This renewed partnership, which has been under way for several years, is based on the shared ambition to draw balanced and mutually beneficial cooperation. The Africa-France Summit organized in Montpellier in 2021 opened this reflection by giving a voice to youth and actors from civil society and African diasporas. It is now necessary to amplify this dynamic. The organization of an Africa-France summit in Kenya, a non-French-speaking country, illustrates this movement of openness and the broadening of relations between France and the entire continent.

This Summit is also a call to invest in new areas of cooperation, particularly in the fields of heritage, culture and sport, in order to invent more humane and direct forms of partnership, especially between our youth and our diasporas. This summit highlights creators, athletes, artists and all those who, through their initiatives, are already shaping the relations between Africa and the France of tomorrow.

Strengthening our ties must also rely on the private sector, which creates opportunities and drives growth. This is why President Emmanuel Macron and President William Ruto want to give a strong economic dimension to this meeting, which is opening with a business forum. The aim is to promote a more horizontal approach, where innovation, entrepreneurship and youth play a central role in addressing the continent’s challenges.

But this re-foundation is not only guided by shared interests; it is also a strategic necessity in a changing world.

At a time when international law and multilateralism are being called into question, France and Africa are carrying a common agenda on global issues and a common commitment to international law and multilateralism, as recalled by the Summit between the European Union and the African Union organized in Luanda, Angola in November 2025. This Summit also constitutes an opportunity for France and Kenya to pledge for a better representation of the African continent in global governance, particularly in the UN Security Council and the international financial system.

The Summit offers the opportunity to move forward on concrete priorities: energy transition, sustainable agriculture, artificial intelligence, blue economy or health. These are all areas where French and Kenyan expertise can complement each other and lead to useful, sustainable solutions adapted to local realities.

Moreover, this Summit is a chance to highlight the commitment of France, Kenya and other African countries to stepping up mutual investment and to financing tangible solutions to common challenges.

Beyond the projects and declarations, this meeting must above all embody a shared ambition: to build a relationship based on trust and reciprocity.

Africa and France have considerable assets: dynamic youth, abundant creativity and a common interest to find together solutions to global challenges. By setting them in motion together, we can create a renewed partnership, looking to the future, capable of meeting the expectations of our societies and contributing to a more balanced, more united and more sustainable world.

The Africa Forward Summit being action-oriented, the results of the Summit will contribute to consolidate the ties between African countries and France and build forward-looking partnerships.

(Alexis Lamek is the Ambassador of France to Ethiopia and the African Union.)

Rallying humanitarian support, Erdoğan’s visit spurred an outpouring of affection for Turkey, with the white crescent and star on red subsequently adorning much of the country. Some Somali children were even named after the Turkish leader. Flash forward nearly fifteen years, and much of the regional and global political landscape has changed almost beyond recognition – as have Turkish geostrategic stakes in Somalia. What followed has been a transformation in kind and scale, spanning military bases and now deepwater drillships, and situated in a broader geopolitical contest for the Gulf of Aden and Red Sea.

Ankara’s engagement has passed through several distinct phases over the years, shifting from soft power and humanitarian diplomacy through infrastructure management to becoming Mogadishu’s foremost foreign allytoday.

Since Erdoğan’s visit, Turkish soft power has proliferated, with thousands of Somali students in Istanbul or Ankara, the Mogadishu elite holidaying in Turkey, and Turkish brands such as Enza Home becoming markers of middle-class aspiration in the capital. At the same time, Turkish companies have assumed control of the management of the Mogadishu port and airport, whilst Camp TURKSOM – Ankara’s largest overseas military base – has facilitated the training of thousands of Gorgor special forces since 2017.

Throughout, Turkey has channelled its support exclusively through the federal government in Mogadishu, a posture that distinguishes it from the UAE – a geostrategic rival of Ankara’s in the Horn of Africa – and Ethiopia, which both have cultivated ties with Somalia’s semi-autonomous regional administrations of Puntland and Jubaland, as well as Somaliland.

Today, it is Riyadh and Abu Dhabi that are grappling for ascendancy over the Red Sea, but in 2017, simmering tensions within the Gulf Cooperation Council erupted into the open, with a Saudi-Emirati-led coalition seeking to blockade Qatar, aligned with Turkey, due to its alleged ties with Iran and various Islamist movements. Though publicly neutral, Mogadishu allied itself with Qatar and Turkey in the fallout– infuriating the UAE, which subsequently broadly steered its considerable financial and military support away from Mogadishu. In this period, however, Ankara was broadly considered the ‘junior partner’ in Somalia for Doha, helping to steer patronage and aid on Qatar’s behalf.

Drill, Baby, Drill

During Hassan Sheikh Mohamud’s second administration, though, it is Turkey that has stepped into the fore, with the more recent prospect of hydrocarbon extraction marking the most significant expansion of the Somali-Turkish relationship to date. Though a NATO member, Turkey has simultaneously taken an increasingly assertive posture across the Middle East, North Africa, and, more recently, the Horn. And as part of this independent foreign policy, Ankara has similarly sought to diversify its reliance on hydrocarbon imports from Azerbaijan, Iraq, Kazakhstan and Russia, significantly expanding its domestic extraction capacity in recent years.

In turn, the decades-old promise of oil and gas – onshore and offshore – in Somalia has proven particularly enticing to Ankara, with the two countries striking a rapid deal in early 2024 for Turkey to exploit Somalia’s latent resources. For its proponents in Somalia, it offers the realisation of a long-awaited dream, with seeps of oil first formally identified by British and Italian geologists in the colonial era. Agreements with Chevron and Shell in the 1950s never translated into formal extraction, and the collapse of the Somali state in the early 1990s – leading to decades of persistent instability and conflict – has left the reserves untapped. And they are believed to be substantial, with more recent seismic studies suggesting around 30 billion barrels, around a quarter of the UAE’s current proven crude oil reserves.

Such a Turkish rationale is likely to grow only further amid the conflagration in the Middle East, with the Gulf energy architecture set ablaze in the US-Israeli assault on Iran. The repercussions of this war – and the selective blockade of the Strait of Hormuz – will reverberate through globalised energy and trade networks for years to come, placing fresh urgency on Ankara’s search for self-sufficiency.

However, a number of criticisms from Somali parties have been levied at the lopsided deal, not least that it was rushed through Somalia’s parliament without scrutiny. The agreement came as Mogadishu sought to rally its foreign allies against a promised deal between Ethiopia and Somaliland, for sovereign recognition in exchange for sea access. Though Addis eventually backed away from its pact with Somaliland following Turkish-mediated negotiations with Mogadishu, Ankara is still permitted to recover up to 90% of the cost of Somali oil or gas produced before any sharing of profits, and its state-owned petroleum company is exempt from production bonuses.

Somalia’s royalties, on the other hand, are capped at just five percent. In a country as impoverished as Somalia, there is discernible excitement about the prospect of a transformative injection of oil money, but the nature of Ankara’s bilateral – often clandestine – dealings with Villa Somalia is causing growing concern as well. Furthermore, Somalia’s federal government has been repeatedly accused of monopolising and politicising funds, withholding support for Jubaland and Puntland after they severed relations over its electoral agenda.

But the hydrocarbon deal is moving ahead and, in April, Turkey’s latest deepwater drillship, the Çağrı Bey – the first deployed outside Turkish territorial waters – arrived at Mogadishu Port amidst much pomp and fanfare. Exploratory drilling is expected to begin in the coming weeks at the Curad-1 well-site, 370 km from Mogadishu, at a depth of 7,500 m. Substantial infrastructure will still need to be constructed, but Ankara is making headway.

Turkey’s Growing Military Stakes

In the past two years, the military dimensions of the Somali-Turkish relationship have grown in lockstep, with some considering them a guarantor of Ankara’s commercial stakes. Jets, drones, helicopters, warships and more have appeared in Mogadishu in recent months, showcasing Turkey’s impressive homegrown military technology. Such aerial support, too, has played a role in operations against Al-Shabaab, the jihadist insurgency and Al-Qaeda affiliate that has waged a grinding war against the Somali state for two decades.

The political will of the Somali government, though, is more questionable. Emboldened by its foreign allies’ support, Villa Somalia has monopolistically sought to consolidate power at home, overriding historic guardrails to rewrite much of the Provisional Constitution earlier in 2026 under the guise of restoring direct democracy. Simultaneously, the gradual penetration of Turkish interests and advisors into parts of the Somali state has become considerable, epitomised by the government’s new Islamist-flavoured ruling Justice and Development Party in Mogadishu, having been modelled on Erdoğan’s own movement.

Moreover, the drawing down of a wearied diplomatic corps – particularly the United States and the UN – from Somalia has opened space for such consolidation. In March, during the violent ousting of a regional leader in southern Somalia after he broke ranks with the government’s electoral agenda, Ankara was accused of facilitating his removal with military and fiscal support. Such an assertive role in Somalia’s fraught domestic politics represents precisely the kind of internal deployment that its critics had long cautioned against, and may yet signal Ankara’s willingness to underwrite Villa Somalia’s own controversial adventurism at home.

In the Regional Contest

But Somalia is far from the limit of Ankara’s ambitions in the region, rather a broader platform for them. It was no coincidence that President Hassan Sheikh’s first visit following Israel’s unilateral recognition of Somaliland in late December 2025 – a bombshell development facilitated by the UAE – was to Ankara.

Agreed during his trip and now coming into sharper focus are plans for a Turkish military base in Laas Qoray, located in a contested region on the Gulf of Aden, the strategic, narrow waterway that connects the Red Sea to the Indian Ocean and through which roughly 12 percent  of global trade passes. The Laas Qoray base would serve as a direct riposte to the growing Israeli and Emirati presence in Somaliland, further along the coast. Though a direct armed conflict between Ankara and Tel Aviv remains unlikely, the theatres in which their geostrategic interests diverge – from Somalia to Syria to the eastern Mediterranean – are multiplying.

That rivalry is part of a broader and accelerating reconfiguration of influence across both sides of the Red Sea; a vast, interlocking theatre, in which the fates of littoral states are being shaped by competition between Israel, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and the UAE. Each state has pursued interests along the Horn’s coastlines and hinterlands, driven by a combination of imperatives, including securing ports and waterways, hedging against hydrocarbon dependence, and divergent views on the role of political Islam.

To date, such external transactional and militarised politics have wrought immense damage on the Horn, deepening pre-existing fissures and fractures from the Somali peninsula to divergences between Egypt and Ethiopia over the Nile water basin, as well as eroding the region’s fragile multilateral peace and security architecture.

Since 2023, the epicentre has been the war in Sudan, effectively a proxy conflict pitting the UAE, principally backing the Rapid Support Forces, against Saudi Arabia and Egypt, supporting the Sudanese army, with an array of African and Arab states behind either party. Within a divided Somalia itself, the Puntland government has been accused of allowing Abu Dhabi to smuggle weapons through Bosaaso airport, whilst the Sudanese military intelligence has facilitated militia support for Mogadishu.

Even before the continuing US/Israel-Iranian war, the western Indian Ocean and Gulf of Aden were bristling with competing navies and interests, ranging from the Iranian-backed Houthis in Yemen to Operation ATALANTA, the EU mission designed to combat piracy. And a Turkish installation at Laas Qoray would join facilities operated by China, France, Italy, Japan, and the US in neighbouring Djibouti, further deepening the concentration of foreign military power near the Bab al-Mandab, the critical chokepoint between the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea, whose strategic significance the Iran conflict has thrown into savage relief. Alongside oil, the real estate value of control over these aortic straits has soared in the past weeks.

Turkish interests in Somalia are an expression of a longer history; the blending of commercial and security interests through these arterial waterways is centuries old, be it through Royal Navy frigates or American aircraft carriers. What has changed, though, is the collapse of the multilateral framework that once provided a degree of structure, however imperfect, to the post-Cold War competition and the dying era of the ‘liberal peace.’ In its place, a bluntly transactional geo-kleptocratic logic has stepped forward, in which the scramble for energy is reshaping politics across the globe.

More than most countries in the Horn of Africa, the Somali peninsula’s geographic position has drawn trade, religion, and cultural exchange for millennia with the Middle East and beyond. It is impossible to divorce Somalia’s politics or culture from the broader region, not least with many Somali clans regarding themselves as ‘Arab’ rather than ‘African.’

Instead, the question for Somalia and the Horn writ large remains whether its governments can convert the rivalries from across the Red Sea from a source of instability into positive leverage for their own countries. Whether Turkey’s rising geostrategic investments in Somalia offer a transformative model of engagement or simply more of the same externalised insecurity will have to be seen, but the augurs are hardly positive.

Matthew de Waal is a freelance analyst on peace and security on the Horn of Africa based in Nairobi.

Contributed by Matthew Chandler de Waal

There is no doubt that peace matters. For a region that has historically suffered from insecurity, underdevelopment, political exclusion, and deep social wounds, any serious effort to improve stability deserves recognition. Roads, schools, hospitals, water infrastructure, investment, and expanded public services are not small matters. They affect real lives. Communities that once measured governance mainly through security operations and suspicion naturally welcome visible development, improved mobility, access to services, and a greater sense of normalcy.

In that regard, the President’s emphasis on peace as the foundation of development is valid. No investor comes where insecurity dominates. No school functions properly where fear controls daily life. No hospital, road, or market can fully serve people where communities are constantly uncertain about tomorrow. The Somali Region needed peace, and it still needs peace.

But peace should never be understood only as the absence of armed conflict. Peace is also the presence of justice, trust, dignity, inclusion, accountability, and equal treatment before public institutions. A region may be calm on the surface while still carrying unresolved grievances underneath. A government may build infrastructure while still needing to strengthen political openness, public participation, and institutional accountability.

This is where the interview invites careful reflection.

The President states that the Somali Region’s “only question is development.” This is a powerful phrase, but it is also a phrase that requires caution. Development is indeed a central question. But it cannot be the only question. For communities that have experienced historical marginalization, political trauma, displacement, drought, conflict, and exclusion, development is inseparable from justice, representation, rights, and voice.

People do not live by roads and buildings alone. They also live by confidence in institutions. They live by the freedom to speak without fear. They live by the assurance that public resources are used fairly, that opportunities are not captured by networks of loyalty, and that criticism is not treated as hostility.

Development without accountability risks becoming a story told from the top rather than a reality measured from below.

The interview presents impressive claims: expanded water schemes, new hospitals, schools, roads, agricultural investment, private-sector growth, and major expectations from natural gas and fertilizer projects. These are important developments, and where they have improved people’s lives, they deserve to be acknowledged. But they also deserve to be publicly documented, independently assessed, and measured against outcomes.

How many communities now have reliable water throughout the year? How many of the new schools have qualified teachers, learning materials, and safe environments for girls and children from pastoral communities? How many hospitals have adequate staff, medicine, equipment, and referral capacity? How much of the reported investment has created decent employment for ordinary people rather than simply benefiting politically connected actors?

These questions are not attacks. They are the normal questions of responsible citizenship.

A confident administration should not fear scrutiny. In fact, the stronger the development record, the more open the government should be to independent assessment. Public achievements become more credible when they are supported by transparent data, citizen feedback, parliamentary oversight, media freedom, and space for civil society.

The Somali Region is vast, diverse, and complex. Its development needs cannot be captured by a single narrative. Urban growth in Jigjiga, improvements in main towns, or progress in selected investment corridors should not hide the continued struggles of pastoral and agro-pastoral communities living with drought, water scarcity, poor road access, livestock disease, market shocks, and climate-related displacement. The real test of development is not only what is visible in regional capitals, but what reaches remote communities during hard seasons.

The President also speaks strongly about political stability and opposition weakness. While stability is important, democracy requires more than the absence of serious challengers. It requires meaningful competition, credible elections, tolerant public debate, and institutions that protect dissent. A political environment where everyone agrees with the government is not necessarily a sign of contentment. Sometimes it may also reflect fear, fatigue, dependency, or lack of trust that criticism will be handled fairly.

The best way to prove that there is no public discontent is not to declare it. It is to allow citizens, journalists, opposition parties, elders, youth, women, professionals, and civil society actors to speak freely and organize peacefully.

The Somali Region has come through painful political chapters. Its people understand the cost of conflict more than most. For that reason, no responsible actor should romanticize instability or encourage a return to violence. But the rejection of violence should not be used to silence peaceful criticism. Supporting peace and demanding accountability are not contradictory. They are mutually reinforcing.

A government that listens early avoids crisis later.

The interview also touches on natural gas, fertilizer production, electricity, and the promise of transforming the regional economy. These projects could indeed become major opportunities. But natural resources can be either a blessing or a source of grievance depending on how they are governed. Communities around resource areas must see real benefits, not only in law but in practice. Revenue sharing, local employment, environmental protection, compensation, consultation, and transparent contracting will determine whether these projects create shared prosperity or deepen mistrust.

The Somali Region should not simply become a place where resources are extracted. It must become a place where resource wealth builds human capital, climate resilience, local enterprise, and intergenerational opportunity.

The President’s recognition that the region was historically marginalized is important. However, overcoming marginalization requires more than inclusion in national economic plans. It requires strong regional institutions, fair federal-regional relations, respect for local voices, and development models that fit the realities of pastoral and borderland communities. The Somali Region’s future should not be imagined only through mega-projects and urban expansion, but also through resilient livelihoods, livestock markets, water systems, dryland agriculture, climate services, education, and peace across borders.

The interview’s broader national message also deserves attention. The President presents the Prosperity Party as a centrist force seeking to bridge extremes and strengthen national unity. Ethiopia certainly needs moderation, dialogue, constitutionalism, and peaceful political competition. But national unity cannot be built by rhetoric alone. It must be built through fairness, justice, credible institutions, and respect for Ethiopia’s diversity. Unity becomes meaningful when citizens feel protected, represented, and heard.

For the Somali Region, the challenge ahead is clear. The leadership should continue investing in development, but it should also widen the political space. It should celebrate achievements, but also accept criticism. It should protect peace, but also address grievances. It should attract investment, but also protect communities. It should speak about progress, but also publish evidence. It should promote regional pride, but also avoid treating dissenting voices as enemies.

President Mustafe’s interview is valuable because it sets out the government’s case in its own words. That case deserves to be heard. But the public also deserves a fuller conversation. Development is not a slogan. It is a lived experience. Peace is not a press statement. It is a daily relationship between citizens and the state. Leadership is not only about listing achievements. It is also about building trust, accepting responsibility, and allowing society to question power without fear.

The Somali Region has changed. That much is clear. The more important question is whether that change is deep, inclusive, accountable, and sustainable.

The region does not need a politics of permanent confrontation. Nor does it need a politics of unquestioned praise. It needs a mature public conversation where progress can be acknowledged, shortcomings can be named, and the future can be debated with dignity.

Development is welcome.

But development must walk beside justice, accountability, inclusion, and freedom. Only then can the peace dividend become a shared and lasting legacy for all people of the Somali Region.

Hussein Mohamed Yusuf is a Climate Change and Environmental Sustainability Professional based in Nairobi, Kenya. He can be reached at hussienm4@gmail.com.

Contributed by Hussein Mohamed Yusuf 

The People’s Republic of China (PRC) was excluded from the United Nations for 22 years. On October 25, 1971, the United Nations General Assembly, at its 26th session, adopted a resolution, recognizing the PRC as the legitimate representative of China and granting it permanent membership in the Security Council.

It is noteworthy that 26 African nations supported this resolution. Subsequently, the relationship between China and Africa has experienced substantial growth. African countries also endorsed China’s entry into the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001, which was followed by a rapid expansion of China’s economy. For the past 17 years, China has maintained its position as Africa’s primary trading partner.

Despite the increasing volume of trade between China and Africa, concerns remain regarding the trade balance, which appears to favor China.

In response to this concern, China has introduced zero-tariff treatment for African countries, aiming to promote a more balanced and mutually beneficial trade relationship.

The United States also implements similar initiatives, specifically the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA). However, these opportunities are extended to a select group of African nations, and eligibility can be suspended due to concerns regarding human rights violations, breaches of the rule of law, or political instability.

Personally, I believe that AGOA is more of a political tool than an economic one.

Similarly, the European Union also has a program called Everything But Arms (EBA) for some countries.

China’s Global Development Initiative emphasizes that the current global system should benefit least developed and developing countries. In line with this vision, China has taken substantial measures on tariff issues to support the Global South. In 2024, China granted zero-tariff treatment to 33 least developed African countries, demonstrating its continued commitment to openness.

President Xi Jinping reaffirmed this commitment in a congratulatory message to the 39th African Union Summit on February 14, 2026, stating that China would fully implement zero-tariff treatment for 53 African countries starting May 1, 2026. This extends the same benefits to the remaining 20 African countries that maintain diplomatic relations under the One China Policy. This policy shift represents a landmark development that could reshape global trade dynamics.

This opportunity holds significant economic potential for African countries. It allows them to export their products to China without tariff barriers. The policy, which will run from May 1, 2026, to April 30, 2028, enhances market access and strengthens economic partnerships. It is also likely to attract increased investment into Africa, as companies in the world may seek to capitalize on these favorable trade conditions.

China’s decision addresses one of Africa’s most pressing challenges—market access. The move has been widely welcomed by African governments.

United Nations Secretary-General Antonio Guterres praised the initiative and called on other developed countries to adopt similar measures. He emphasized that Africa should not be disadvantaged by restrictive trade policies.

Likewise, African Union Commission Chairperson Mahmoud Ali Youssouf described the decision as timely, particularly in light of global uncertainties such as conflicts in the Middle East that disrupt trade flows. This initiative is expected to play a vital role in strengthening China–Africa economic and trade relations.

At a time when multilateralism is weakening and protectionism is on the rise, China’s zero-tariff policy signals solidarity with Africa during a period of global economic uncertainty. To ensure effective implementation, China’s customs authority issued detailed rules of origin on April 29, covering certification, shipment requirements, and customs procedures.

The African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) provides an important framework to align intra-African trade with China’s zero-tariff policy. In his keynote address, China’s President highlighted China’s support for AfCFTA through initiatives such as connectivity projects and the establishment of an expert group on economic cooperation with the AfCFTA Secretariat.

China’s experience in developing a digital economy also offers valuable lessons. With the digital economy contributing more than 30 percent of China’s GDP, companies such as Baidu, Alibaba, and Tencent have become global leaders. China’s e-commerce ecosystem is vast, dynamic, and increasingly cashless, supported by widespread electronic payment systems and a large base of online consumers and entrepreneurs.

Integrating technology into China–Africa trade relations will further enhance economic cooperation. Alongside zero-tariff treatment, strengthening the digital economy can facilitate technology transfer and innovation. Expanding successful infrastructure projects, such as the Addis Ababa–Djibouti Railway under the Belt and Road Initiative, can also improve trade connectivity across the continent and with China.

Finally, enhancing the capacity of private sector actors engaged in import and export activities is essential. These actors serve as key drivers of economic relations alongside governments. Promoting experience-sharing through trade fairs, exhibitions, and capacity-building programs will enable African businesses to fully utilize the opportunities created by zero-tariff access to the Chinese market.

The zero-tariff policy marks a significant turning point in China–Africa economic relations.

African countries now have access to one of the world’s largest markets. This opportunity can stimulate both export growth and industrial development. It also creates favorable conditions for increased foreign investment in Africa. The initiative reinforces the importance of South–South cooperation in global trade. At a time of rising protectionism, it highlights the value of openness and partnership.

To maximize these benefits there is a need to have strong institutional and private sector capacity. Aligning this policy with AfCFTA can further strengthen both intra-African trade integration and trade between China and Africa in the twenty first century.

Melaku Mulualem K. is the director general for Training and Consultancy Directorate at the Institute of Foreign Affairs of Ethiopia.

Contributed by Melaku Mulualem K.

This is a critical turning point in time where the ultimate success or failure of an endeavour is determined in any area, be it in sports, business, relationships, politics, or what have you. It is a juncture where the outcome is effectively binary: success or failure, advancement or collapse, triumph or setback. You either rise to the occasion, making it, or fall short, breaking it.

This is a time when the outcome of an endeavor is put to the final test and can either succeed decisively or fail utterly. In a high-stakes instant where a single decision, performance, or response can determine the ultimate result, there is no in-between but a situation where you only face the moment of truth to make a choice between a go or no-go alternative, either to rise to the occasion or to fall short.

If underlying discipline, skill, and mindset are solid, you tend to rise to the occasion and seize the opportunity. On the contrary, if foundations are weak or confidence brittle, the same pressure can cause someone to fall short, reinforcing the “break it” side of the binary equation. So, there is a serious need to think and make a calculated compromise to decide on the better side.

This is a moment where preparation meets pressure to yield triumph or collapse. Normally, pressure amplifies underlying strengths; sometimes it disciplines one’s mindset to enable rising to the occasion, while weaknesses trigger choking.

Solid foundations foster confidence and make you task-focused, turning anxiety into composure for execution. But there are always double risks in such moments. The current status in West Asia seems to lead to this situation. In this region, the foundations are asymmetrically distributed.

Iran’s Axis of Resistance has spent decades building what it sees as a structural foundation. It helped to establish a layered deterrence through proxies, missile arsenals, and economic resilience under sanctions. However, the pressure of Israeli and US targeted assassinations (Soleimani, Haniyeh, Nasrallah) and degraded air defenses is testing whether that foundation is truly solid or merely brittle. The collapse of Assad’s foundation in Syria in just 11 days (Dec 2024) showed how quickly apparent strength can become precarious.

Israel has extraordinary tactical foundations—intelligence, air power, and technological innovation. Yet the pressure of a multi-front war (Gaza, Lebanon, Yemen, potential Iran strike) reveals a different story: strategic overstretch and diplomatic isolation. The Oct 7 failure was the ultimate “choke,” a moment where previously praised intelligence and preparation were tested under pressure.

Sometimes systems built to handle expected pressure often break under novel pressure. The US shock and awe doctrine choked in Iraq’s resistance and war tactics. Russia’s massive preparation choked in Ukraine’s first year with an unexpected jump from defense to attack.

The common trend is built assuming the opponent will fight on your terms. Finally, the “unpleasant alternative”—for Iran, it’s either humiliation or escalation; for Israel, it’s either endless attrition or a risky execution strike.

Every war front today is full of actors who were trained for yesterday’s war, but they are now facing a different scenario with UAV, drone, and interceptor technology of hybrid warfare. The novel pressure point is crucial. UAV swarms, electronic warfare, and low-cost wandering munitions are changing the calculus. Every major actor in West Asia is simultaneously afraid of the unpleasant alternative.

Evidently, Assad’s fall (Dec 2024) was a seismic shock, but it may be less an indictment of the Axis’s structural weakness than its geographic overextension. Syria was always the longest logistical land bridge from Hezbollah to Iran. Its collapse in 11 days revealed not that the entire Axis is brittle, but that Tehran’s ability to project power through failed states (Syria, post-withdrawal Iraq) happens to be a dangerous contingency, as a nearby collaborator at a critical moment in the play.

Israel’s war economy is running at a challenging rate. The U.S. can backstop munitions, not budget deficits or workforce depletion. By contrast, Iran has learned to run a sanctions economy for 45 years, yet its pain is now disturbingly high. The question isn’t who has more strength and who will run out of resources first. The “novel pressure” of drone/UAV warfare hits hardest to change the war calculus algorithm. Though the Iranian strike (300+ drones/missiles) was tactically intercepted, Iran learned it could force Israel to burn USD one billion in interceptors for USD 50 million in drones.

The warfare of the 2020s has brought a revolution in cost asymmetry. Iran’s one-way attack drones cost $20-50k; Israel’s, UAE’s, Qatar’s, and Kuwait’s interceptors (Arrow, David’s Sling) run $2-4 million per shot. In a protracted campaign, that math breaks the defenders’ simplification equation, leading to a collapse that necessitates an unexpectedly higher and more complex war calculus technique. Israel cannot afford to fight optimally. It can only afford to fight decisively and fast.

Such a multi-front war sends a clear message to Israel that Iran is a greater threat than expected. Thus, if Iran cannot be stopped from going nuclear at this moment, Israel will undoubtedly face a nuclear Iran in 12-18 months.

Thus, the only question is which system breaks first and whether the breaking happens as a controlled demolition or a catastrophic collapse. Come what may, it is a moment of make or break. When the gray zones of strategy collapse into a binary verdict of make or break, rise or fall, triumph or collapse, there is no margin for error, no shelter for halfway measures. Thus, the unforgiving arithmetic of modern hybrid warfare needs critical thinking in all steps for a synthesized, decisive verdict. Otherwise, one has to be ready to face the sharp blade of technology damage.

As you can see, in the current landscape of West Asian geopolitics, the long-standing shadow conflict between Iran and Israel has accelerated into a direct, high-stakes confrontation. Decades of proxy warfare, covert operations, and strategic politicking have collapsed into a moment where traditional deterrence no longer offers a safety net.

West Asia now stands at that exact juncture where the margin for error has evaporated, and the only remaining outcomes are decisive success or catastrophic failure. It is obvious that neither Iran nor Israel will win in any traditional sense.

But both sides have shown a remarkable capacity to absorb pressure without breaking. Israel survived October 7, a tactical choke of historic proportions. Iran survived Soleimani, Haniyeh, Nasrallah, and the degradation of its air defense. The drone/interceptor cost asymmetry and the novel pressure of hybrid warfare tilt the math toward the unraveling side.

With each side unwilling to back down on their individual terms, the silent and only remaining options are stark diplomatic channels for middle ground. The binary outcome is not victory for one and defeat for the other. Rather, it is a choice between two forms of breaking—controlled halt versus catastrophic collapse. Neither wants the catastrophic outcome, but both are locked into escalation dynamics because backing down looks like the other form of breaking.

The probable outcome is contingent upon the diplomatic channel. A controlled cessation necessitates a mutually acknowledged threshold of adversity—a juncture at which both parties can disengage and assert a measure of triumph. Iran requires either the alleviation of sanctions or a reliable deterrent against nuclear proliferation. Israel, conversely, seeks a diminished Hezbollah and a credible assurance that Iran is at least 12 months away from developing a nuclear weapon. However, these objectives do not appear to be reconcilable.

This is the true “moment of truth” for Washington, Doha, and Abu Dhabi, as much as for Tehran and Jerusalem. The question is whether the actors recognize the cliff before they step over it. This is a pivotal moment where escalating tensions across West Asia, where miscalculations could tip the region (and beyond) over that cliff.

We are currently at a pivotal juncture, observing the potential emergence of either favorable or unfavorable outcomes. Therefore, a controlled cessation of activities would be a prudent course of action. We express our hope for such a controlled halt, as a positive outlook is preferable to any alternative.

Contributed by Gizachew Wolde

Hypertension — defined as blood pressure persistently at or above 140/90 mmHg on at least two separate measurements — is a systemic condition that damages multiple organs, including the blood vessels, heart, kidneys, eyes and brain. It is a pervasive, multifaceted public health challenge with far-reaching consequences. Most deaths linked to hypertension occur not from the condition itself but from its complications, particularly cardiovascular and cerebrovascular events such as stroke.

The global burden is substantial and rising. Between 1990 and 2019, the number of people living with hypertension doubled to an estimated 1.3 billion. By 2023, roughly 1.28 billion adults aged 30 to 70 were affected. Yet awareness remains alarmingly low: nearly half of those with the condition do not know they have it. Untreated or poorly managed hypertension can lead to stroke, heart attack, heart failure, kidney failure and widespread organ damage.

The distribution of the disease is uneven. Globally, prevalence is slightly higher among men (34 percent) than women (32 percent), and rates have declined in high-income countries over the past three decades. By contrast, Africa bears the highest regional prevalence, at 36 percent, compared with 28 percent in the Western Pacific region. The gap is even more pronounced in diagnosis and care: in Africa, only 43 percent of cases are diagnosed and just 27 percent receive treatment, resulting in treatment control rates as low as 12 percent.

Ethiopia reflects these disparities. Cardiovascular deaths attributable to elevated systolic blood pressure account for a significant share of mortality, with a disproportionate burden among women. Nationally, only about 34 percent of people with hypertension are diagnosed, 16 percent receive treatment and a mere 6 percent achieve adequate control — a cascade that underscores systemic gaps in screening, access and continuity of care.

Hypertensive disorders take on added urgency in specific populations, particularly pregnant women. Maternal hypertensive disorders are among the leading causes of maternal mortality in sub-Saharan Africa, including Ethiopia, where they rank second. Surveillance data from the Ethiopian Public Health Institute have consistently identified pregnancy-induced hypertension as a major contributor to maternal deaths. Globally, the burden is increasing: between 1990 and 2019, the prevalence of maternal hypertensive disorders rose by 146 percent. In Ethiopia, a 2020 systematic review estimated a pooled prevalence of 6.8 percent.

The human and economic toll is profound. Hypertension not only strains health systems but also erodes household incomes and national productivity through premature death and chronic disability. Compounding the challenge, clinical guidelines have become more stringent. The American College of Cardiology and the American Heart Association now define hypertension at a lower threshold of 130/80 mmHg, expanding the number of individuals considered at risk and in need of monitoring or treatment.

Taken together, these trends point to a silent crisis that is both preventable and, with the right policies, manageable — yet still insufficiently addressed.

Why, then, should Ethiopia consider lowering the blood-pressure threshold used to define hypertension?

First, the scale of the problem is expanding rapidly. Hypertension is no longer a marginal condition but an increasingly common feature of the country’s disease profile. According to the Ministry of Health’s hospital disease registry for the 2017 Ethiopian fiscal year (2024/25), more than 877,000 cases of hypertension in its various forms were reported nationwide — a figure that almost certainly understates the true burden, given low detection rates.

Second, the underlying risk factors for noncommunicable diseases are widespread and, in many cases, worsening. Findings from the Ethiopian Public Health Institute–Ministry of Health STEPS survey (2024) point to a troubling landscape: tobacco use, though relatively low at 3.8 percent, is rising; alcohol consumption stands at 20.1 percent, with a significant share of heavy drinkers; and khat use has reached 23.4 percent nationally, often coupled with alcohol intake.

Physical inactivity affects nearly one in three adults. Average daily salt consumption — at 9.4 grams — is almost double the World Health Organization’s recommended limit. Diets remain poor in fruits and vegetables, and 10.9 percent of adults are overweight or obese.

Screening gaps are stark: the overwhelming majority of adults have never had their cholesterol measured, and fewer than half of those with elevated blood pressure are diagnosed and treated. These converging risks create a pipeline for sustained increases in hypertension and its complications.

Third, hypertension is already a major driver of premature mortality. In 2019 alone, it was associated with an estimated 627,000 deaths in Ethiopia, underscoring its role as a leading, yet largely preventable, cause of death.

Fourth, the age profile of the disease is shifting downward. Evidence from clinical settings suggests that hypertensive disorders — particularly those related to pregnancy — are increasingly affecting women in their 20’s. This trend amplifies both maternal and neonatal risks and places additional strain on health services. Fifth, the burden is projected to grow. By 2030, noncommunicable diseases, including hypertension, are expected to overtake infectious diseases as the leading causes of illness and death in Ethiopia.

Sixth, the country is navigating multiple, overlapping transitions—epidemiologic, demographic, nutritional and obstetric. These shifts are reshaping patterns of disease and vulnerability. The rise of hypertension, alongside persistent infectious diseases, reflects a system under dual pressure.

Seventh, the health system—particularly in rural areas—remains underprepared to manage chronic conditions and their complications, including maternal hypertensive disorders.

Eighth, pregnant women face compounded risks. The intersection of sex, reproductive age and pregnancy creates a distinct vulnerability to hypertensive disorders. Ninth, hypertension continues to behave as a “silent killer,” progressing without symptoms until severe complications arise. Lowering the diagnostic threshold would bring more individuals into care before irreversible damage occurs.

Finally, Ethiopia has already laid important groundwork. The Ministry of Health has developed strategies and guidelines for the prevention and management of hypertension. Aligning these efforts with a lower diagnostic threshold — 130/80 mmHg, as recommended by major international bodies — would expand the pool of individuals eligible for early intervention. While this would increase the number of diagnosed cases, it would also create an opportunity to prevent progression, avert complications and reduce long-term costs.

The logic is straightforward: earlier identification enables earlier action. Lowering the cutoff would not, on its own, solve the problem. But without it, millions will remain undiagnosed until the disease manifests in its most dangerous forms. Given the escalating prevalence of noncommunicable diseases within the nation, the pertinent inquiry is not whether Ethiopia can accommodate a reduced threshold, but rather whether it can sustain the consequences of not doing so.

Bedilu Abebe is a public health Specialist, lecturer and researcher. He is a PhD Candidate at Jimma univesity and can be reached via bediluab@gmail.com.

Contributed by Bedilu Abebe 

As African policymakers gather for the 5th Ordinary Session of the AU Specialized Technical Committee on Transport and Energy, the continent faces a stark reminder of its enduring vulnerability to external shocks. The recent disruption associated with the Strait of Hormuz—a critical artery for global energy flows—has triggered renewed volatility in fuel prices, shipping costs, and supply chains. For many African economies, the consequences are immediate and severe.

This is not simply another cycle of global price volatility. It is a structural stress test—one that exposes the depth of Africa’s integration into external energy systems and the fragility of its buffers. At a moment when the continent is advancing an ambitious development vision under Agenda 2063, energy security has re-emerged as both a vulnerability and an opportunity.

Over the past two decades, the African Union and its member states have built an increasingly coherent policy architecture for energy development and integration. Flagship initiatives such as the Programme for Infrastructure Development in Africa (PIDA) and the evolving African Single Electricity Market reflect a clear understanding that the continent’s energy challenge is less about resource scarcity than about fragmentation and underinvestment.

The logic is simple but compelling: integrated markets, interconnected grids, and coordinated infrastructure can unlock economies of scale and reduce vulnerability. Regional power pools linking countries across Eastern, Western, and Southern Africa have already demonstrated the benefits of shared capacity and cross-border electricity trade.

Yet the current crisis reveals the limits of this framework when confronted with acute external shocks. Much of the architecture remains aspirational or unevenly implemented. The gap between continental vision and operational readiness is where vulnerability persists.

Compared to other regions, Africa’s exposure to disruptions in global energy transit routes is disproportionately high. While Europe and Asia are also dependent on oil flows through Hormuz, they typically combine diversified supply sources with strategic reserves equivalent to 60–90 days of consumption. Many African countries, by contrast, maintain reserves covering only a few weeks, or none at all.

The structural paradox is striking.

Africa accounts for around 7–8 percent of global oil production, yet imports approximately 80–90 percent of its refined petroleum products. This dependence on external refining and shipping systems amplifies the impact of any disruption. When freight rates rise, insurance premiums spike, or supply chains tighten, African economies face compounded costs.

In Ethiopia, for instance, the impact is particularly acute. As a landlocked country with no domestic fossil fuel production, Ethiopia relies heavily on imported petroleum to sustain its transport and logistics systems. Even as it has made remarkable strides in renewable energy, primarily hydropower, fuel imports remain a major source of foreign exchange pressure. Periods of global oil price volatility have historically translated into inflation spikes and fiscal strain, underscoring the tight coupling between energy security and macroeconomic stability.

Responses So Far: Progress Without Synchronization

The continental response to energy vulnerability has evolved, but not yet at the scale or speed required.

Encouragingly, several structural shifts are underway. Investments in domestic refining capacity, most notably the Dangote Refinery, signal a recognition of the need to internalize value chains. Renewable energy deployment is accelerating, with Africa now home to some of the world’s fastest-growing solar markets.

Regional electricity cooperation has also expanded. Ethiopia provides a compelling example here. Through its leadership in hydropower development, including projects such as the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, the country is positioning itself as a regional energy exporter.

Power interconnections with neighboring countries, including Sudan, Djibouti, and Kenya, illustrate how cross-border electricity trade can reduce reliance on imported fuels while enhancing regional resilience.

Yet these gains remain fragmented.

Strategic petroleum reserves are uneven or absent across much of the continent. Procurement mechanisms are largely national, limiting bargaining power in tight global markets. Data systems for real-time monitoring of supply and pricing are underdeveloped.

In moments of crisis, coordination often gives way to reactive, country-level measures.

The issue is therefore not the absence of frameworks, but the pace and manner of their operationalization.

From Crisis to Catalyst: Africa’s Strategic Opportunity

If the current disruption exposes vulnerability, it also clarifies direction.

Africa’s energy future is uniquely positioned to turn constraint into advantage. Unlike more industrialized regions locked into carbon-intensive systems, many African countries retain the flexibility to leapfrog into diversified, resilient energy pathways.

Ethiopia again offers a glimpse of this possibility. With over 90 percent of its electricity generated from renewable sources, primarily hydropower, it demonstrates how structural dependence on imported fossil fuels can be reduced in the power sector. The country’s parallel push toward electric mobility, including pilot programs for electric buses and incentives for EV adoption, signals an emerging shift in the energy–transport nexus.

At the continental level, the expansion of the African Single Electricity Market could transform fragmented national grids into a unified system capable of redistributing surplus and absorbing shocks.

Similarly, Africa’s vast potential in solar, wind, geothermal, and green hydrogen positions it not only as a future energy self-sufficient continent, but as a competitive player in global clean energy markets.

The crisis thus sharpens the economic and strategic rationale for reforms that are already underway. Domestic refining becomes a matter of resilience, not just industrial policy. Renewable energy becomes a hedge against geopolitical risk. Regional integration becomes a practical necessity rather than a long-term aspiration.

Immediate Priorities: Coordinated and Pragmatic Action

In the short term, there is scope for decisive and coordinated measures that can stabilize markets and build confidence. African countries, working through the AU and regional economic communities, could move toward pooled procurement of petroleum products, leveraging collective demand to secure better terms. The establishment or expansion of regional strategic fuel reserves would provide critical buffers against supply disruptions.

Equally important is the need for transparency and information-sharing. A continental platform for real-time monitoring of fuel supply, pricing, and logistics could help reduce uncertainty and mitigate speculative pressures.

Strengthening transport corridors, both maritime alternatives and inland logistics, will also be essential to ensure that external disruptions do not cascade into internal bottlenecks.

Strategic Pathways: Building Resilience for the Long Term

Beyond immediate responses, the priority must be structural transformation. Accelerating the operationalization of the African Single Electricity Market can unlock the full potential of regional integration.

Scaling up domestic refining and petrochemical industries will gradually reduce dependence on external supply chains. Integrating energy planning with industrial policy, particularly in emerging sectors such as green hydrogen and battery manufacturing, can position Africa at the forefront of the global energy transition.

For countries like Ethiopia, the strategic pathway lies in consolidating renewable energy leadership while reducing residual dependence on imported fuels through electrification of transport and expanded regional trade in electricity. This dual approach—domestic transformation combined with regional integration—offers a model that could be adapted across the continent.

Indeed, the disruption in the Strait of Hormuz is a true reminder that in an interconnected world, distant events can have immediate and profound local consequences.

For Africa, the lesson is obvious: energy security cannot be externally guaranteed; it must be internally constructed.

The upcoming STC session in Johannesburg offers more than a forum for discussion—it is an opportunity to align immediate crisis response with long-term continental ambition.

By accelerating integration, investing in resilience, and leveraging its unique resource base, Africa can transform vulnerability into strategic advantage.

In doing so, the continent moves closer to realizing not only energy security, but the broader vision of sovereignty and shared prosperity embedded in Agenda 2063 – the enduring promise of “The Africa We Want.”

Alemayehu Tedla is a political analyst.

Many African governments have already assumed a leadership role on this front. So far, 47 African countries have submitted the second round of nationally determined contributions (the decarbonization plans required under the 2015 Paris climate agreement), while 23 have submitted the third round. Their NDCs have become increasingly ambitious, with higher emissions-reduction targets, and their adaptation planning has improved.

The direction of travel is clear: Africa is laying the foundations for an era of green development. Investment flows have started to reflect this rising climate ambition, with the continent receiving around USD 15 billion in renewable-energy financing in 2023, more than double the previous year. But a persistent financing gap remains. In recent years, Africa has received only 11 percent of the USD 277 billion required annually to implement the NDCs and meet its 2030 climate goals.

One of the main problems is that planning has outpaced the creation of a pipeline of concrete investment opportunities—a challenge not unique to Africa. For most countries, the hardest part of the green transition is not setting targets or building frameworks but ensuring enough climate-mitigation projects into which investors can deploy capital.

Many national policymakers take a “wish list” approach to NDCs, without thinking about their investment potential or how they contribute to economic transformation. Governments undermine their credibility when they shop a long list of decarbonization ideas that do not translate into bankable projects. And when NDCs are misaligned with the broader economic-growth agenda, they are likely to cause intragovernmental disputes that stall progress. Investors often echo these concerns, describing NDCs as extensive lists of aspirations that lack clarity on prioritization and implementation.

In many cases, climate investments are capital-intensive, policy-dependent, and slow to mature. So, when countries fail to substantiate NDC commitments with investable strategies and connect them to policy reforms, fiscal allocations, and regulatory signals, assessing risk and return becomes more difficult. This reduces the likelihood of mobilizing capital, whether commercial, philanthropic, or concessional, particularly amid tightening global financial conditions.

Fortunately, African countries can close this gap by taking a practical, results-focused approach to converting NDCs into concrete, actionable plans for delivering climate resilience and economic prosperity. That means explicitly anchoring opportunities in national development and sectoral priorities. Instead of focusing on isolated projects that serve only a single climate objective, policymakers should promote those that contribute to the development of durable capabilities, value chains, institutional capacity, or key infrastructure. It also means encouraging private investment alongside public or concessional funds.

Some opportunities are already commercially attractive. Others may require blended finance, targeted policy reforms, or stronger enabling environments. And still others may have no medium-term pathway to economic viability and require the commitment of philanthropic funding. Distinguishing between these categories and matching the right type of capital to the right opportunity requires a structured, iterative approach.

That is why the African Climate Foundation, together with Dalberg Advisors, developed the NDC Investment Planner, a framework that can help governments assess the impact of mitigation and adaptation solutions, enabling a better understanding of their contribution to NDCs. The NIP facilitates systematic evaluation of these opportunities in terms of both their investment potential and their alignment with broader economic goals. This helps countries identify high-priority areas for commercial financing, which can improve project preparation, and those that require policy alignment or concessional support.

In short, the NIP is a platform for creating pipelines of investment-ready climate projects that can attract public, concessional, and private capital. The goal is to enable policymakers to strengthen coordination across government ministries and focus on opportunities that can be packaged into credible portfolios, accelerating the green transition. With this framework, partners and development-finance institutions can better align technical assistance and funding, while the private sector can engage earlier, with clearer entry points and stronger confidence in proposed projects.

From mini-grids and off-grid solar to improved agricultural inputs and green manufacturing, Africa’s climate transition has the potential to drive economic growth while strengthening resilience. But to realize this ambition, the continent must reimagine climate leadership. The challenge is not setting targets but translating them into strategies that attract the investment needed to deliver real results.

This commentary is supported in part by the African Climate Foundation.

Sunru Yong is a partner at Dalberg Advisors. Saliem Fakir is Founder and Executive Director of the African Climate Foundation.

Contributed by Sunru Yong & Saliem Fakir

Although the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia guarantees the right to life and health for children, stunting persists. The government is serious about addressing stunting that it specifically stipulates in its Law of the Republic of Indonesia concerning the Welfare of Mothers and Children in the First Thousand Days of Life, which states that every child has the right to nutritional security from birth to two years of age.

However, when stunting occurs, the blame is placed on the state, even though children’s human rights are fundamental obligations that parents must fulfill. These consequences require a collaborative effort to address the problem of stunting.

Maria Asuncion Silvestre, in a joint study with UNICEF titled “Understanding and Solving Chronic Malnutrition in the Philippines” titled “Addressing Stunting in the First 1,000 Days: How the Philippine Plan of Action for Nutrition 2017–2022 is Implemented at National and Subnational Levels,” found that strong awareness of nutrition within the bureaucracy, mitigation of stunting pandemic preparedness, strengthening nutrition at the village level, and commitment with the private sector are essential. It seems simple, but we have been doing it for a long time and there is a lack of state oversight.

Constitutionally, the responsibility is absolute for the state, but support from the community must remain consistent. The guarantee of being free from stunting only applies to the first 1,000 days because it will affect a child’s development in the following period.

From a constitutional perspective, the state has a clear responsibility to ensure the welfare and health of the community. The Constitution affirms that every citizen has the right to health services and a decent standard of living. This right also includes the right of children to grow and develop healthily.

 Therefore, the state’s involvement in stunting prevention efforts is not merely a matter of health policy, but also part of fulfilling citizens’ constitutional rights. This means that when health services are good but parents don’t care about their children, everything is in vain.

Strengthening maternal and child health services is a fundamental step that must be continuously expanded. Routine prenatal checkups, providing nutritional supplements for pregnant women, and monitoring infant health need to be systematically implemented through service networks such as community health centers (Puskesmas) and integrated health posts (Posyandu).

Another new initiative could be implemented through the Merah Putih Village Cooperative. This integration serves to illustrate that expansion is also mandatory. For example, the Merah Putih Village Cooperative has established a lactation room, offers early marriage education classes, and provides mentoring on nutritional needs after having children.

Parental education is crucial because some still believe that stunting is influenced by the parents’ genes, but this is not the case. Therefore, if you are ready to marry, you must also be ready to meet your child’s needs. The selection of the Merah Putih Village Cooperative was due to the large number of interactions with the community, thus facilitating the achievement of goals.

Furthermore, improving public nutritional literacy is crucial. Many families have access to food but don’t understand the proper nutritional needs of their children. Education about healthy eating patterns, exclusive breastfeeding, and good parenting practices needs to be continuously strengthened through various community outreach programs. Several viral videos have appeared on social media, showing children being exclusively breastfed, but parents neglecting their nutritional intake and even experiencing stress due to environmental factors.

Environmental factors cannot be ignored either. Poor sanitation and limited access to clean water can increase the risk of infectious diseases in children. Disposing of waste and caring for the environment are not just prioritized in elementary schools but are lifelong needs. These conditions ultimately hinder nutrient absorption and increase the likelihood of stunting. Therefore, developing sanitation infrastructure must be a key target in stunting prevention.

Ultimately, stunting is not solely the responsibility of the government; all parties must coordinate to ensure its effectiveness. Acceleration can also be achieved through more modern methods, such as providing information about the dangers of stunting in public spaces such as terminals, ports, and airports.

Another crucial step is to immediately normalize leave for husbands to accompany their wives after childbirth. This means that the burden of stunting falls not on mothers, but also on fathers. New mothers have strong desires and sometimes experience baby blues, while fathers are focused on earning a living, neglecting their children’s development. Preventing stunting is a national investment that must be a top priority.

Tomy Michael, Lecturer at Universitas 17 Agustus 1945 Surabaya

Contributed by Tomy Michael

A story is often told about Türkiye in Somalia. It begins with compassion, the famine of 2011, a highly visible visit by a foreign leader, and a surge of humanitarian assistance that helped restore a sense of dignity in a country long abandoned by much of the international community. It is a powerful story that deserves recognition. Yet it is also incomplete, because what followed was not simply recovery. It was positioning.

For much of the past fifteen years, Türkiye maintained a careful balance. It built a strong foothold through aid, infrastructure, and security cooperation, while largely avoiding direct involvement in Somalia’s internal political contestations. That restraint gave Ankara credibility. It allowed Türkiye to present itself as a partner of the Somalia state, rather than a patron of a particular political agenda.

That balance is now eroding.

 Recent developments suggest that Türkiye is no longer simply supporting the Somalia state in an institutional sense. It is increasingly aligned with the governing direction of President Hassan Sheik Mohamud, reinforcing a centralized political approach that lacks a broad popular base and has struggled to accommodate Somalia’s federal reality. In doing so, Türkiye is shifting from state support to agenda support, a distinction that carries profound consequences in a fragmented political system.

Somalia’s history offers a warning. Attempts to impose centralized authority over a diverse political landscape have repeatedly failed, most notably under Siad Barre, whose regime ultimately collapsed under the weight of that approach. Today, external reinforcement of central authorities without corresponding engagement with federal member states risks reproducing elements of that failure in a new form.

At the same time, Türkiye’s posture toward Somaliland has become more explicit and more assertive. What was once framed as facilitation—Somalia and Somaliland talks— has evolved into clear opposition. Statements emphasizing Somalia’s territorial integrity are now coupled with resistance to any development that may strengthen Somaliland’s state-building, institutional capacity, or economic trajectory. This is not only rhetorical. It is reflected in the geography of Türkiye’s engagement itself. Its investments, capacity-building programs, and political presence remain overwhelmingly concentrated in Mogadishu, reinforcing a visibly asymmetrical alignment.

This shift was further underscored during President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s visit to Addis Ababa in February 2026, during which Türkiye’s position on Somaliland was articulated directly and opposed Israel’s recognition of Somaliland.

The message was clear. Türkiye now views the preservation of Somalia’s territorial claim not simply as a diplomatic principle, but as a strategic priority.

That priority is not detached from material realities. Over the past decade, Türkiye has embedded itself across Somalia’s most critical sectors. By 2013, Turkish firms were operating Mogadishu’s airport and port, key gateways through which revenue, trade, and international access flow. These were not marginal investments. They were structural footholds. Somalia’s own oversight bodies later acknowledged that these agreements were concluded in a weak institutional environment, with limited safeguards and unclear terms.

This detail is foundational. It suggests that Türkiye’s early gains were not simply commercial successes, but advantages shaped by timing, secured when Somalia’s capacity to negotiate on equal footing was at its lowest.

The pattern continued in security. The establishment of the TURKSOM military base in 2017 anchored Türkiye within Somalia’s security architecture. Officially framed as capacity-building, it also created long-term dependency in training, doctrine, and operational alignment. Military partnerships rarely remain technical. Over time, they shape how a state understands and organizes its own defense.

The timing of Türkiye’s next major expansion made this dynamic even clearer. In early 2024, the Ethiopia–Somaliland MoU triggered political tension and diplomatic anxiety in Mogadishu. Somalia felt exposed and in need of strong external backing. It was at that moment that Türkiye and Somalia signed their expanded defense and maritime agreement. Turkish officials emphasized support and capacity-building, yet the context reveals something more: this was a strategic insertion during a period of vulnerability.

Through that agreement, Türkiye positioned itself at the center of Somalia’s maritime security, a domain inseparable from economic sovereignty. Control over maritime space shapes access to fisheries, shipping routes, offshore jurisdiction, and the development of energy resources. For Somalia, the arrangement brought reassurance. For Türkiye, it created access to another strategic domain through which long-term influence could be exercised.

If earlier phases could still be framed as a partnership, the move into hydrocarbons made the underlying logic more explicit. Beginning in March 2024, Türkiye signed a hydrocarbon cooperation agreement with Somalia covering oil and gas exploration, with its energy minister noting the aim to “strengthen Turkey’s presence in the Horn of Africa.”

By 2026, this had translated into action, with the launch of Türkiye’s first deep-sea drilling mission off Somalia’s coast, widely reported as a milestone in both Somalia’s energy development and Türkiye’s external expansion.

What stands out is not only the scale of the engagement but also the clarity of intent. Turkish officials openly stated that the objective was to strengthen Türkiye’s presence in the Horn of Africa. That language reflects a dual purpose, development and positioning, situating Somalia within a broader energy and geopolitical landscape.

For Somalia, the promise is significant. Energy exploration offers potential revenue and economic transformation. Yet the structure of these agreements raises deeper concerns. In contexts of institutional fragility, legalization does not necessarily equal ownership. When agreements are approved through processes with limited scrutiny, and where even key actors lack full access to their terms, external advantage expands while domestic accountability lags.

This concern becomes sharper when the cumulative nature of these agreements is taken into account. Ports shape trade. Security partnerships shape reliance. Maritime agreements shape jurisdiction. Hydrocarbon contracts shape future resource control. Fisheries governance shapes access to everyday economic wealth. Together, they form an integrated system of influence.

At this point, the relationship cannot be understood sector by sector. It must be understood structurally. What has emerged is not simply cooperation, but strategic entrenchment.

For Somaliland, this carries immediate implications. A powerful external actor is strengthening its rival, opposing its political aspirations, and shaping the regional environment in ways that narrow its room for maneuvering. Under such conditions, passivity is not neutral. It is costly.

The response is not an escalation. It is an adaptation. Somaliland has already begun to explore alternative partnerships with actors such as the United Arab Emirates, Ethiopia, and Israel. These relationships reflect a broader process of counter-alignment, a standard response when one side faces concentrated external pressure.

But counter-alignment requires more than agreements. It demands institutional strength, legal preparedness, and the ability to negotiate from a position of confidence rather than necessity. Without this, Somaliland risks reproducing the very asymmetry it seeks to counter.

The emerging pattern in Somalia demonstrates how external actors consolidate influence where capacity is limited, and negotiations are shaped by urgency. Somaliland must therefore move decisively to strengthen its negotiating architecture and pursue alternative alignments with strategic clarity, ensuring that partnerships are structured on balanced terms and in line with long-term national interests.

The broader lesson extends beyond Somalia and Somaliland. It reflects a recurring logic of external engagement in fragile contexts: crisis creates entry, weakness enables consolidation, and opportunity drives expansion. Türkiye’s trajectory in Somalia, from humanitarian entry to security integration and resource positioning, illustrates this sequence with clarity.

The lesson for Somaliland is not to replicate this model, but to anticipate it, act earlier, and negotiate better. By building resilient institutions, diversifying alliances, and securing carefully structured agreements, Somaliland can position itself not as a reactive actor but as a prepared and strategic partner capable of shaping outcomes rather than absorbing them.

For Somaliland, the question is no longer whether this dynamic will continue. It will.
The real question is whether it will be prepared to respond on its own terms, with the institutional strength, strategic clarity, and alliances necessary to restore balance.

In the Horn of Africa, influence does not wait for legitimacy. It follows preparation, timing, and the ability to act decisively. Those who anticipate and shape external engagement define outcomes; those who delay risk being defined by them.

Abdirahman Osman Gaas (PhD) is a visiting lecturer at the University of Hargeisa, School of Graduate Studies, and a regional researcher specializing in the political economy and geopolitics of the Horn of Africa.

Contributed by Abdirahman Osman Gaas