We are the primary implementers of these initiatives on the ground. The BRI benefits these countries and their people through the goal of “constructing and sharing together.” CCCC plays a decisive role in executing that vision of shared development.

In light of BRICS initiatives, what is the future plan for CCCC in Ethiopia and the broader region?

As mentioned, our plan is to stay for 100 years, which requires even deeper localization. We want to move toward projects involving advanced technologies, digital implementation, green development, and integrated systems. We are seeking more projects that emphasize intelligent and digital development. This will transform the country’s image and ensure mutual benefits for everyone involved.

The political landscape is fraught with concerns that the ongoing conflicts in Oromia and Amhara, coupled with the exclusion of Tigray from the electoral cycle,  and opposition figures argue that the election may render competitive voting physically impossible in large swathes of the country.

A central point of contention is the National Election Board of Ethiopia’s (NEBE) controversial “traffic light” security map. By categorizing constituencies as Green (safe), Yellow (minor concerns), or Red (high risk), the NEBE sought to provide operational clarity. However, this has met significant pushback from opposition parties who claim the “Green” designations are overly optimistic and rely too heavily on state-provided data.

In a bid to resolve these discrepancies, the Board has deployed a joint monitoring task force—comprising NEBE officials, political party representatives, and civil society members—specifically to re-evaluate conditions in contested “Green” zones where the opposition maintains a free and fair environment is non-existent.

Amidst this volatility stands Merera Gudina (Prof.), a man whose biography is inextricably woven into the fabric of modern Ethiopian politics.

Merera is the current Chairman of the Oromo Federalist Congress (OFC) and a founding architect of the Medrek coalition, representing a formidable multi-ethnic challenge to the country’s historical power structures. A veteran of the struggle, he has long championed a “stem and branches” philosophy: the belief that Oromia is the indispensable heart of Ethiopia, and that its people must secure self-rule and shared-rule within a unified, democratic state rather than through secession.

Today, as he navigates the shifting winds of the current administration, Merera remains a definitive voice of the “old guard.” His perspective is tempered by the over five decades of activism, leading him to argue that Ethiopia still lacks the genuine political will required for the deep-seated dialogue that could resolve its dynamic crises.

The Reporter’s Abraham Tekle sat down with Merera to get his views on current political developments, security dynamics, and policy debates in Ethiopia, offering a sobering assessment of the drawbacks facing the national vote. EXCERPTS:

The Reporter: Ethiopia is preparing for its 2026 general election and your party will be taking part. How does the OFC assess the credibility and inclusiveness of the upcoming election, particularly in light of ongoing security concerns and questions about political space?

Merera Gudina (Prof.): Other than the ’97 election [referring to the 2005 National Election], in the history of elections in Ethiopia, no vote has ever even reached the stage of being a “competition.” There are times where situations change due to the process. But the main issue is that a democratic and fair election, even one that reached the level of a competition on Ethiopian soil, was only that of the ’97 election.

And because Ethiopia has been unable to do even that, it has failed to fulfill three basic national desires for the last 50 years. The first thing is that it hasn’t been possible to bring lasting peace and stability during those five decades. The other one is, for the last 50 years, the country hasn’t been able to create a democratic system. This “change” we’ve been struggling for for 50 years has just been spinning us from one crisis to another crisis, and still, we are in another crisis now. It hasn’t been possible to get out of that.

Thirdly, since most of the country’s wealth goes toward these conflicts—because we can’t get out of the cycle of conflict—it hasn’t been possible to bring meaningful economic development and prosperity. The people’s current standard of living and situation show this clearly.

Before the upcoming election, we repeatedly asked the government—along with other political parties—for the basic changes needed for a free and fair election by raising basic issues related with the election. The government, instead of moving toward that, kept pushing in the direction it was already headed. Starting from the structure of the Election Board, to security issues, to the political space which is becoming extremely narrow—we kept asking about these things. It didn’t work out for us.

The [OFC] Central Committee leadership convened a meeting with representatives from across the Oromia region and Addis Ababa to assess whether conditions permitted a free and fair election in our primary constituencies. Following these deliberations, we concluded that the political environment remained unfavorable. However, recognizing that current laws prevent us from boycotting the election entirely, and acknowledging that fundamental issues remain unresolved, we have decided to limit our participation and participate only in select areas of Addis Ababa/Finfinne, maintaining our stance that this election is unlikely to foster national peace or stability.

We are also closely monitoring the escalating situations in the Oromia and Amhara regions, while noting that Tigray continues to follow its own course. The impact of the vote on these dynamics will be revealed in a month and a half; however, our internal evaluation concludes that the upcoming election will fail to establish either a democratic system or lasting peace.

There is a condition where a woman’s abdomen swells as if she were pregnant, yet she never gives birth—a phenomenon sometimes referred to as a “Satan’s pregnancy.” Ethiopian democracy over the last 50 years has mirrored this. The “pregnancy” is visible; the struggle, the sacrifice, and the rhetoric are all present. Yet, there is no result. No tangible progress has been realized on the ground. Ultimately, democracy in Ethiopia did not emerge from politics nor elections.

There are persistent rumors and reports suggesting the ruling Prosperity Party (PP) may opt out of certain constituencies to allow “government-affiliated” opposition parties to secure parliamentary seats. What is your assessment of the rumors regarding “seat-sharing” between the ruling party and specific invited opposition groups?

Ideally, an election is a process where candidates assert their superiority and seek a popular mandate; there is no greater civic engagement than this competition. However, if the process is one-sided—driven by the government and parties brought in through negotiation—it forces a dynamic where dissent is suppressed. Being told when to show support or when to withhold opposition directly contradicts the fundamental principles of a free, fair, and democratic election.

Furthermore, an election represents the ultimate right of the people to establish their own government and choose their leaders. The current circumstances undermine these democratic foundations. As such, this process fails to break the cycle of the last 50 years; as previously stated, it remains an election where no tangible democratic progress is born.

Does this strategy marginalize grassroots parties like the OFC?

It doesn’t bring about any change. Significant political shifts have occurred in the past; for instance, during the 1997 election, our organization emerged as the primary opposition force. At that time, we secured approximately 53 to 57 parliamentary seats and 125 regional seats in Oromia. Despite these gains at both the regional and national levels, we were unable to effect substantive change for the people beyond amplifying their grievances. We faced immense challenges even in sustaining our own organization, illustrating that electoral success did not translate into tangible progress.

Globally, parliaments—the assemblies where people’s representatives convene—generally function at one of three levels. A strong parliament is characterized by its ability to pass robust legislation that improves citizens’ lives while actively monitoring the executive branch to ensure those laws are implemented. This oversight is the primary hallmark of a high-functioning representative body.

At the second level, a parliament may still possess the desire and capability to pass quality legislation; however, it lacks the authority to hold the executive accountable. In this scenario, the executive branch implements laws at its own discretion. The third and lowest level of parliament is one that can neither pass effective laws nor monitor the executive. Its only remaining function is to serve as a forum where the grievances of the people can be heard.

Therefore, a parliament that doesn’t qualify as one of the above three cannot be referred to as a parliament.  

Opposition parties have called for the NEBE to revise its assessment of security conditions and the map it recently published. How does the OFC respond to the NEBE’s designation of “Green” zones in Oromia where your members still face arrests and other dangers as you describe it? How do you view this situation?

Since entering the political arena, we have engaged in discussions with the government, the National Election Board, and the diplomatic community. Our consistent assessment is that the necessary conditions for a free and fair election in Ethiopia do not exist. Given that the situation in the country’s four major regions—including Oromia, Amhara, and Tigray—is far from conducive, participating under such circumstances serves no one’s interest. Instead, we have repeatedly advocated for essential pre-election measures, including a formal ceasefire, genuine negotiations, the expansion of political space, and, most critically, the resolution of security concerns.

The government and the Election Board frequently maintain that “conducive conditions” are in place. However, as we live among the people, we know this is not the case. In previous cycles, I campaigned extensively through the Amhara region, in cities such as Bahir Dar, Dessie, and Kombolcha. In Oromia, my reach extended to the Kenyan border at Moyale, the Somali border at Ginnir, and across Harar, Jimma, Illubabor, and Wollega. I navigated not just the central hubs, but the most remote areas of the country.

While elections were indeed conducted in the past, the environment for political mobilization was entirely different. Back then, we could move freely and campaign by gathering hundreds of thousands of supporters, often coordinating convoys of five to ten vehicles. It was under those specific operational conditions that we were able to conduct our outreach and engagement.

So, how do you assess the Board’s decision to designate the areas you described as dangerous as “green”?

At times, the government’s assertions appear to be a joke. For instance, it is well-documented that bank robberies occur repeatedly in towns near the capital, and travelers on the road to Gojjam are frequently intercepted and robbed. Furthermore, widespread and recurring conflicts continue to plague areas such as Ambo, Metasbeia, Chobi, Jeldu, Ginde Beret, and Meta Robi.

For the past five or six years, a mafia-like group—allegedly involving elements of the government and other entities—has been operating in the Ambo area. This group has been responsible for shocking public killings and the mistreatment of civilians. The formation of this group and its recent activities have caused significant outcry across Oromo areas.

Given these prevailing conditions, a “green light” from the government or the Election Board does not reflect the actual security environment. The reality on the ground is well-known to the public and the government alike. While these facts may be obscured from the international community, the government remains fully aware of the situation; it is not a secret.

The OFC recently also stated it would not field candidates in active conflict zones in Oromia. But beyond that, what specific alternative negotiation framework does your party propose to halt the violence in the region?

We have tried a lot to bring a lasting solution to the problems both locally and internationally. Several international organizations—including the Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy (NIMD), the National Democratic Institute (NDI), and various South African institutions—have facilitated extensive training for both government officials and opposition leaders. These high-level study tours to The Hague, Belfast, and Robben Island focused on democratic transitions, conflict resolution, and the dismantling of systemic oppression. These programs were designed to share global experiences on how other nations have successfully navigated long-standing internal conflicts and established democratic systems.

Beyond international efforts, numerous domestic forums have been held across Ethiopia, from Adama to Arba Minch, involving political leaders at all levels. During the transition of power from the EPRDF era, current ministers and high-level officials participated in collective planning in Bishoftu to establish a unified vision for the country’s future. Despite this wealth of training, planning, and shared knowledge, the core obstacle remains a lack of political commitment.

I would say the government appears more focused on suppressing opposition than on maintaining stability through the promotion of democratic processes in the country.

Security challenges—including armed conflicts in multiple regions—have raised concerns about voter access and electoral legitimacy. To what extent do you believe the current security environment could affect voter turnout and the legitimacy of the electoral process? What is your party’s position on the ongoing tensions and how should the federal government manage relations with regional armed actors?

We have consistently informed the government, through public statements and various other channels, that the current situation requires a resolution. For instance, last year at Elilly Hotel, we held a week-long convention with the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF), prominent intellectuals, university professors, and Abba Gadaas. This gathering also included religious leaders, such as priests and sheikhs, who met for several days to deliberate on necessary actions for the Oromia region. Following these discussions, we submitted a formal proposal outlining sixteen key solutions; however, the government has since failed to respond or engage further.

Throughout this period, we have remained vocal, expressing our concerns through both direct and indirect means. Our evaluation remains that the primary obstacle is the government’s lack of political commitment. Until this fundamental issue is addressed, there is little hope for meaningful progress.

The intensified political tensions, recent clashes, and internal divisions within the proscribed Tigray People’s Liberation Front, including the term extension of the Interim Administration of Tigray, have raised fears of renewed conflict despite the Pretoria Agreement. How do you assess the current relationship between the federal government and Tigray forces?

As you know, within the movement we call the Medrek Coalition, Arena Tigray is included. We maintain a collaborative approach; for example, we recently joined Arena Tigray in issuing a critique of the National Dialogue Commission. Our joint conclusion was that the current issues cannot be resolved through existing methods, as they lack the necessary political commitment. We must determine how to apply lessons from the past to move forward effectively, as continuing with outdated strategies will only hinder progress.

Based on my observations and assessments, Tigray has essentially achieved a state of de facto independence. It is an area where the federal government cannot exercise authority at will and where the Ethiopian National Defense Force lacks freedom of movement. Furthermore, the federal government’s claims of “enforcing the rule of law” are not recognized there. This situation has persisted for some time—not through constitutional means, but in practice—and it remains uncertain how much longer this lack of central control will continue.

As the situation escalates, there appears to be a lack of sincere effort to alleviate the underlying problems, which are ultimately rooted in a struggle for power. The primary focus seems to be on maintaining dominance: whether the TPLF will retain its authority or whether the federal government will succeed in bringing the region under the same level of control as other states. Consequently, I see no genuine commitment to fully implementing the Pretoria Agreement or resolving negotiations regarding constitutional and territorial matters.

As I have previously stated on social media, the region is currently characterized by a “witch politics of blame,” where each side holds the other responsible for the ongoing crisis. I leave it to the people of Tigray to determine which party—the federal government or the TPLF—bears the true responsibility for being the witch.

What would be the most possible solutions to resolve these disputes?

The most viable path forward is to engage in negotiations rooted in democratic principles. To that end, the parties reached and signed the Pretoria Agreement. However, instead of prioritizing the implementation of this accord at every opportunity, there appears to be a consistent effort to undermine it. While both sides publicly affirm their commitment to the Pretoria Agreement, they simultaneously accuse one another of violating its terms.

This contradiction is compounded by the fact that the full details of what was negotiated behind closed doors remain unknown to the public.

While the signing of the agreement was publicized, the specific terms and the process by which they were reached remain opaque. For instance, the Ethiopian government negotiated and signed the accord directly with the TPLF, rather than with any other entity. It is therefore contradictory that the federal government, upon returning to Addis Ababa, demanded the TPLF obtain new legal certification from the Election Board. After negotiating with an entity previously designated as illegal, turning around to demand its re-legalization appears to be a vague and inconsistent stance.

From my perspective, these shifting demands seem to be a search for excuses to stall the process. Similarly, while the TPLF officially accepted the various stages of disarmament requested by the federal government, the reality on the ground does not show that their forces are actually disarming. Consequently, it appears that both sides are engaging in political posturing rather than genuine implementation.

The two companies have enjoyed a strong relationship over the past six-and-a-half decades. Today, Boeing’s jets make up a large part of Ethiopian’s fleet, and the Seattle, Washington-based manufacturer opened an office in Addis Ababa last year.

As Ethiopian Airlines embarks on a multi-billion dollar airport in Bishoftu, its executives also seek to bolster their fleet with an order for 19 new jets from Boeing, including nine new 787 Dreamliners.

The Reporter’s Ashenafi Endale caught up with Anbessie Yitbarek, Boeing’s vice president of commercial sales and marketing for Africa, for an inside look at the partnership between the two companies and their plans for the future of African aviation.

Anbessie, a former chief operating officer at Ethiopian Airlines and board member of the Ethiopian Defense Engineering Corporation, has headed Boeing’s sales and marketing in Africa since January 2023.

An electrical engineer by training, Anbessie first joined Boeing’s Customer Engineer Group in 2005, specializing in data analytics and maintenance optimization. In this role, he was awarded multiple patents for his innovation.

In this interview with The Reporter’s Ashenafi Endale, Anbessie describes the long-standing partnership between Ethiopian Airlines and Boeing from his unique perspective, outlines plans for the near future, and highlights the prospects for the African aviation industry. EXCERPTS:

The Reporter: How do you assess the evolution of the Ethiopian aviation industry in line with the evolution of aircraft technology over time?

The evolution of Ethiopian aviation closely mirrors the evolution of airplane technology. From its early operations in the 1940s with Douglas-built aircraft, Ethiopian Airlines entered the jet age in 1962 with the Boeing 720B, becoming the first airline in Africa to do so. Since then, each introduction of new technology, from the 767 to the 777 and later the 787 Dreamliner, has enabled step changes in range, efficiency, and reliability. This has allowed Ethiopian Airlines to move from a regional operator to a global carrier, demonstrating how technology has been a key enabler of aviation growth in Ethiopia and across Africa.

In that context, how have Boeing and Ethiopian Airlines intertwined their growth trajectory over the past several decades?

The relationship between Boeing and Ethiopian Airlines is one of the longest-standing, spanning more than 75 years. It is a relationship that has been built on partnership and working together to further the Ethiopian Aerospace industry. Ethiopian Airlines has consistently been among the first carriers in Africa to introduce new Boeing airplanes, aligning its growth with advancements in aviation technology. This approach has supported the airline’s expansion into new markets and strengthened its role as a continental hub. Over time, the partnership has evolved to include collaboration in training, operations, and long-term industry development.

How do you think Boeing has contributed to ET’s growth?
The introduction of the Boeing 720B in 1962 marked Ethiopian Airlines’ transition into the jet age and a defining moment for African aviation. It enabled faster, more reliable travel and opened the door to longer routes, positioning Ethiopian as a pioneer on the continent. Each fleet milestone has unlocked new capabilities. The 767 supported more efficient long-haul operations, the 777 expanded capacity on high-demand international routes, and the 787 Dreamliner introduced improved fuel efficiency and passenger experience. These aircraft have enabled Ethiopian Airlines to scale its network while maintaining operational efficiency.

Boeing has cultivated a long-term strategic relationship with Ethiopian Airlines, with capacity building and talent development as indispensable components. In 2019, Boeing and Ethiopian Airlines signed an MoU to position Ethiopia as Africa’s aviation hub, focusing on industrial development, advanced training, educational partnerships, and leadership development. As part of this strategic framework, Boeing works with Ethiopian Airlines and Cranfield University, to deliver tailored training programs for the airline’s employees in fleet and network planning, safety, and leadership. Boeing’s collaboration with Ethiopian Aviation University on a range of cadet training courses that address key industry topics such as sustainability and joint community engagement initiatives such as the STEM School for Ethiopian school students also support skills development and help build a long-term talent pipeline for the aviation sector in Ethiopia and beyond.

What, in your view, has particularly contributed to ET’s success, amidst a number of African flag carriers struggling?

Ethiopian Airlines’ success is rooted in a long-term, consistent approach to growth, underpinned by early adoption of advanced aircraft technology and sustained investment in capability building. The airline has demonstrated a strong ability to align fleet modernization with network expansion, allowing it to scale efficiently over time. It has also invested in training, maintenance, and development of one of Africa’s leading aviation academies and successful MRO facilities. These factors, combined with a clear strategic vision and strong partnerships, have enabled Ethiopian Airlines to build resilience and maintain a leading position on the continent.

Looking ahead, why do you believe the next 20 years of African aviation growth may be more consequential than the last 80?

Africa is dawning upon a new age in its geopolitical and global economic position. This next phase of African aviation growth is critical. As economies across the continent grow alongside the liberalization of skies, driven by the shared vision of African nations, we shall see increasing demand for global and regional connectivity, trade, and mobility. To leverage this opportunity profitably and sustainably, our African airlines will need 1,200 new airplanes in order to modernize and grow their fleets as well as expand their networks. If not, this opportunity may be lost to airlines from outside the continent. Ethiopian Airlines are embarking on a huge expansion and growth plans to their fleet and also to the airport. We are proud to be their partners and look forward to working with them for their growth plans.

More broadly, tell us about Boeing’s market share landscape across Africa, and how this compares with its presence in other regions globally.

Boeing has a long-established presence in Africa, where its airplanes have formed the backbone of the commercial fleet for decades and represent around 70 percent of the in-service market across the continent. While market dynamics vary by region globally, Boeing’s approach in Africa is centered on long-term partnerships, supporting airline growth, and contributing to the development of the broader aviation ecosystem through training, services, and capability building.

How many aircraft is Boeing currently working to supply to ET?

The airline operates the largest Boeing fleet in Africa, including the 737, 777 and 787 families, which have supported its expansion into a leading global carrier. Most recently, Ethiopian Airlines committed to 11 Boeing 737 MAX airplanes and placed an order for nine 787-9 Dreamliners. These airplanes will be delivered over time and will support the airline’s continued network expansion, improved efficiency, and long-term growth strategy. Ethiopian Airlines has also selected the Boeing 777-9 as part of its future widebody fleet, becoming the first carrier in Africa to do so, further reinforcing its long-term strategy to expand high-capacity, long-haul operations.

Boeing inaugurated its Ethiopia office last year. What have its operations involved so far, and are there plans to open manufacturing facilities in Ethiopia in the near future?

Boeing’s presence in Ethiopia reflects our long-term commitment to the country and to the broader African aviation market. The office supports engagement with key African stakeholders, including airlines, regulators, and industry partners, and plays a role in advancing initiatives related to training, education, safety, sustainability and industry development.

Our industrial partnership with Ethiopian Airlines began in 2008 with the establishment of a wire-harness manufacturing facility in Addis Ababa. Since then, the relationship has further matured: Ethiopian Airlines and Ethiopian Sky Technologies joint venture produces thermo‑acoustic insulation blankets for the 737 MAX at the Ethiopian Airlines’ MRO facility.

Veronica Adane has quickly established herself as one of Ethiopia’s most dynamic contemporary artists, skillfully blending traditional Ethiopian sounds with modern production to captivate audiences both at home and across the continent. She graduated from Mekelle University with a Bachelor’s degree in journalism and communication, bringing not only creative artistry but also a keen understanding of media and audience engagement to her work.

Her album Meteriyaye has amassed millions of streams and views across digital platforms, marking a milestone in both commercial success and cultural impact within Ethiopia’s music industry. Between 2025 and early 2026, Veronica achieved pan-African recognition, winning Artist of the Year (Continental) and Best Female Artist at the 2025 Zikomo Africa Awards in Dares Salaam. She followed this triumph with a major win at the 9th All Africa Music Awards (AFRIMA) in January 2026, where her song “Kante Lela” was honored as Best African Traditional.

Domestically, Meteriyaye dominated the Ethiopian music scene, earning Album of the Year and solidifying Veronica’s reputation as one of the nation’s leading vocalists. Her achievements have been celebrated with a high-profile homecoming in Addis Ababa, and she continues to build on her success with new nominations and growing continental influence.

In an exclusive conversation with The Reporter’s Surafel Ashebir, Veronica spoke about her journey, her artistic vision, and her plans for the future. EXCERPTS:

The Reporter: You have emerged as one of Ethiopia’s most prominent contemporary artists in a relatively short time. What would you identify as the “turning point” in your journey?

Veronica: The turning point in my journey came when I decided to be completely myself; authentic, real, and unapologetic. That decision truly changed everything for me.

I’ve always believed that being yourself is the easiest thing to do. It doesn’t cost money, it doesn’t require preparation, and it doesn’t drain your energy. When you’re being real, you don’t have to pretend or carry the pressure and anxiety of trying to be someone else. For me, the person I am off camera is the same person people see on camera and that’s what creates a genuine connection.

At the beginning, I had zero followers on Instagram. I remember recording a simple one-minute video in my university dorm with no makeup, no styling, nothing special. It was just me, singing in the most natural way. That video went viral, and I truly believe it’s because people connected with how real it was.

Within a few months, I gained over 100,000 followers, and opportunities started coming my way. Producers, media professionals, and my creativities began reaching out, and my career grew very quickly from that moment.

What made that experience a real turning point is that I never changed after it. The girl people saw in that very first one-minute video is still who I am today. Whether I had zero followers or now have millions across platforms like TikTok and Instagram, I’ve remained the same.

At the same time, I’ve always stayed grounded. I respect my family, my culture, and where I come from, and those values guide me in everything I do. I also try to use my voice to support and uplift others whenever I can.

Most importantly, I put God first in my life. I truly believe that everything I have today comes from Him, and He is the main reason I am who I am today.

Your work blends traditional Ethiopian sounds with modern production. How do you define your artistic identity within this evolving musical landscape?

I define my artistic identity as a bridge between tradition and modern expression. My music is rooted in Ethiopian culture, especially in its unique pentatonic system and qinit modes like Tizita, Bati, and Ambassel, which carry deep emotional and cultural meaning. Those elements are not just influences, they are part of who I am.

At the same time, I blend these traditional sounds with contemporary styles like R&B and modern production, so my music can connect with today’s generation while still staying authentic. I want it to feel both culturally grounded and globally relevant.

I’m very proud of where I come from, and I try to reflect that in everything I create. It’s important for me that young people feel confident in their roots, while also seeing that our sound can travel and resonate beyond borders.

For me, everything comes back to authenticity being real, staying grounded, and growing without losing my foundation. That balance between honoring tradition and embracing evolution is what truly defines me as an artist.

The Ethiopian music industry appears to be undergoing significant changes. How do you assess its current trajectory, and where do you see its biggest opportunities? 

I believe the Ethiopian music industry is undergoing a deep and dynamic transformation, and from my perspective, it is evolving in a very positive and promising direction. What stands out most to me about this generation is that, even as the industry becomes more modern and globally connected, there is a very intentional return to our roots. I see a strong and growing appreciation for traditional Ethiopian sounds especially the music of the 1980s and 1990s and a renewed pride in our cultural identity.

For me, what makes this moment so powerful is that artists are not simply imitating the past; they are reinterpreting it. I see musicians drawing from our traditional pentatonic scales, our unique rhythmic structures, and our storytelling heritage, and then blending those elements with contemporary genres like R&B, Afro-fusion, and modern pop production. That balance between tradition and innovation is very important, because it allows us to preserve our identity while also making our music feel fresh, relevant, and globally competitive.

At the same time, technology and digital platforms have completely reshaped the industry. Social media, especially platforms like TikTok, has opened doors for new and emerging artists in ways we have never seen before. Today, an artist does not have to rely only on traditional media or industry gatekeepers to be discovered. A single authentic moment, a short video, or a unique sound can reach millions of people instantly. Because of this, artists are now more visible, more informed, and more intentional about their careers. They are not only creating music, but also building personal brands and understanding how to communicate their identity to a wider audience.

I also see that today’s artists have a deeper awareness of their cultural responsibility. They are proud of their heritage, and at the same time, they are learning how to present it in a way that connects with international audiences without losing its authenticity. This is why I believe Ethiopian music has strong potential to expand globally. We are already seeing more collaboration with international artists, more cross-cultural projects, and more global recognition of our unique sound. And I truly believe this is just the beginning.

Another important factor, in my opinion, is the role of the audience. Ethiopian listeners are incredibly supportive, engaged, and united. They celebrate their artists, they promote their music, and they stand behind their culture with pride. That unity creates a powerful ecosystem where artists can grow and thrive. For me, this collective support is one of the biggest strengths we have as an industry.

Overall, I am very optimistic about the future. I believe that if we continue to embrace our roots while also innovating and adapting to the global music landscape, Ethiopian music will not only grow, it will stand out. I truly see a future where our sound is not just recognized internationally, but respected as a unique and influential voice in the global music scene.

Artificial intelligence is edging its way into global music production. How do you evaluate AI-generated music compared to human creativity, particularly in terms of authenticity and emotional depth?

For me, music is something deeply human. It is more than just sound it is emotion, memory, and lived experience. Behind every song, there are real people, songwriters, producers, and artists who invest not only their time and effort, but also their personal stories, their struggles, their joy, and their truth. That human experience is what gives music its authenticity and emotional depth. It is what allows listeners to connect, to feel understood, and to find meaning in a song.

AI, on the other hand, can generate music in minutes, but it cannot feel. It does not experience life, it does not understand pain or happiness, and it cannot translate real emotion in the way a human being can. Even when it produces something that sounds technically impressive, there is still a difference because it lacks the soul that comes from genuine human expression.

What concerns me even more is the growing impact of AI on opportunities for real artists. We are already seeing a shift where companies that once invested in musicians and creators are now choosing faster, cheaper alternatives through AI-generated content. This not only reduces opportunities, but it also risks devaluing the hard work, talent, and dedication that artists bring to their craft. For many creators, this is not just a profession it is a calling and seeing that replaced can be very discouraging.

Another issue I find troubling is the rise of AI-generated versions of songs gaining popularity, sometimes even surpassing the original works. To me, that raises serious questions about fairness and respect for artistic ownership. When an artist pours their heart and identity into a piece of music, it deserves recognition and protection. Seeing that work overshadowed by artificial replication can be deeply disheartening.

At the same time, I am not completely against AI. I believe it can be a powerful tool when used responsibly. It can support creativity, enhance production, and open new creative possibilities for artists. But for me, there has to be a clear boundary AI should assist, not replace. It should empower human creativity, not compete with it.

In the end, I strongly believe that real music will always come from real people. It comes from emotion, from experience, from culture, and from truth. And no matter how advanced technology becomes, I don’t believe it can ever truly replicate the depth, the soul, and the authenticity of human artistry.”

Some criticize the Ethiopian music industry for what they see as failing to live up to the golden age of icons like Tilahun Gesesse. Others argue the industry is diversifying, evolving and is creating several talented young musicians. What do you think?

I believe the older generation of Ethiopian artists was truly remarkable, and at the same time, I see the new generation growing and evolving in its own unique way. Personally, I don’t fully agree with the idea that the industry has lost its greatness. I think this generation is simply different. We are more connected to our culture, more intentional about representing it, and deeply respectful of the traditions that shaped our music.

There is a strong appreciation for the foundations laid by the legends of the past, and many of us are incorporating that respect for tradition into our music, while also experimenting and evolving to reflect our own experiences and perspectives. We are creating music that feels authentic to our roots, yet resonates with contemporary audiences both in Ethiopia and beyond.

I also see the new generation thinking bigger. We are not only creating music for local audiences, we are striving to take Ethiopian music to the international stage and represent our country with pride and excellence. It’s not about comparing the past to the present; rather, it’s about building on the foundation the legends gave us and expanding it, reaching new heights, and opening new possibilities for Ethiopian music globally.

If you want, I can combine this with her other interview answers and turn it into a fully polished feature article ready for print, with pull quotes and narrative flow.

You recently achieved major continental recognition, winning Artist of the Year at the Zikomo Africa Awards and Best African Traditional at AFRIMA. Given that Ethiopian musicians have historically had limited visibility on global stages, how do you reflect on this milestone, and what insights or advice would you share for bringing Ethiopian music to international audiences?

All of these awards truly belong to God. He is the reason I am who I am today, and I genuinely believe that every recognition and opportunity I have received comes from Him. My journey has not been without challenges, but I stayed true to myself, held onto my faith, and trusted God through every moment. To be recognized on an international level is something I could never have imagined.

When I reflect on who I was six or seven years ago, it almost feels like a dream, and I am deeply grateful for how far I have come. What makes this achievement even more special is the opportunity to represent Ethiopia. That, for me, is the greatest honor. I love my country deeply, and being able to showcase our culture, our people, and our identity on such prestigious international platforms fills me with immense pride.

I firmly believe that Ethiopian music has everything it needs to reach a global audience. Our sound is unique, our culture is rich, and we must stay true to ourselves; original and confident in who we are instead of trying to imitate others. At the same time, we should make smart use of social media and international platforms, remain open to collaborations, and continue building bridges that allow Ethiopian music to shine worldwide.

You’re known for your powerful stage presence. How do you connect with audiences during live performances, and what can you tell us about your upcoming Ethiopia tour and the artistic vision behind it?

For me, live performance is everything. I often call it my heaven. That’s the space where I feel safest, most free, and most like myself. I think that authenticity is why people connect with my performances. What they see on stage is real.

When I perform, I always remind myself to be present, to be genuine, and to give my full energy. For me, it’s never just about singing; it’s about creating a connection. I feel the audience’s energy, and they feel mine. It becomes a shared moment. I always strive to give my best not only vocally but emotionally. I want people to feel something when they watch me whether it’s joy, love, or even a sense of healing. That is what music is truly about for me.

This upcoming tour is incredibly special. While we are still finalizing details step by step, I’m very excited about what’s to come. I can’t share exact dates yet, but I can say that this tour is designed to be more than just a series of performances; it’s about creating an experience. I want every show to feel emotional, energetic, and authentic. My goal is for the audience to feel connected not just to me, but to the music and to each other.

I also want this tour to be remembered, to become part of Ethiopian music history. So far, the tour will include cities such as Addis Ababa, Gondar, Bahir Dar, Asosa, Mizan Teferi, Arba Minch, and Hawassa, with more cities to be announced. And of course, this is just the beginning. I’ll continue updating my audience with more information very soon. For me, this tour is about celebration, connection, and creating moments that people will carry with them long after the music stops.

Many young Ethiopian musicians look up to you. How do you see your role in mentoring emerging artists, and what advice would you give them about building a sustainable music career?

I see my role as a responsibility. If people look up to me, I want to lead by example not just through my music, but through my values, my work ethic, and the way I carry myself. I believe that the way I live and create can inspire others, and that’s something I take very seriously.

I always encourage young artists to be themselves, because authenticity is what truly allows people to connect with you. In today’s world, social media has made it easier than ever to share your talent and be recognized. But even with these tools, success doesn’t happen overnight. It might come in one night or it might take years. The most important thing is to believe in yourself, stay consistent, and remain patient.

At the same time, I always emphasize staying grounded. Respect your family, honor your culture, and never lose sight of where you come from. And above all, put God first. That balance between ambition, authenticity, humility, and faith is what I believe helps an artist not only grow, but also make a meaningful and lasting impact.

How do you evaluate government support for the music industry, in terms of facilitating music lessons at schools or in enforcing copyright rules to protect creativity?

To be completely honest, I don’t think the support for Ethiopian artists is enough, and I speak from my own experience. Over the past months, I’ve had the privilege of representing Ethiopia internationally traveling to countries like Tanzania, Nigeria, and Rwanda, and even receiving several awards. But throughout this journey, the level of support I expected simply wasn’t there. I reached out to various offices and organizations that I believed had a role to play in supporting artists, and while there was initial interest, there was little follow-through. Even when I shared my experiences and concerns on social media, there was no meaningful response.

Seeing how other countries invest in their music industry was eye-opening. In Nigeria, for example, there are regular panels, discussions, and structured initiatives designed to take their music to global audiences. That level of strategic support is something we urgently need for Ethiopian artists. We are working tirelessly to represent our country, not just culturally but also economically, through international platforms, yet without a strong support system, these efforts are much harder and the impact is limited.

I believe it’s crucial to recognize that the talent, dedication, and vision are already here in Ethiopia. Artists are ready and willing to put in the work to elevate our music and culture globally. What we need now is a system that stands with us, one that actively supports, nurtures, and amplifies our efforts. With the right support, Ethiopian music doesn’t just have the potential to succeed internationally, it can thrive and become a source of national pride for generations to come. We are ready to carry our country’s flag with our art; we just need the structures around us to be as committed as the artists themselves.

Experts like Muauz Gidey (PhD), a researcher specializing in political science and peace, noted that this lingering ambiguity offers a tactical pause but risks a strategic disaster.

As the mandate of the Tigray Interim Administration (TIA) nears its expiration, the region faces a looming institutional vacuum. Without a permanent governance structure, the expert posits that a unified Tigray will severely be diminished, leaving the door open for external actors to plunge more damage to the local population.

The geopolitical map of the Horn of Africa has also been further redrawn by Ethiopia’s vocal pursuit of sovereign sea access, a move that has transformed the 2018 alliance between Addis Ababa and Asmara into one of visible, high-stakes tension. According to the expert, this rift heightens the risk of Tigray becoming a perennial battleground for proxy interests, especially as Eritrean troops remain entrenched in constitutionally defined areas of the region. 

Internally, Tigrayan elites increasingly view the upcoming national elections as “non-democratic”, signaling that the possibility of holding a credible, inclusive election in the region remains virtually non-existent. Instead, political actors prioritize the withdrawal of foreign forces and the full implementation of the Pretoria framework towards stability.

Muauz is currently the lead researcher at the Tigray Institute of Policy Studies (TIPS) and a scholar at Mekelle University. He has  also served as an Assistant Professor of Political Science at Aksum, Wollo, and Mekelle Universities.

In addition to his academic roles, he works as a consultant on peace and security matters and previously served as an Associate Professor at TIPS until the end of the war in Tigray. From 2024 to 2025, he worked as a Project Specialist for the UNDP Governance Reform Program.

Muauz describes a region trapped in a profound state of limbo that has left the Tigray population in a fractured state of mind, uncertain of their heading or what the future holds. According to him, this sense of drift is exacerbated by the looming end of the Interim Administration’s mandate and the presence of foreign forces, creating an institutional and psychological vacuum.

With the shifting rift between Addis Ababa and Asmara and the impracticality of upcoming elections, he added that the people remain caught in a geopolitical transition that offers no clear remedy or predictable path forward.

In an interview with Abraham Tekle of The Reporter, Muauz highlighted the fragility of the post-Pretoria landscape and several other critical issues grappling Tigray and its people. EXCERPTS:

The Reporter: As a university lecturer and political analyst closely following developments in Tigray, how do you assess the overall situation in the region?

Muauz Gidey (PhD): While there are many ways to describe the present moment, a defining feature is the emergence of a level of moral anxiety and instability that the region has not experienced before. By any standard, Tigray is undergoing a period of profound confusion that appears unprecedented in its history. Although the effects of the post-war period remain visible, there is a growing sense that direction has been lost. This uncertainty has reached a point where concerns are rising about whether people can still clearly recognize what serves their own interests.

The region’s political standing, social fabric, and overall outlook for the future are all under considerable strain. Beyond post-war challenges, this period stands out as a distinct historical phase marked by conditions not previously witnessed in Tigray’s past experience.

Nearly four years on from the Pretoria Agreement, many argue that a “no-war, no-peace” state persists. In your view, what are the primary bottlenecks preventing the full implementation of the agreement?

At the center of the current situation are three principal actors: the Ethiopian government, the Eritrean government, and the Tigray forces. Within the TPLF, a division has emerged between political and military wings, further complicating the landscape. Additional actors, including the Fano forces, also play a role. However, the primary parties remain the Ethiopian government and the TPLF, as they are the main signatories to the Pretoria Agreement.

From the perspective of the federal government, there appears to be a lack of practical commitment to implementing the Pretoria Agreement in good faith. Instead, there are patterns of deliberate and systematic postponement—delays, stalling, weakening, and gradual alteration of the agreement’s original intent. This is significant because peace agreements do not automatically produce peace. Even what is termed “sustainable peace” requires consistent, incremental progress built on trust and tangible actions.

The agreement itself also carries structural limitations, including elements of power assimilation. At the same time, delays and internal divisions within Tigray—exacerbated by federal actions—have hindered implementation. Key provisions remain unfulfilled, preventing the existence of national cohesion including the return of territories to regional administration, the resettlement and rehabilitation of displaced populations, and the application of transitional justice mechanisms for accountability and reconciliation. Rather than advancing these commitments, actions taken have contributed to undermining the legitimacy and public standing of Tigray’s political leadership, particularly the interim administration, thereby deepening internal tensions.

Within Tigray, divisions inside the TPLF, especially among those identifying as a “political-military wing,” have also shaped the current situation. A focus on power and internal positioning, alongside concerns over governance and accountability, has created vulnerabilities that external political maneuvers have exploited. This has further complicated the political environment.

As a result, Tigray’s political forces now face a fragmented reality. The interim administration led by Getachew Reda had been expected to facilitate political transition, open dialogue, and expand media space. But since it was forced out by power, Tigray is now split—one side looking toward the north, the other toward the south; one centered in Addis Ababa, and the other centered in the Amhara region and Asmara.

By creating this environment, where the military wing has also emerged, Tigray is in a state of internal division. Because of the problems created primarily by the federal government and secondary actors within the TPLF’s political-military wing and the former interim administration, forces that were once marginalized have now become the center of gravity, both locally and nationally.

So, the fate of the continuation of the Pretoria agreement is being decided by these people, and an environment has been created where Fano and Shabia (Eritrea) are returning to the center of the stage

What is the underlying advantage for the federal government in this scenario?

If you take the federal government as an actor that felt a sense of responsibility and accountability, it would have taken actions that were beneficial. However, the federal government is not like that. This is because, after looking at Tigray as an enemy for a long time, it has not viewed Tigray as an actor that is returning to reconstruction and reconciliation based on the peace agreement or an international process. Instead, it views Tigray as an existential threat.

Looking at conflicts in different parts of the country, the approach of the federal government—particularly under Abiy Ahmed—appears increasingly personalized. The objective of weakening Tigray and rendering it politically irrelevant has been a recurring theme. During the Pretoria process, Tigray’s representatives, including Getachew Reda and Tadesse Werede, adopted an open and conciliatory stance. Their willingness to engage drew criticism from some quarters, who questioned how they could embrace a process following the scale of violence experienced.

Despite this, they approached the negotiations with a forward-looking, cooperative posture.

In contrast, remarks attributed to the Prime Minister—characterizing such engagement as “prisoner behavior”—have been perceived as dismissive and diminishing. This reflects a broader tendency to frame the situation through suspicion and adversarial thinking. In this context, the absence of good faith from the outset has contributed to the creation of internal friction.

The Pretoria Agreement, in principle, establishes parity between its signatories. However, in practice, this balance has been strained. Tigray’s political actors have, over time, been repositioned from equal partners to increasingly subordinate roles within the evolving political framework. This shift has been reinforced by internal fragmentation, as competing alignments emerged, including links toward Isaias Afwerki and other external or federal centers of influence.

These dynamics are not solely attributable to the federal government. Divisions within Tigray’s own leadership, marked by limited coordination, internal rivalry, and concerns over accountability, have also played a role. Such conditions have reduced collective agency and made political actors more vulnerable to external pressures.

There is a saying that ‘those who seek to save the fish by taking it out of the sea have already failed to drain the sea.’ Having failed to break the spirit of the Tigrayan people, as genocide powerhouse, Isaias Afwerki said after the signing of the Pretoria Agreement “Tekolifna” (an expression used for an “entrapped” progress), the current strategy appears to be one of fragmentation, driving one faction toward the influence of Asmara while the other retreats into a ‘prisoner’ mindset.

As a result, Tigray has experienced a decline in cohesion, unity, and political leverage. It is increasingly perceived less as a central actor and more as a marginalized force, struggling to maintain basic governance and services. This weakening has broader implications, as it is seen by some as a signal to other regions. In this framing, Tigray’s trajectory is used as an example within a wider effort to consolidate power and deter similar challenges in the Amhara Regional State or elsewhere.

The mandate of the Interim Administration of Tigray is nearing its end. What are the legal and political risks of an institutional vacuum if a permanent governance structure is not established soon?

What’s taken as a mistake by the Tigrayan political figures is mixing the interim government for an interim state, as there is no interim state in Tigray but an interim government. This is because restoring Tigray to its constitutional status implies that the Tigray Regional State is a state. Unless you change or revise the constitution, that state is a valid entity and continues to exist.

What was dismantled? The government that was formed following that election, which was cited as the trigger for the war, was the one deemed illegal. However, the constitutional foundation of Tigray cannot be dissolved or overturned. Therefore, until a legal government is established based on the constitution, having a “government” is a necessity.

But what is being done now? As I said before, the goal seems to be ensuring Tigray lacks any political posture or cohesion. This format, which is different from all other regions, was created by the political elite that established this constitutional order. While it’s thought to share equal rights and status with other regions on paper, the current design for Tigray is intended to keep it from having a stable government.

Now, when you consider the issue of Tigray, whether this interim government continues its power or not, or whether it’s changed, the core issue is that Tigray has already lost its agency. Particularly the current situation with the reigning president, Tadesse. The situation between Tadesse and the TPLF is different; Tadesse is an army man, and he was in the army during the struggle. He has a certain portion of the political elite and the politico-military wing behind him. So, further, this is divided between the two. There is a major division playing out between Addis Ababa and Asmara. Now, there is also a present dynamic, an emerging fault line. If the TPLF appoints someone else next time, what will that bring? It will bring further factionalism, splitting like an amoeba that brings another factionalism.

And another possibility is the recent formation of the TPF [Tigray Peace Forces] and there was also a new military force that recently joined the TPF that was previously unknown. In addition, other new military elements could also continue to emerge. This is all within the making and deliberate design of the federal government

In your expertise, what possible measures would the federal government take in this regard? How does it affect the region’s ability to negotiate with the federal government?

I think it would continue to escalate the situation by assigning one controversial person to do the dirty job exactly like what the colonial powers used to do. They sit in the metropolis and appoint someone who has no legitimacy and is controversial. That person’s existence depends entirely on the presence of those who appointed them and their loyalty to them. Therefore, the source of power, influence, legitimacy, and strength comes from somewhere else rather than from the people.

This is exactly what they did with Tadesse when they gave him eight executing points to fulfill and in evaluating him in their completion. So, the appointee says, “It’s the federal government that appointed me,” just as Getachew has been doing. He cannot do anything differently because he’s stuck in a trap.

But I can say with 100 percent certainty that they appoint someone without legitimacy or acceptance, whose group is coerced, who cannot mobilize a dominant force, who cannot unite Tigray, or who cannot initiate stability. By doing so, they perpetuate the problem. Otherwise, if you think a military force will be stationed there, I think that would be damaging to the federal government itself, and it would only transition Tigray into a worse cycle of war.

The current military force in Tigray, its strength, form, and stance, is divided; half is with Fano, half is with the Eritrean government but this would lead to a full-fledged war. I don’t think this path will be chosen because there is no international support for it right now, as the world faces a fuel crisis. So, given the current situation, that’s not a foreseeable future. However, what they are doing instead is political manipulation.

If there were a healthy mindset, what would be better is not to marginalize the TPLF, but to restore their legal status and re-engage them. Re-engagement is key. Their alignment with Eritrea is a re-engagement by its nature as part of an existential necessity. So, the federal government should build a pact to remove their reason for working against it. Then, since the federal government is for everyone, you create a new council where its members, people in Addis Ababa, and Tigrayans everywhere have an equal voice, and then work toward a future election.

If this kind of work is done, it could at least bring a model of stability to Ethiopia and give the government some breathing room. But they aren’t giving it any breathing room as it didn’t seem to need it.

As a nation, we are months away from holding a general election. There is also a question of whether elections are the “remedy” in addressing the country’s issues. Can we take the national election as the Alpha and Omega of all the solutions and bring a lasting peace to the country?

It never happened before and it will not happen now. For example, in this process called National Dialogue and Reconciliation—they talk about transitional justice, reconciliation, and the old way of doing things. Then they bring in international mediation. Beyond those who were displaced, persecuted, and harmed by this war and genocide, they try to fix the structures that caused the harm. They try to dress it up in democratic institutions, changing their scent, color, and appearance through a process. But this won’t solve the problems from the root.

During the EPRDF era, elections were treated like a political ritual. After four or five years of governing, they’d reach the end of their term, and instead of genuinely addressing the public’s concerns or the weaknesses seen over those years, they’d just put on a new mask and start the process over again. A true election should be a time to remove those who failed over five years, learn from mistakes, and create new political alternatives, strategies, leadership, and ideas. But instead, it was just a political ritual.

In this current era, they’ve taken this process of ritualization and added extremely massive violence. In the current situation, holding an election is just a way to create a high-level distraction and take things to another level. Look at the results they produce—they look at the results of the genocide and say, “Look, what we did here and there after committing similar genocide in Amhara and ritualize it with grand resort projects. 

They don’t base anything on reality. In practical terms, is the issue of the ballot what the people of Amhara, Tigray, or Afar need right now? Or is it an engagement that can solve the issue of living in peace, economic issues, health issues, and social issues, putting many young people in the deepest trouble. So, elections, in and of themselves, aren’t noble; they are a tool. They are an instrument meant to bring public safety, security, and greater happiness for the people.

Democracy isn’t some sacred, holy thing—it’s a means to an end. In a situation where those goals can’t be met, even if you hold the “most democratic” election, we already know the results. The same people will just elect themselves. What does that achieve? It just ritualizes tyranny and dictatorship under the guise of democracy for the sake of propaganda consumption.

The National Dialogue Commission recently announced it is gathering agenda items from the Tigrayan community in Addis Ababa. Do you see it as a possible solution for the existing problems surrounding the region?

I took the calling as a sort of forming a government-in-exile or a cabinet formation type of thing. First of all, under what legal mechanism is this National Dialogue empowering and establishing the Tigray interim government? Who gave them this responsibility? Under what authority or mandate did this come? It’s actually quite laughable. Because the reason a National Dialogue Commission is needed is to reconcile Tigray with Ethiopia, and Ethiopia with itself.

While we are still in a process where we haven’t even begun to reconcile these issues, I don’t understand where the authority or the power to form a government comes from. Secondly, the fact is that the Tigray that the constitution recognizes, the Tigray where elections are held, why is that? It’s because of law, order, and a law-enforcement body guided by law and order. That law-enforcement body, in turn, is meant to ensure the universal application of laws, regulations, and authority over all citizens across the entire territory of Tigray. This is what authority and law mean.

If this is the case, the territory of Tigray is not “fully secured”, the people are not “fully settled”, so who is “constituting” the election to be held? This is the first thing. Secondly, there is a military force within Tigray, and another military force supported by the federal government has been created. Therefore, in a situation where there is no legitimate monopoly of violence, where a region does not have full control over its territory, where there is a crisis of legitimacy or a crisis of government acceptance, where national consensus and unity are lacking, and where basic human security and basic needs are not met in Tigray—how can an election be held?

This is simply “white-washing” the crisis to prevent another Pretoria Agreement type of situation from happening and just pushing an agenda. The real issue that needs to be asked for the people of Tigray and the people of Ethiopia is that an election is needed for a reason, for a purpose. That purpose, however, is a human rights issue that involves people who are suffering and being counted in the hundreds of thousands; that is what needs to be delivered first.

Are you suggesting that there is no possibility of holding elections in Tigray?

Yes, there is no chance of holding an election in the region given the current situation.I would say it is impossible.

Reportedly, the relationship between Addis Ababa and Asmara has shifted from “alliance” to visible tension. How does this rift between change the security calculus for the Tigray region?

Any alliance with Eritrea puts Tigray into entanglement. So, what’s happening now is that we’ve entered into a “multiple entanglement” and Tigray has become stuck in something we didn’t even want. Notably, Tigray is entangled with Eritrea in terms of geography, in climate, and also entangled in war, culture, and life—and even in the economy. Now, taking a stance with your genocider adversary by itself brings multiple crises. It brings a crisis of identity and also a moral crisis. Doing this is also a process of erasing the things we use to define as part of our history.

So, bringing all these things together is very dangerous and totally suicidal. This is because they are a force that has committed a historic betrayal and treason over Tigray. And, looking back to the dispute Shabia has with Abiy Ahmed is because he isn’t able to finish destroying Tigray from the collective frustration it causes by tearing Tigray’s land apart, which is what he’s currently expressing it in various ways.

When you look at his rhetoric, we are Ethiopians and he doesn’t have any affection for Ethiopia. And for him, the worst form of Ethiopianism is being Tigrayan. And again, the worst expression of “Tigray-ness” is the TPLF. So, through these overlapping lenses, there is an insatiable desire to eliminate Tigray. So, you’re projecting this through these overlapping lenses—what are you trying to achieve or prove? It’s very dangerous.

No matter what happens, an “inter-corridor rebellion” or external issues won’t help or support you. They want to break you down, use your strength, and then break you again in the way that you cannot return to what you were before. So, the alliance is totally suicidal. However, you have to go in a way that maximizes your own interests without completely subduing them there. To move within that framework is a logical trap. It creates a “hermeneutics of despair”—leading people down a path followed by those who have lost all hope. And that is very dangerous.

What realistic diplomatic pathways exist to ensure their withdrawal as per the Pretoria Agreement or other means? And, what is the way out in general?

The current political landscape between the TPLF and the federal government requires a dialectical transcendence to move beyond existing hostilities toward a constructive transformation. This shift necessitates an all-inclusive “New Deal” or negotiation platform that integrates all major actors, including Eritreans and Fano, to ensure no single group remains a potential spoiler. Moving from an “either/or” binary to a “both/and” logic is essential for creating a political reality where diverse interests are recognized and integrated rather than being manipulated against one another.

Furthermore, leverage preservation through cohesive internal unity is required to strengthen bargaining power and increase the ability to influence national outcomes. Internal structures must be strengthened to allow for strategic pivoting while ensuring the region maintains its own political agency rather than becoming a messenger for external interests.

Finally, clear international signaling must project that the region is not a pawn to be moved at will. Systematically implementing these strategies serves as the primary entry point for a dialectical transformation, forcing a shift from divide and rule tactics toward genuine, balanced engagement. By projecting strong political agency, the region can ensure that international and domestic actors view it as an indispensable partner in any lasting settlement.

Finally, based on your understanding of the region’s geopolitics and Ethiopia’s ambition for sea access, how do you see Tigray’s role within this evolving geopolitical landscape?

Geography offers strategic advantage, but if mismanaged it turns into a point of collision where competing forces converge, making the region a central battleground. The current situation reflects what is described as “ambiguous realism,” where engagement is neither idealistic nor destructive, but shaped by uncertainty and calculation. Within this context, key actors are compelled to interact—whether openly or indirectly—creating space for political maneuvering. This dynamic presents an opportunity, but it requires moving beyond narrow interests and individual ambitions.

Ethiopia’s debate over Red Sea access illustrates this ambiguity, with positions oscillating between outright rejection and highly charged nationalist rhetoric. Meanwhile, Tigray has maintained historical continuity on territorial issues, using silence or neutrality as a strategic signal. At the same time, this moment is seen as a critical turning point.

If the current period of relative peace is not utilized, both internal and external threats may intensify. There is a perception that Eritrean leadership is pursuing a calculated strategy to capitalize on this window to weaken and destroy Tigray, viewing it as a rare historical opportunity. The same is true with the federal government using the opportunity to dismantle TPLF and crushing Tigray at the very beginning of the outbreak of the war. So, this creates a scenario in which Tigray risks being crushed by both sides for a similar objective.

Controversy surrounding Lege Dembi is not new, as the mine was shuttered in 2018 following public uproar over environmental damage and health impacts. At the time, studies and reports from rights groups indicated the presence of worrying levels of mercury and cyanide near the mine, impacting newborn children, plants, and livestock.

Mining resumed in 2021 despite the concerns, which remain unaddressed. MIDROC claims it paid affected communities a “livelihood restoration” but details on what exactly that entails are unavailable. The company also claims any mercury in the area is residue from the mine’s days under state ownership.

Today, a gold boom in Ethiopia has lured tens of thousands of artisanal miners to an industry that relies on smuggled heavy metals, magnifying worries about toxic waste, environmental degradation, and public health.

Juliane Kippenberg is associate director in the Children’s Rights Division of Human Rights Watch and an expert on human rights abuses in mining and mineral supply chains. Since 2011, she has conducted investigations and published reports on child labor, children’s environmental health, related subjects in Ghana, Ethiopia, Mali, Tanzania, Zambia, and the Philippines, and advocated for more robust rights protections in mining and in global supply chains.

In an interview with The Reporter’s Ashenafi Endale, Kippenberg shed further light on the concerns surrounding Lege Dembi and the wider Ethiopian gold mining industry. EXCERPTS:

The Reporter: How do you assess the environmental hazard and human rights violation risks associated with mining?

The mining industry is a high-risk sector. There are many human rights and environmental harms taking place, including violations of labor rights, pollution and ill-health, and linkages between mining and armed conflict-related abuses.   

In December 2025, an NGO named Kontoma Darimu Alliance and Northwestern University’s  Center for International Human Rights (CIHR) published a report on the health crisis facing people living in the vicinity of the Lege Dembi gold mine. It highlighted miscarriages, birth defects, and skin disease, among other worrying problems. What else can you tell our readers?

Residents living near the Lege Dembi mine have complained about serious health impacts for years, including miscarriages, stillbirths, and children born with long-term health conditions. Several studies have also found high concentrations of toxic heavy metals and other chemicals, including cadmium, mercury, lead, and arsenic, near the mine. Now this new report contains fresh testimony from 2025, so several years after the government and MIDROC claim they solved the problems at the mine. The report includes shocking cases of children’s ill-health and deaths, as well as stillbirths. Residents also say they have to drink water from MIDROC’s tailings dams because there is insufficient clean drinking water. One case from the report that stuck with me is of a woman who suffered two stillbirths, and then gave birth to a baby boy who died a few hours after birth.

Reports on the mine’s toxic effects have surfaced repeatedly over the past decade, yet the company continues to refute them. Why do you think decisive action has not been taken?

Some steps have been taken but they don’t seem to have succeeded in protecting people’s health. The reason for this is probably that there is a lack of political will on the part of the government to truly address the problem. Lege Dembi is Ethiopia’s largest gold mine so is an important business for the country’s economy. There has also been little pressure from outside so far.

In 2018, the Ethiopian government closed the mine and promised to reopen it only after environmental concerns had been addressed. It then signed a memorandum of understanding with the global company operating the mine, MIDROC Investment Group, and reopened the mine in 2021. The MoU was never published, so the exact steps taken were not known. MIDROC stated in a 2023 letter to Human Rights Watch that it had paid compensation (called livelihood restoration) to victims, improved cyanide waste management, and provided clean drinking water. In early March 2026, MIDROC denied that there were any human rights impacts resulting from its operations and said the contaminants were in the “allowable range of international standards”. MIDROC also said it constructed a hospital, and that the drinking water provided was sufficient. Yet, the NGO report suggests that the health problems of local residents have continued to occur.

Which hazardous chemicals are responsible for the health problems?

I do not have the answer to that, I am not a chemist or environmental scientist. What we know from chemical and environmental studies is that cyanide, mercury, arsenic, cadmium and lead have been found near the mine. Mercury and cyanide are both widely used to leach gold from the ore—cyanide by MIDROC, and mercury was used by its predecessor pre-1997. When mercury and cyanide are mixed in a certain way, after they are released to the environment, the mixture can cause lethal problems on humans and the environment, so this could be part of the problem.

However, there is no independent evidence which chemical is being used at the site. What it really needs is a full, independent environmental health assessment to recommend steps to protect residents’ right to health and to a healthy environment.

There have been assessments conducted but the findings were never made public. Are you aware of any independent audits?

Lege Dembi mine was never opened up for independent environmental auditing.

However, a number of reports have been conducted, either by firms close to MIDROC, or government institutions. So, these are not impartial reports. Yet, even those studies contain alarming evidence regarding the use of hazardous chemicals at the site, and the health risks connected to these chemicals.

The UN Committee on the Rights of the Child inquired about the mine and those affected during a recent meeting, and an Ethiopian delegation replied by stating that affected communities had been compensated. Was compensation paid out?

We understand from MIDROC that payments were made to the affected communities. MIDROC does not call this compensation, but livelihood restoration. However, there is no public report on this process, disclosing for example how victims were identified, on what basis the compensation was given, whether it was cash disbursement or other remedy, or when it was done.

Less than two months ago, the International Cyanide Management Institute (ICMI) certified MIDROC’s safe use of the chemical. Was this certification based on an independent assessment?

Yes, the certification under the ICMI states it is based on an audit by an independent, third-party auditor. We cannot judge whether this was a legitimate and transparent process. 

Have you pressured MIDROC or the Ministry of Mines on issues related to the affected communities, or requested an independent audit of the site?

In our 2023 report, we called upon the government, MIDROC and the company to conduct a comprehensive, inclusive, and transparent process of remediation at the mine, guided by international environmental and health experts. We also urged the government, together with international environmental and health experts, to put in place a robust monitoring program, subject to independent audits, that will monitor and publish contaminant levels over time, taking corrective action when contaminant levels exceed thresholds. We have also reached out to the government and MIDROC directly.

Who can force commercial miners to open their doors to an independent environmental audit?

Ideally the UN and also World Bank can exert pressure to make sure the Ethiopian government and the company open up the mine for independent environmental health assessment, and also make sure the mine adheres to international laws and standards of chemical uses during mining.

MIDROC acquired the mine from the government in the mid-90s. The company has previously claimed that mercury was used while the mine was under state ownership, and said it has only ever utilized cyanide. Do you think this is true?

From what we know this is true. Before MIDROC bought Lege Dembi from the government, the government was using mercury in the mine. MIDROC claims it stopped using mercury and shifted to using cyanide. But this should be confirmed by independent auditors. Even if MIDROC is not using mercury anymore, there is a problem with mercury—mercury stays in the environment for a long time. That means even the mercury the previous company used is still in the soil, water bodies, and the environment.

International conventions prohibit trade in minerals sourced from conflict zones, and there are laws in place against labor abuse and environmental degradation in the industry. However, gold mined in Lege Dembi is readily received by the global market. Do you think large mining firms can truly be held accountable?

Until the closure of Lege Dembi in 2018, MIDROC sold the gold to a gold refinery in Switzerland. However, after MIDROC reopened the Lege Dembi in 2021, the gold was not being supplied to Switzerland anymore. We have written to the UAE, another major destination for gold, to ask them to check if gold from Lege Dembi is being sold there, but the government did not answer. We do not know where they are sending the gold now.

Actors in global supply chains—such as traders, gold refineries, and jewelry brands, as well as industry bodies such as the LBMA—can do more to ensure they are not contributing to abuses. We have been pushing for more responsible conduct, and for mandatory rules on due diligence, in gold supply chains for years.

Reports suggest that substantial volumes of hazardous chemicals like mercury and cyanide are circulating and in use in Ethiopia at present, including by local artisanal miners and foreign mining outfits. How are these chemicals making their way into the country? Why is the government unable to trace and identify suppliers and distributors?

Basically, Importing mercury legally is prohibited under the Minamata Convention on Mercury, a global treaty designed to protect human health and the environment from anthropogenic emissions and releases of mercury and mercury compounds. It specifically bans, restricts, or regulates the import of mercury from primary mining and other unauthorized sources.

Therefore, the mercury being circulated in Ethiopia is most likely illegally smuggled. 

How many people do you think are affected by the abuse of hazardous chemicals in the mining industry?

An estimated 50 million people are working in gold mining globally, most of them in artisanal and small-scale mining. Therefore, the risk and exposure to hazardous chemicals is significant.

As the world celebrates International Women’s Day (March 8), the spotlight remains on the critical intersection of gender, conflict, and food security. Maureen Miruka (PhD), director of Gender Equity, Youth and Social Inclusion at CIMMYT, brings over two decades of experience in gender responsive approaches across agricultural research and innovation.

A development studies expert, Miruka has held leadership roles focused on equity in smallholder farming systems across the Global South. Her career includes 16 years at the Kenya Agricultural Research and Livestock Organization (KALRO) and 12 years at CARE, an international development and humanitarian non-profit.

During her time at CARE, she worked on gender equity, gender transformative approaches, and food systems. At CIMMYT, where she has worked for close to one year, Miruka oversees the development of policies, research protocols, and innovation frameworks. These initiatives align science with climate-resilient outcomes and inclusive food systems.

Before joining CIMMYT, Miruka worked with agricultural and food systems in Ethiopia. Today, she continues this work from CIMMYT headquarters in El Batán, Mexico, as a gender scientist and research specialist. Her work at the organization encompasses designing and scaling initiatives that advance equity in farming systems to ensure sustainable food systems.

Miruka’s current role also involves embedding gender approaches into agricultural research and advisory systems.

In an interview with Abraham Tekle of The Reporter, Miruka highlighted the importance of women in leadership and the urgent need to address worsening GBV across Africa. The discussion also focused on achieving justice for survivors, implementing land policy reforms to guarantee women’s access to property, and advancing broader women’s rights. EXCERPTS:

The Reporter: With nearly three decades of experience in social institutions and gender equity, you have frequently shared your perspective on women’s leadership. What drives your commitment to advocacy within the fields of science and agriculture?

Maureen Miruka (PhD): If we begin by looking at the role of women in agri-food systems worldwide, we know that nearly 50 percent of women are involved in agricultural production and make a huge difference. When we turn to Ethiopia, the latest statistics show that agriculture employs over 75 percent of the workforce, and that 80 percent of women are involved in agriculture. In economies such as Ethiopia and Kenya, where I just came from, women’s roles in agriculture are not fully captured beyond what is well known, but their invisible labor also truly counts—and that is what makes these numbers reach 75 to 80 percent.

That also means we need women in positions of leadership, because we identify most easily and most deeply with the challenges women face, and that representation should extend all the way into leadership. Why this matters is that diversity drives expertise, thought processes, and decision-making. So, the more diverse leadership is, and the more women’s voices you have that match what they actually contribute to the sector, the more important it becomes.

In Ethiopia, that representation in parliament stands at about 23 percent, but you led the way in 2018 with gender parity in your parliament, which was truly significant. Additionally, the fact that you have a woman president and the work she has done over the years is something I am very much in awe of. I also read a book about the Battle of Adwa and the role of female leadership in Ethiopia’s struggle, so I believe your country is one that should truly recognize what women mean in leadership and create those spaces for them.

In a recent discussion with a Kenyan media outlet, you stated that leadership is not just about efficiency; it is a fundamental human right enshrined in international frameworks. Despite representing nearly half of the population, women’s representation in high-level decision-making remains low. Why is it critical for women to occupy leadership roles, particularly in national development, science, technology, and other related sectors?

First of all, women are farmers, entrepreneurs, and they are scientists who drive science at all levels. In terms of being scientists themselves, there are renowned women leaders in science in Ethiopia, and others who support science under operations. There are also who work behind the scenes to make sure that science and innovation move ahead. So, when you look at the roles women play across the entire spectrum of our food systems, they deserve a seat at the table, and equitably as they bring expertise, diversity of thought, opinion, and expertise.

They need to match the number of women involved in agriculture and food systems, so that we are serving them.

The other thing, our work with our partners at CIMMYT has actually shown that we have a partner, Last Mile, who worked with village agents who are women. Before they put a quota on the number of village agents they had, they were only able to reach about 23 percent of farmers. But they took a step back and said extension service providers who are women tend to reach women better. These women made sure that 80 percent of their village agents are women, and that enabled them to reach 50 percent of women with our help.

I think that brings in the other element of my answer, in terms of how we have such stringent, discriminatory, exclusionary social norms that we need to address. And that is not by focusing on women only, but also by working with men as decision makers and allies to move the needle. But we do need that leverage to close the gender gap we have in leadership.

You also said that education is a gateway to leadership, yet girls in rural areas of Ethiopia and Kenya face significant barriers. What are the most critical factors preventing girls from completing their schooling?

In Kenya, we believe that if you educate a woman, you educate the village. That, for me, is a big experience. My own mother was taken to school in a time when people did not believe in girls going to school. By her going to school, she completely transformed the life of her family and the life of anyone within her village. Being an educator, anyone from her village who wanted to go to any college-level education—because that was within her sphere of influence—she actually created the opportunities to do so by educating us.

What does that mean? I am here as a woman leader, providing leadership for our science and innovation at CIMMYT, and whatever else I have passed through, I am providing, just by being myself, role modeling for other women. I am also ensuring that we set up the structures within CIMMYT for mentorship and hand-holding by opening up opportunities, scholarships, and everything for women to step into this space and take up leadership.

However, in Africa, young women face such significant barriers earlier on in their lives compared to young boys because of social and cultural norms that are reinforced by poverty to limit the rights of women.

While socio-cultural barriers persist globally, Gender-Based Violence (GBV) remains a critical challenge across Africa, often exacerbated by regional instability. In Ethiopia, reports from the conflict in Tigray indicate that over 100,000 women fell victim to GBV, with similar patterns appearing in the ongoing unrest in the Amhara and Oromia regions where such violence has been documented as a tool of warfare. Given this context, what is the current status of legal and restorative justice for these survivors, and what systemic changes are needed?

Throughout the world, we have seen women being used as tools of war and experiencing gender-based violence again and again. For me, GBV has evolved to currently within a household, within online spaces, and social media has enabled it. It keeps evolving, and it requires us to really take a step back and say why this has happened and what we can do within our programming to ensure that the sexual violence, for instance, that women faced during the Tigray War should not happen.

Right now, there is so much crisis going on around the world, and that also makes the work we do with agricultural systems for research and development in building climate resilience to women, because what happens when people are fighting for scarce resources such as water, women have to walk long distances to go and fetch water. So, today, we recognize the triple harm that women face.

In the agricultural sector as well, when we do not implement gender transformative approaches, we do more harm that causes tensions in the household that lead to gender-based violence. So, we must really address it as a core issue in all of our programming and preempt conversations around GBV.

At CIMMYT, for instance, our Jesse Action Plan has five principles, and one of those is to ensure that we do no harm. Another is to make sure that we look at intersecting identities that might lead to all of that and really preempt GBV. But beyond having that as a principle, we have to have the tools and approaches for addressing it within our programs and having the right partners for doing so.

We cannot also work in the agriculture sector and say we do not know about this—we work with partners who already have the system set up for being frontline responders, for referral systems by linking with the police and providing all the medical, psychosocial, and other support.

To also tackle the issue, we should be able to know what the ecosystem that we are dealing with. The other thing is to go back again and use the approaches that I have worked a lot in my previous work that have been developed with organizations and other NGOs, such as CARE. These approaches help us to sit down and go through a conscientization process where women share what they go through and try to change those norms at the community level about GBV. However, all of these come to legislation and ensuring those international treaties at the national level.

So, if women are oppressed, GBV will aggravate and perverse.

Reports indicate that up to 50 percent of GBV survivors are in conflict-affected areas, where sexual violence is weaponized to terrorize communities. Despite thousands of reported cases, the accountability gap remains vast. Could you identify the primary obstaclesthat hinder successful prosecutions? How can you define its consequent impact?

Survivors face profound physical and psychological trauma, compounded by pervasive stigma and social exclusion. These factors, alongside the disruption of livelihoods and food systems, significantly increase the vulnerability of women. Within conflict zones, displacement and the collapse of support systems have led to a total breakdown of health, justice, and protection frameworks. Consequently, development interventions—regardless of whether they focus on climate or food systems—must mainstream the prevention of gender-based violence (GBV) rather than treating it as a concern exclusive to health-focused projects.

Governments must be held accountable for addressing historical injustices to ensure these cycles of violence do not persist. As researchers and scientists, it is essential to align with social movements advocating against these injustices. By providing robust data and evidence, we can demonstrate how GBV undermines community resilience and destabilizes food systems. Adopting this holistic, systems-based perspective allows us to illustrate the interconnectedness of food, health, and social stability, providing the necessary evidence to drive meaningful dialogue and policy change.

You have argued that women are the backbone of food systems. How does the current Ethiopian context reflect the need for a “stronger gender lens” in agriculture?

While women are the backbone of agriculture and are often credited with feeding the world, this should not result in an unfair burden being placed upon them. At CIMMYT and specifically within Ethiopia, women are recognized as agri-food system heroes who drive political discourse, science, innovation, and entrepreneurship, in addition to their roles as farmers. It is essential to adopt a systems perspective to ensure women secure their rightful place within the Ethiopian agricultural landscape.

Past collaborative work in Ethiopia focused on institutionalizing gender-transformative approaches, starting at the community level to address social and gender norms. The goal was to enable the Ethiopian Ministry of Agriculture and aligned ministries to implement these strategies effectively. This included ensuring gender parity at the ministerial level by refining job descriptions to attract women to the sector. These efforts considered how women are reached, how they benefit, and how they are empowered through systemic transformation.

Applying this knowledge to on-ground market systems development requires a deep consideration of social norms and the implementation of gender-transformative approaches. This is a critical link in the development continuum; even the superior varieties of wheat and maize developed in Ethiopia will not achieve their full potential without addressing market systems. Furthermore, these innovations cannot benefit the population holistically if women’s roles within these systems are overlooked. A comprehensive, holistic outlook is necessary to move the needle forward.

What systemic reforms are still required to ensure that women across Africa—and Ethiopia specifically—can transition from marginal players to primary beneficiaries and impactful leaders in the agricultural sector?

For me, land access is a critical component of agricultural development and the creation of resilient food systems. As to my knowledge, in Ethiopia, it is estimated that only 20 to 30 percent of women hold formal land ownership documents. This is largely because their names are frequently omitted from land certificates, a common occurrence within government-owned land systems, community-based arrangements, or traditional inheritance structures.

The challenge of land access is compounded by marital and inheritance traditions; when women marry and leave their family homes, they often lose their claim to ancestral land. While countries like Kenya and India have passed legislation granting women the right to inherit land from their parents, deeply rooted social norms often prevent these laws from being realized. To address this, we must bridge the gap between formal legislation and community-level social norms, ensuring a shift that allows these legal rights to be fully exercised.

In Ethiopia, what I have seen—and what continues to happen—is the need to ensure not just addressing the lack of women’s inclusion, but also promoting joint thinking between men and women. This is important so that women have control and decision-making power, particularly in relation to land systems to ensure continued investment in land productivity. If you do not have ownership over a piece of land, you are less likely to make significant investments in it. In that regard, land certification reforms in Ethiopia are expected to have a strong impact.

Evidence has already shown that when women’s land rights are strengthened, overall productivity and household welfare improve.

I have served as a board director at an organization known as land campaign for Ladessa in Ethiopia involved in the Stand for Her Land (S4HL) campaign, in which many countries are participating. This is part of a broader social movement that should expand globally to address these issues, using tools developed by the organization and others to support land reform.

These reforms are important, but they must be aligned with social norms and institutional processes. When this alignment is achieved in land systems, food systems become more resilient. Women gain better access to finance—since land is often used as collateral—and improved access to markets, which supports long-term productivity.

What lessons should the country take from international institutions to ensure these policies are actually implemented on the ground?

The S4HL campaign is a tool that Ladessa has developed should be fully utilized. Ladessa, together with partners that have experience engaging with governments, communities, and traditional institutions on land-related issues related with land. We already have data from Ethiopia, which indicates figures in the range of 22 to 30 percent. At the same time, we recognize that earlier land reforms have contributed to the empowerment of women in the sector. The question then becomes how to move to the next level.

In my view, this requires addressing the social norms surrounding land ownership. Policy reforms alone can only achieve limited impact. It is necessary to engage communities directly, working at the local level. For example, in Kenya—where I come from—approaches differ significantly between communities, such as those in the western part of the country and those in central Kenya. Similarly, in Ethiopia, interventions must be highly contextualized, taking into account the country’s ethnic diversity and varying local practices related to women’s land ownership.

As we look beyond the month of March, what is your “call to action” for the Ethiopian government and the international community to ensure a future where women and girls can lead and thrive?

I have said it many times: women are at the center of agricultural development. Gender equity and social inclusion are central to this—they are not side issues. They are not things to be addressed only when convenient. My call to the Government of Ethiopia is to recognize women as key actors: as farmers, entrepreneurs, scientists, extension service providers, policymakers, and as part of the broader system that supports research and development.

We also know that agriculture employs about 75 percent of Ethiopia’s workforce. When investment is directed toward women’s labor, access to climate-resilient technologies—as we are discussing CIMMYT—and women’s leadership in agricultural systems, it contributes directly to the country’s socioeconomic growth, particularly in the case of Ethiopia’s economy. Doing this is also a matter of justice or a social justice issue that must be addressed.

So, we have to shift the focus from simply raising awareness to taking action. We already have the data—we know where women are and what they are doing. What is needed now is to ensure that women have access to land, finance, innovation, and leadership opportunities. In particular, access to finance can unlock many of the resources’ women need to fully participate and contribute. The emphasis should now be on action: allocating budgets and directing donor funding toward these priorities. As we have the data, we understand the solutions, and we know what works. The next step is to move forward and implement what needs to be done.