We have the knowledge and resources to end preventable maternal mortality – today. So why are women still dying while giving birth? Because for too many women, a safe birth still depends on a chain of simple, but life-or-death contingencies: whether a family can find transport to skilled care, whether a midwife is on duty, whether the clinic cupboards are stocked. If any links in this chain falter, the consequences can be catastrophic.

A woman named Mercy recently saw this first-hand: She traveled to a clinic in Zambia’s capital, Lusaka. She experienced a routine labor and a safe delivery. She held her baby in her arms. And then, without warning, she began to bleed profusely.

That condition, post-partum haemorrhage, is the world’s most common cause of maternal death, but there are many others, from dangerously high blood pressure to infections. Every day, on average, more than 700 women die from causes linked to pregnancy and childbirth.

And in Africa, these risks are multiplied to a staggering degree. On this continent, a 15-year-old girl has a 1 in 57 chance of dying while pregnant or during childbirth; for a girl in Australia, that risk is 1 in 21,000. Africa accounts for 70 per cent of all maternal deaths globally. That isn’t a health gap, it’s a moral chasm.

Just 7 of the 55 African Union Member States are on track to meet the global goal on reducing maternal death. This is not a failure of science or clinical know-how. It is a failure of systems, and a failure to sustain high-level commitments.

Beyond aid: A new public health order

The truth is that, with timely access to quality supplies and healthcare, most maternal deaths are avoidable. A woman does not die because we cannot save her; she dies because the ambulance has no fuel. Because the supplier was not paid on time. Because supplies are sitting in a warehouse instead of a clinic. Because the medicines are expired. Because staff training has been delayed.

The links in Mercy’s chain of contingencies were, thankfully, unbroken. Her clinic in Lusaka was part of the UNFPA-supported SafeBirth Africa initiative, where midwives are equipped with the tools and skills to quickly diagnose the severity of post-partum bleeding and initiate life-saving treatment.

Every woman on the continent deserves to benefit from that kind of care. And it is possible with the African Union’s New Public Health Order, which shifts the continent away from donor-led procurement and towards a unified, African-led agenda. That means coordinated disease control led by the Africa Centres for Disease Control and Prevention and regulations harmonized by the Africa Medicines Agency. It means the production of quality-assured medicines by Africa’s own dynamic pharmaceutical manufacturers and a strengthened African health market championed by the African Union Development Agency. It means the creation of robust intra-African supply chains, and partnerships with the UN and others to ensure monitoring and accountability.

The global battle against maternal mortality will be won or lost in Africa. We have the research, the technical expertise and the roadmap. What we need now is to unite behind Africa’s public health leadership.

Africa’s future is the future of the world

This is the world’s youngest region, with nearly one third of the population between the ages of 10 and 24. Their future – and the world’s future – depends on Africa’s ability to address these systemic failures now.

We do that not just by disseminating health commodities and building supply chains but by understanding mothers and their children as the inseparable link from one generation to the next. When a mother is able to give birth safely, her children can thrive – a process that starts even before her child is born, when she is able to access family planning, antenatal care and safe delivery services. It continues into the life of the child, as she is able to access healthcare, education, and an unfolding universe of possibilities.

As much as this is a moral argument, it is also an economic one: When a mother dies, her potential contribution to the economy, her labor, her innovation, her enterprise dies with her. The cost of inaction is staggering and quantifiable: A recent Lancet Commission showed that failure to invest in maternal and child health could lead to productivity losses amounting to USD 3.8 trillion by 2035.

On the other hand, every dollar invested in family planning can yield up to USD 27 in economic benefits, and broader investments in maternal health deliver substantial returns. We see clearly that the failure to act is the most expensive choice of all.

If we are serious about building healthy generations and a sustainable future for the continent, we must ensure that childbirth is a safe, empowering experience that secures the future for every woman and her family.

Diene Keita is the Executive Director of the United Nations Population Fund, Amma Twum Amoah (Amb.) is the African Union Commissioner for Health, Humanitarian Affairs and Social Development, Nardos Bekele-Thomas is the CEO of the African Union Development Agency, AUDA-NEPAD, & Claver Gatete is the UN Under-Secretary-General and Executive Secretary, Economic Commission for Africa.

Contributed by Diene Keita, Amma Twum Amoah (Amb.), Nardos B e k e l e – T h o m a s ,
Claver Gatete

Yet one critical dimension remains under-discussed: the program’s implications for urban air quality, particularly black carbon, a major constituent of fine particulate matter.

This is not a secondary issue. In rapidly urbanizing African cities, transport-related emissions are a dominant source of air pollution. Addis Ababa is no exception. Diesel powered minibuses, aging vehicle fleets, and congestion-driven stop-and-go traffic, contribute substantially to ambient fine particulate matter pollution levels. Within this mixture, black carbon is especially important-not only because of its health impacts, but also due to its strong radiative forcing and role in regional climate processes. 

Ground observation of particulate matter emissions in Addis Ababa and its surroundings exhibit strong diurnal and seasonal variability. It peaks in the morning and dips in the afternoon. Sundays show the lowest concentration levels, builds from Monday to Thursday, peaking on Friday. Higher emissions were observed during the rainy season (June-September). The annual average fine particulate concentration is more than three times higher than the World Health Organization  guidelines.

These findings highlight urban emissions-particularly from urban combustion sources-are already influencing the city’s radiative and pollution environment.  

Against this backdrop, the corridor program presents a rare opportunity to address emissions at their sources.

If designed with air quality in mind, corridor development can reduce exposure through several mechanisms. Improved walkability and cycling infrastructure can decrease short-distance motorized trips, which are disproportionately polluting due to inefficient combustion at low speeds. Better traffic flow may reduce idling and transient emissions, lowering localized concentrations of black carbon along major routes.

Equally important is the program’s potential to reduce resuspended dust, a major contributor to fine particulate matter pollution in Addis Ababa. Upgraded road surfaces, proper drainage, and the elimination of unpaved shoulders can significantly reduce coarse and fine particle emissions associated with road dust-an often overlooked but substantial component of urban fine particulate matter.

However, these benefits are not automatic.

Urban transport research consistently shows that increasing road capacity without complementary policies can induce additional traffic demand. In such cases, initial reductions in congestion are often short-lived, and total emissions may ultimately increase. Without measures to limit high-emission vehicles and promote clean public transport, corridor expansion risks reinforcing car dependency rather than reducing it.

Moreover, construction-phase impacts must not be ignored. Dust generation, material transport, and demolition activities elevate particulate concentrations, potentially exposing nearby communities to higher pollution levels during the transition period.

To fully realize its environmental potential, the corridor program must be integrated with broader air quality and transport policies.

First, priority should be given to low emission mobility. This includes modernizing public transport fleets, enforcing vehicle emissions standards, and accelerating the adoption of cleaner fuels and electric mobility where feasible.

Second, corridor design must ensure functional continuity of pedestrian and cycling infrastructure. Fragmented or poorly maintained pathways will fail to shift travel behavior.

Third, dust control measures-including site management during construction and long-term-maintenance-should be treated as core components of the project, not afterthoughts.

Fourth, there is a need for systematic air quality monitoring along corridor routes. Integrating  ground based observations with satellite data would allow for real-time evaluation of the program’s environmental impact and provide feedback for adaptive planning.

Finally, urban transformation must remain people-centered and inclusive. Clean air is a public good, and its benefits should extend to all residents, not only those living or working along newly developed corridors.

Addis Ababa stands at a critical inflection point. The corridor development program has the potential to redefine not only urban mobility but also the city’s  atmospheric environment.

If implemented with a clear  focus on emissions reduction and exposure mitigation, it could significantly lower black carbon concentrations and improve public health outcomes. If not, it risks becoming a missed opportunity-modernizing infrastructure while leaving underlying environmental challenges unresolved.

The success of this transformation will ultimately be measured not only by how the city looks, but by the quality of the air residents breathe. 

Araya Asfaw is an Adjunct Professor of Physics at the Institute of Geophysics and Space Science, a former Dean of Science Faulty and founding director  of Horn of Africa Regional Environment Centre and Network, Addis Ababa University.

Contributed by Araya Asfaw

For instance, regarding severity and magnitude, the Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation’s Global Burden of Diseases report indicates a substantial increase in cancer cases in Ethiopia over the past three decades, specifically from 1990 to 2023. Females disproportionately experience the highest burden of cancer, with breast cancer being the most prevalent, followed by cervical cancer. According to the 2022 GLOBOCAN report, new cancer cases among children aged 0-19 and 0-14 were 5,842 and 4,119 respectively. The most common cases identified were Acute Lymphoblastic Leukemia, non-Hodgkin lymphoma, rhabdomyosarcoma, Wilms tumor, and neuroblastoma.

According to the 2024/25 Ministry of Health reports, the predominant cancer diagnoses within Ethiopian healthcare facilities were, in descending order, breast, cervical, esophageal, hematological, and prostate cancers. A disaggregation of these cases by sex reveals that malignant unspecified breast, cervical, specified and unspecified ovarian, and uterine cancers were the most frequently observed conditions among females.

Similarly, malignant cancers of the prostate, testis, and scrotum represent the leading cancer cases among males nationally. In 2022, the World Health Organization’s Global Cancer Observatory reported 80,334 new cancer cases in the general population, with 27,713 among males and 52,621 among females. During the same year, 54,698 deaths were reported. Breast cancer is identified as the tenth leading cause of female mortality in Ethiopia. Further disaggregation of prevalence by age reveals that individuals aged 30 to 64 years bear the highest burden of malignant cancer cases in Ethiopia, as per the Ministry of Health. For example, an analysis of the Ethiopian cancer registry over a decade indicates a median age of 50 years for cancer diagnosis.

What are the contributing factors to the rise in cancer diagnoses?

Consistent with the risk factors associated with other chronic non-communicable diseases, the following elements contribute to the escalating incidence of cancer in Ethiopia. Firstly, the prevalence of cancer risk factors has notably expanded and intensified across Ethiopia over recent decades. The Ministry of Health identified eleven distinct risk factors for cancer in Ethiopia as of 2025. These include a national tobacco use prevalence of 3.8 percent, harmful alcohol consumption evident in 20.1 percent of the population, with 7.9 percent categorized as heavy drinkers. Additionally, the national prevalence of khat use in Ethiopia was 23.4 percent in 2024, with one-third of these individuals also consuming alcohol.

Furthermore, approximately one-third (27.9 percent) of Ethiopian adults engaged in insufficient physical activity. Similarly, the daily salt intake among individuals over 15 years of age in Ethiopia was 9.4 grams, significantly exceeding the recommended intake of less than 5 grams. Additionally, inadequate fruit and vegetable consumption was observed, with an average of 2.2 days per week for vegetable intake in Ethiopia, although this has shown improvement over the past decade. Moreover, 10.9 percent of adults were classified as obese or overweight. Another identified risk factor was elevated total cholesterol levels; however, 98.3 percent of the population in Ethiopia had not had their blood cholesterol measured. Four out of ten individuals (39.6 percent) received a diagnosis of elevated blood pressure from healthcare professionals and initiated medication. Finally, a national survey indicated that approximately 4.6 percent of the population in Ethiopia reported a history of cardiovascular diseases.

Second, despite cancer being a chronic disease with a significant latency period, its symptomatic manifestation has noticeably increased within the community. The severity of these symptoms often compels individuals to seek medical attention, thereby contributing to the elevated presence of cancer cases in healthcare facilities and across the nation.

Third, there has been a substantial enhancement in the capabilities of medical professionals and healthcare providers in Ethiopia regarding the identification and diagnosis of illnesses. This progress is substantiated by the initiation and growth of specialized oncology training programs and the expansion of oncology units. Evidence for this includes the establishment of thirty cancer treatment centers and seven dedicated oncology centers and specialty training institutions, as reported by the Ministry of Health in 2024.

These developments have significantly augmented the diagnostic capacity of healthcare professionals. This advancement has been further supported by the expansion of oncology diagnostics, including histology and pathophysiology diagnostic capabilities, as well as the increased availability of diagnostic and therapeutic drugs, supplies, and equipment such as Computed Tomography (CT) scans, MRIs, various scopes, radiotherapy, chemotherapies, and oncology surgical interventions.

However, considering the evolving disease burden, the nation’s population size, and the recent surge in cases, significant shortages necessitate immediate intervention (MoH, 2025). This observation has been corroborated by private hospitals and healthcare facilities nationwide. Nevertheless, access to palliative care for cancer and psychosocial support remains limited due to affordability constraints.

Fourth, heightened awareness regarding cancer cases has led to an increase in individuals seeking medical attention at healthcare facilities. This trend can also be attributed to the proactive increase in medical check-ups across the country.

Fifth, the heightened reporting of cancer cases over the past few years is evident through the establishment and operationalization of a cancer registry in Ethiopia. Globally, there are over 700 cancer registries. Sixth, Ethiopian medical professionals have significantly advanced their histological, pathophysiological, and clinical detection capabilities for cancer within the country in recent years.

Seventh, the community’s health-seeking behavior has improved, attributable to enhanced education and health outcomes. For example, as per the EDHS 2024/2025 report, this can be further substantiated by Ethiopia’s educational transformation. This, in turn, has led to an increased propensity for healthcare-seeking within the community, particularly among individuals experiencing cancer-related symptoms. The increased availability of services has demonstrably attracted a greater number of clients to cancer care, indicating a clear improvement over the past two decades. However, a national study revealed that only 25 percent of health facilities in Ethiopia offered cancer services.

 Despite advancements, a significant number of cancer diagnoses, such as those observed at Tikur Anbessa Specialized Hospital, occur at advanced stages following prolonged symptomatic periods. Multiple research studies show that the average age of esophageal cancer patients at St. Paul Hospital was documented as 57 years. Additionally, at Jimma Medical Center Hospital, one-third of cancer diagnoses were identified at Stage II. However, financial constraints have limited access to healthcare services, particularly cancer care.

Eighth, the Ministry of Health acknowledges cancer as a significant clinical and public health burden and has consequently planned to reduce premature mortality due to cancer in Ethiopia by 15 percent by 2030.

 However, the diagnosis of cancer by middle and low-level healthcare workers should be interpreted with caution, and necessary capacity training should be fostered to address the low detection rate and high reporting. In addition, according to the report of the Ethiopian Digital Health Information, two reports of cancer cases labeled as ‘unspecified cancer’ or ‘unspecified neoplasms’ need further national investigation, research, and identification or specification with state-of-the-art physicians and technologies.

Therefore, prioritizing the reduction of risk factors is crucial for primary prevention. Furthermore, it is essential to enhance early cancer awareness, facilitate regular screenings, ensure timely diagnoses, provide optimal treatment services, offer high-quality palliative care, and implement psychosocial support programs, all based on the most current evidence. Accessible and decentralized comprehensive cancer services should be made available to the community. Additionally, stakeholders and the community must collaborate to achieve the Ministry of Health’s new cancer strategic control plan for 2025-2029. Particular attention should be directed towards the adoption of leading global cancer prevention and control initiatives. As highlighted by The Lancet Oncology in February 2026, “cancer [is] another casualty of geopolitical unrest?” if countries are not adequately prepared and equipped to prevent, detect, and treat it.

Contributed by Bedilu Abebe

Global trade flows through a number of other critical passages, which could also become disruptive bottlenecks. The Strait of Malacca between Malaysia and the Indonesian island of Sumatra – one of only two sea lanes linking the Indian Ocean to the Pacific – receives much attention in war simulations. When the Suez Canal was blocked for six days by a massive container ship, the Ever Given, in 2021, the disruption reverberated across supply chains for months. The Panama Canal raises similar risks.

Excessive market concentration generates similar vulnerabilities. The dominance of a few Japanese producers of microcontrollers and engine airflow sensors – small but essential components in automaking – meant that, when a massive earthquake and tsunami hit Japan in 2011, the global auto industry contracted sharply.

Such vulnerabilities are somewhat easier to address than those embedded in geography, like the Strait of Hormuz. Since 2011, automakers have diversified their suppliers, built up buffer stocks, and created large data systems that improve transparency in complex supply chains, making it easier to identify hidden single-source risks.

But diversification comes with trade-offs, as the advanced-semiconductor sector is likely to learn. A single Dutch company, ASML, produces all the extreme ultraviolet lithography equipment required to produce the most advanced semiconductors, and only two companies, Taiwan’s TSMC and South Korea’s Samsung, have the capabilities to produce 2-nanometer semiconductors.

Given the obvious vulnerabilities this creates, governments are now promoting diversification. The United States and the European Union have introduced incentives for TSMC and Samsung to diversify their production geographically, and the US government is backing the development of Intel’s advanced-semiconductor capabilities. Meanwhile, China is investing heavily to reduce its dependence on external sources in semiconductor design and fabrication.

But while this approach might increase resilience, the sector can ill afford lower efficiency. The most advanced semiconductors are crucial not only to training generative-AI models, but also to advancing physical-AI applications (such as robotics and autonomous vehicles), which require low latency, high thermal efficiency, low power consumption, and a long battery life. It is not clear that the diversified supply chains currently being built will be able to keep up with demand.

Rare earths represent another notable vulnerability in technology supply chains. A range of critical and strategic products – including electric vehicles, consumer electronics, medical technologies, and advanced military technologies – depend on these essential ingredients, yet China alone controls about 60 percent of global rare-earth mining and over 90 percent of processing.

Points of failure characterize the financial sector as well. The US-controlled SWIFT inter-bank messaging system for cross-border transactions is an obvious example.

At the economy level, excessive dependence on any one source for anything – from energy to demand – can generate a point of failure, as Europe learned after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. This is true not only because of the risk of an accident or shock, but also because excessive dependence enables extortion or other forms of pressure, exemplified by China’s rare-earth export controls, America’s enforcement of sanctions via SWIFT, and US President Donald Trump’s use of tariffs.

The proliferation of points of failure has to do with the global economy’s design and incentives. In a highly decentralized and competitive network, investors are more motivated to optimize for efficiency (the benefits of which are appropriable, meaning they accrue largely to the investor) than for resilience (the benefits of which are spread across the network). When there are many investors, none has an incentive to internalize the costs of balancing efficiency and resilience.

Networks with a greater concentration of ownership are more likely to optimize for resilience. Three companies (Alcatel Submarine Networks, SubCom, and NEC) supply and maintain 87 percent of the vast global network of undersea fiber-optic cables, which convey over 95 percent of international data traffic, including payments and other financial transactions. These “architects” have a powerful incentive to build resilience into the system, such as by increasing the number of cables, spreading out landing points, ensuring wide dispersion, implementing looped designs, using internet protocols for seamless rerouting around blockages, and including spare capacity. After all, resilience is part of the package they are selling.

The same is true in the auto sector, where large players like Toyota control a sufficiently large chunk of the supply chain to benefit from optimizing for both cost and resilience. For the internet, it was the US government that acted as the primary architect, ensuring, for example, that embedded protocols automatically reroute traffic around blockages. In fact, large national economies are important players because, to some extent, they internalize and aggregate the benefits of resilience across a range of small private-sector players.

When markets undersupply resilience, countries become important players in delivering it. To this end, they have a few options. They can go it alone, such as by “onshoring” the production of critical goods like semiconductors. They can increase international cooperation – for example, by forming a coalition to maximize alternative sourcing of rare earths. Or they can pursue some combination of the two. A crude rule of thumb might be that cooperation is less expensive than onshoring, more effective in principle, and in certain cases, essential – but much harder to achieve.

Whatever approach countries choose, eliminating or mitigating points of failure will be expensive. But, at a time of growing fragmentation and deteriorating cooperative, it is a cost they will have to bear.

Michael Spence is a Nobel laureate in economics, is Professor Emeritus of Economics and a former dean of the Graduate School of Business at Stanford University

Contributed by Michael Spence

Growing up, I had classmates from Marange in Zimbabwe’s eastern highlands. To say you were from Marange invited laughter; it meant dust and poverty. Then diamonds were discovered, and overnight the town became the centre of a global rush. People flooded in, chasing fortune.

Today, the rush is over. The dust remains. The communities are still poor. The diamond rush is gone and the wealth cannot be seen when you look at the community.

I am often told that Africa is one of the richest continents on earth, abundant in natural resources and critical minerals. Yet I find myself asking: if we are so rich, why does the dominant image of Africa remain one of poverty?

Banning raw exports not enough

Across the world, critical minerals are being positioned as the engine of a green and digital future. Yet without deliberate choices, Africa will not benefit. We will repeat the fate of Marange: raw extraction, value captured elsewhere, and communities left behind.

Africa will not ‘win’ the critical minerals boom by simply owning and exporting more ore. Banning raw exports will not be enough. We will win by governing better, pricing and taxing smarter, and building regional infrastructure and value chains that turn mineral wealth into shared prosperity.

Mining Indaba 2026 featured extensive discussions on critical minerals. South Africa has now adopted its Critical Minerals and Metals Strategy, and the African Union has set out a continental roadmap through Africa’s Green Minerals Strategy. In his recent State of the Nation Address, President Cyril Ramaphosa framed critical minerals as a cornerstone of South Africa’s industrial strategy and future growth.

Global demand is accelerating. Lithium demand could grow tenfold by 2050 under the International Energy Agency’s Net Zero scenario, while vanadium demand is projected to rise eightfold by 2050.

The fiscal problem

Sub-Saharan Africa is especially abundant in these natural resources. South Africa is the world’s leading producer of PGM-containing mined material, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo accounts for roughly three-quarters of global mined cobalt production. However, the space remains geopolitically contested, while finance and infrastructure constraints continue to limit industrialisation.

Consider ruthenium. South Africa supplies more than 90% of global ruthenium, a vital input for technologies such as semiconductors to fuel cells. Yet in South Africa, royalty calculations often exclude ruthenium because it is not separately invoiced or reported. This reporting structure can result in unrealised royalty and tax revenue, reducing funds that could otherwise support industrialisation and development.

Pricing also presents a challenge. UNDP’s analysis shows that domestic pricing for ruthenium and cobalt can diverge from equilibrium values. In South Africa, ruthenium traded about 9% below equilibrium in 2023, and around 71% of output is sold through three- to five-year contracts, limiting exposure to market prices. Zambia’s cobalt shows larger gaps, with 2023 prices well below equilibrium.

In addition to being a fiscal problem; this is a missed industrial opportunity. UNDP estimates that localising production of ruthenium-based goods in South Africa could generate $25m in additional tax revenue, $51m in economic output, and nearly 1,000 new jobs each year. In Zambia, localisation of cobalt-based products could yield $215,000 in tax and $321,000 in output.  Get the conditions right, and localisation turns minerals into real livelihoods.
 

Africa does not need another Marange

So what must Africa do now to avoid another ‘Marange moment’ in critical minerals?

First, fix the basics: transparency, pricing and royalties. Governments and revenue authorities should require clearer disaggregation of by-product minerals in declarations and composite export sales, and issue administrative guidance on valuation methods. When by-products are treated as accounting afterthoughts, countries lose revenue and bargaining power.

Second, build regional value chains. Export restrictions can be useful signals of intent but bans without processing capacity invite smuggling and rent-seeking. Regional economic communities can coordinate standards, infrastructure corridors, power pools and industrial clusters so that scale becomes a competitive advantage.

Third, invest in the enabling conditions that make beneficiation real: power, logistics, skills and policy certainty. Limited refining capacity forces raw exports, while weak transport and energy infrastructure and gaps in technical education constrain industrialisation. A practical agenda would pair targeted incentives for priority value-chain nodes with predictable regulation and vocational training aligned to the jobs created by localisation. 

Some argue that Africa is not yet positioned for industrial policy, suggesting instead that the continent focus on extraction. This is why we must design governance and fiscal systems that make accountability easier. If we do not act while supply chains are still taking shape, we may not get another chance.

Africa’s critical minerals will either entrench the old pattern of extraction without development, or become the foundation of a very different future. That outcome will not be shaped by speeches or strategies, but by hard choices about pricing, taxation, regulation and investment. And most importantly, by a deliberate decision to build value at home rather than export it.

The continent does not need another Marange. It needs a minerals model that leaves more than dust behind. A model that powers local industry, secures fair revenues and delivers tangible dignity to the people who live above the resource.

 (Nokutula Mhene, is Project management specialist at UNDP)

Contributed by Nokutula Mhene

Ethiopia, with a population exceeding 130 million, is the world’s most populous landlocked country. Its landlocked status is not a technical inconvenience but a binding structural constraint. It inflates trade and transport costs, weakens export competitiveness, exposes the economy to external shocks, and limits Ethiopia’s full contribution to regional and continental growth.More than 90 percent of its trade depends on a single maritime corridor—a level of dependency that would be strategically risky for any nation, particularly one central to the Horn of Africa’s economic future.

Some argue that landlockedness is an immutable geographic reality that states must simply manage. Yet history shows otherwise. Geography is mediated by politics, law, and cooperation. Europe’s landlocked countries thrive because access regimes are diversified, predictable, and rules-based. Africa, by contrast, has too often treated maritime access as a bilateral privilege rather than a shared developmental responsibility—despite repeated commitments to regional integration and the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA).

A Continental Challenge

Ethiopia’s appeal must therefore be understood in a broader African context. Sixteen AU member states are landlocked, collectively losing billions of dollars each year to excessive transit costs, delays, and uncertainty. If AfCFTA is to become a driver of industrialization rather than a paper aspiration, structural bottlenecks—especially access to ports—must be addressed systematically at the continental level.

Concerns are occasionally raised that Ethiopia’s maritime agenda could destabilize the Horn of Africa. In reality, the greater risk lies in inaction. Unresolved structural asymmetries—where a major economy remains permanently dependent on ad hoc arrangements—tend to generate friction over time. Predictable, negotiated access reduces tension; ambiguity and improvisation magnify it.

Recent debate surrounding Ethiopia’s engagement with Somaliland has heightened sensitivities, particularly regarding Somalia’s sovereignty. These concerns warrant clarity rather than escalation. Ethiopia has neither claimed Somali territory nor sought to undermine Somalia’s unity or internationally recognized sovereignty. Its engagement was driven by economic and logistical imperatives—not territorial ambition—and Ethiopia has repeatedly reaffirmed its respect for Somalia as a sovereign AU member state.

In instances where misunderstandings have emerged, Ethiopia has consistently shown a willingness to engage in dialogue, mediation, and clarification. The core challenge lies not in the intention itself, but rather in the lack of an AU-approved framework that would facilitate the transparent, lawful, and collective resolution of legitimate maritime access requirements.

Maritime Access and Security Responsibilities

Maritime access is not only an economic question; it also carries security dimensions. As one of Africa’s largest economies and leading contributors to AU and UN peace operations, Ethiopia has a legitimate interest in the safety of the sea-lanes upon which its trade, energy supplies, and food security depend.

Any future Ethiopian naval capability should therefore be understood as modest, defensive, and cooperative—embedded within regional and AU-led maritime security arrangements. Its purpose would not be power projection or territorial control, but contribution: combating piracy, protecting commercial shipping, enhancing search-and-rescue capacity, and supporting stability in one of the world’s most congested and strategically sensitive waterways. At a time when extra-regional military presences in the Red Sea are expanding rapidly, greater African ownership of maritime security should be seen as a stabilizing, not destabilizing, development.

Why the AU Must Act

Some maintain that maritime access should remain a purely bilateral matter. Experience suggests otherwise. When negotiations occur in a vacuum—without shared principles or continental guidance—they become vulnerable to misinterpretation, domestic politicization, and external interference.

The AU Summit therefore has an opportunity—and a responsibility—to elevate this issue from fragmented diplomacy to structured continental engagement. Doing so would reinforce the Union’s relevance and demonstrate its ability to anticipate challenges rather than merely manage their consequences.

Three practical steps merit serious consideration.

First, the AU should mandate a high-level panel of legal experts, economists, and eminent persons to examine maritime access for landlocked states, with Ethiopia as a priority case. Second, it should develop an AU framework on maritime access and transit equity, outlining cooperative options—such as long-term leasing, joint port management, or special economic corridors—while fully safeguarding sovereignty and territorial integrity. Third, maritime access must be aligned with AfCFTA implementation, ensuring that Africa’s largest economies are not structurally constrained from participating fully in continental trade.

Ethiopia’s maritime question is not a demand for special treatment. It is a call for structural fairness, regional foresight, and African agency. Addressing it constructively would strengthen—not weaken—sovereignty by replacing uncertainty with rules and unilateral pressure with cooperation.

As the AU Summit convenes, leaders face a clear choice: defer the issue until it resurfaces in a more volatile form, or confront it now with vision and pragmatism. Ethiopia’s maritime access is not only about ports or naval presence. It is about whether Africa can collectively design solutions equal to its ambitions.

The Summit should choose foresight over delay—and cooperation over complacency.

Alemayehu Tedla is a political analyst.

Contributed by Alemayehu Tedla

At its core, Bishoftu reflects Ethiopia’s long effort to escape the structural limits imposed by geography. Since losing direct access to the Red Sea, the country has lived with a persistent vulnerability that shapes everything from trade costs to diplomacy. Rather than attempting to resolve this vulnerability through territorial revision or short-term political fixes, Ethiopian policymakers have increasingly turned to networks. Railways, airlines, logistics corridors, and now a new international airport are being used to redraw Ethiopia’s strategic map without redrawing its borders.

Seen this way, Bishoftu is not an isolated project. It is part of a broader attempt to convert Ethiopia from a landlocked country into a land-linked one. The logic is straightforward but ambitious. If Ethiopia cannot control coastlines, it can control flows. If it cannot dominate maritime chokepoints, it can dominate aerial and logistical ones. The airport sits at the intersection of this logic, reinforcing Addis Ababa’s role as a continental junction rather than a peripheral capital.

This ambition rests heavily on the unique position of Ethiopian Airlines. Unlike many national carriers in Africa, Ethiopian Airlines is not merely symbolic. It is profitable, operationally sophisticated, and deeply embedded in global aviation networks. Over time, it has become one of the country’s most effective diplomatic tools. Bishoftu expands the physical space in which this airline can operate and grow, enabling larger cargo volumes, longer-haul connectivity, and more flexible scheduling. The goal is not just to move people, but to capture value across the aviation ecosystem, from cargo handling and maintenance to training, leasing, and logistics services.

The airport also connects directly to Ethiopia’s wider infrastructure system. The Addis Ababa–Djibouti railway shortens the distance between factory and runway. Industrial parks clustered along transport corridors are designed to feed exports directly into air cargo networks. In theory, this creates a self-reinforcing system where production, transport, and distribution are tightly integrated. Once such a system reaches scale, it becomes difficult for competitors to replicate. Trade routes harden, habits form, and investment follows established pathways.

This is where the geopolitical implications become clearer. East Africa already has established aviation hubs, most notably Nairobi. Kenya’s capital has long served as a primary gateway for the region, benefiting from a liberalized economy and deep private-sector ties. Kigali, though smaller, has pursued its own carefully curated hub strategy, emphasizing efficiency and global branding. Bishoftu enters this landscape not by offering marginal improvements, but by betting on scale and centralization. The competition is not simply about passenger counts. It is about who controls routing decisions, where cargo is consolidated, where aircraft are serviced, and where aviation finance is anchored.

Beyond East Africa, Bishoftu quietly challenges the dominance of Gulf aviation hubs that have acted as Africa’s primary connectors to the world for decades. Cities like Dubai and Doha built their success on geography, scale, and Africa’s fragmented connectivity. As African trade patterns evolve and South-South routes become more important, the value of these intermediaries diminishes. Bishoftu does not replace Gulf hubs, but it narrows their role. Even small shifts in routing can translate into significant changes in revenue, influence, and strategic relevance over time.

The airport also reshapes Ethiopia’s relationship with Djibouti. Ethiopia remains dependent on Djibouti’s ports, and no amount of aviation infrastructure can change that overnight. What Bishoftu does change is the balance of leverage. High-value, time-sensitive goods no longer need to pass exclusively through maritime channels. Humanitarian logistics, pharmaceuticals, perishables, and critical imports gain alternative pathways. This diversification reduces vulnerability and strengthens Ethiopia’s negotiating position. Dependence becomes more elastic, and elasticity is power.

There is also a quieter dimension to Bishoftu that has little to do with trade statistics. Control over a major aviation hub confers influence over time itself. In a region frequently affected by political instability, humanitarian crises, and peacekeeping operations, the ability to move people and resources quickly matters enormously. Addis Ababa already serves as the diplomatic heart of Africa through its role as host of the African Union. Bishoftu amplifies that role by making Ethiopia indispensable to the logistics of diplomacy, crisis response, and multilateral coordination. Soft power is rarely dramatic, but it accumulates through reliability and necessity.

None of this guarantees success. Mega-infrastructure projects are inherently risky, especially in an era defined by fiscal pressure and climate awareness. Airports require enormous upfront investment and take years, sometimes decades, to generate returns. If traffic projections fall short, the financial burden shifts from commercial operators to the state. At the same time, global aviation faces increasing scrutiny over emissions and sustainability. While Africa’s contribution to global aviation emissions is small, regulatory regimes are global by nature. Long-term demand assumptions may not hold in a world of carbon pricing and shifting travel behavior.

Governance adds another layer of uncertainty. Concentrating flows through a single hub increases efficiency, but it also increases fragility. Political instability, regulatory missteps, or mismanagement within key institutions could have system-wide consequences. The success of Bishoftu depends not only on concrete and runways, but on policy discipline, institutional credibility, and the ability to insulate strategic assets from short-term political pressures.

In the end, Bishoftu International Airport represents a wager about the future of power in Africa. It assumes that connectivity will matter more than territory, that logistics will matter more than raw resources, and that infrastructure can anchor influence more reliably than ideology or force. If the wager pays off, Ethiopia will emerge not just as a large country with a strong airline, but as a continental systems manager shaping how Africa moves, trades, and responds to crises. If it fails, Bishoftu will stand as a reminder that ambition alone cannot overcome structural constraints.

Either way, the airport is more than a transport facility. It is a statement of intent, a strategic experiment, and a tangible expression of how Ethiopia sees its place in the world. The runway, in this case, is not just a strip of asphalt. It is a line drawn toward the future.

(Theódros Tadesse is a seasoned journalist with extensive experience across various media outlets. He has also served as a communications manager in multiple organizations. Currently, he is the Communications Consultant and Deputy CEO at The Missing Link Communication Consultancy.)

Contributed by Theódros Tadesse Ayele

The Framework emerged from the 2016 New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants, endorsed by world leaders as a response to protracted displacement. In 2018, the UN General Assembly adopted the Global Compact on Refugees (GCR), placing the CRRF at its operational core. The CRRF focuses on operational frameworks for national-level implementation, whereas the GCR provides the global vision, a program of action, and follow-up mechanisms. While not legally binding, these frameworks were politically ambitious since host countries were to expand inclusion and protection, while the international community would share responsibility through predictable, additional, and sustained support.

The GCR/CRRF consists of four core ingredients: burden and responsibility sharing, the Humanitarian–Development–Peace (HDP) nexus, refugee inclusion, and support conditions for voluntary, safe, and dignified return. Central to these ingredients is the principle of global responsibility for hosting refugees. Burden sharing commitments emphasized concessional financing, grants, and long-term investments to ease pressures on host countries and improve conditions for both refugees and host communities.

Ethiopia’s 2019 Refugee Proclamation is widely celebrated as one of the most progressive refugee laws in Africa. It marks a significant transition in the country’s approach to refugee assistance by granting freedom of movement, work opportunities, and access to social services comparable to those enjoyed by citizens. With this reform, Ethiopia positioned itself as a global example of refugee inclusion and an early adopter of the CRRF, a concept which is later embedded in the GCR.

However, after nearly a decade, the reality in Ethiopia exposes a widening gap between promise and practice. Progressive policies and early compliance have not been matched by commensurate international support. On the contrary, donor expectations for deeper refugee integration and job creation have increased even as funding has declined. This contradiction is unfolding in a country grappling with underdeveloped public services, limited fiscal space, and severe youth unemployment, conditions that already drive mass outward migration for economic opportunities.

The conventional humanitarian assistance model for refugees in Ethiopia costs approximately USD 378 per person per year. The World Bank estimates that allowing refugees access to work could reduce this to USD 210 per year, and full socioeconomic inclusion to USD 78 per year—a nearly five-fold reduction under the CRRF/GCR approach. While often presented as efficiency gains, these figures signal a strategic shift toward declining international support and greater cost absorption by host countries.

Compared to pre-GCR humanitarian spending, this represents a dramatic reduction in international responsibility.

This shift explains the current funding situation in Ethiopia that is characterized by insufficient development financing and sharp reductions in humanitarian assistance. The shortfall which is estimated at nearly 65 percent has forced reductions or suspensions of life-saving services, transferring pressure onto national systems, land use, security structures, and fragile local economies. These indirect costs which are borne by national systems remain largely invisible and rarely acknowledged in global burden-sharing metrics.

The inefficiencies of the traditional humanitarian system—its protracted nature, high overhead costs, duplication of efforts, and limited sustainability—were among the factors that prompted the search for an innovative approach to refugee assistance. However, the root causes of donor dissatisfaction the pre-GCR/CRRF era were not adequately scrutinized. As a result, similar shortcomings persist, with insufficient transformative investment in job creation, infrastructure development, or local economic growth.

Although the GCR/CRRF aims to streamline aid, reduce humanitarian inefficiencies, and strengthen national ownership, in practice, it has increasingly shifted responsibility onto host governments by reducing external assistance. This contradicts the principle of global responsibility and burden-sharing.

Countries like Ethiopia are now expected to mobilize alternative financing by demonstrating further “refugee-friendly” reforms, such as the national strategy for enhanced refugee inclusion. However, the promulgation of progressive laws and unilateral efforts by the hosting countries alone cannot realize GCR/CRRF or compensate for declining global responsibility in the context of reduced donor commitments. Otherwise, the GCR/CRRF risks being forgotten.

Another persistent concern is that much of what is reported as GCR/CRRF financing is not genuinely new or additional. Funds are frequently reallocated or relabeled from existing development portfolios, reflecting reprioritization rather than expansion. Projects that predate the GCR are retrofitted to align with CRRF language, often adding little to host-country fiscal space.

For instance, the R3D Ethiopia Refugee Displacement and Development Digest (2019) reported over USD one billion in CRRF-related investments, yet most listed projects predated the GCR and were reframed to comply with its objectives. Similarly, UNHCR’s reporting of USD 500 million for Ethiopia coincided with drastic reductions in basic services, increasing strain on local resources and, at times, social tensions. These examples illustrate reprioritization and relabeling rather than genuinely additional funding.

Funding also remains vulnerable to political landscapes, undermining predictability and reliability. Aid suspensions, trade restrictions, and political conditionalities have weakened Ethiopia’s economic capacity. For instance, the suspension of AGOA eligibility since late 2021 significantly affected textile industries and export revenues, further constraining national capacity to increase employment opportunities and support refugee inclusion.

The consequence is a growing sense of abandonment among refugee-hosting countries. It is clear that the urgency that prompted CRRF through global engagement during the 2015 European refugee crisis has faded, and African refugee situations no longer command sustained priority. While development instruments such as the World Bank’s IDA refugee sub-window provide some relief, they are insufficient and must not be substitutes for declining humanitarian aid.

The call to action is clear. CRRF and the GCR must strengthen solidarity and protection through inclusion, development investment, and shared responsibility. It must not be a framework for shifting responsibility onto host countries that are least able to carry it. Without sufficient and consistent funding, it risks becoming mechanisms of burden shifting onto those least able to bear it. Therefore, global actors must move beyond rhetoric and recommit to genuine burden sharing. Funding must be genuinely additional, multi-year, needs-based, and insulated from political volatility. Inclusion without support is not solidarity but substitution. 

Furthermore, Africa must assert greater leadership in shaping refugee responses that reflect regional realities. A sustainable future requires a robust African-led refugee management approaches without disrupting the natural population movement dynamics and coping mechanisms of persons who cross the border during conflicts. Not all refugees who cross the border come to seek permanent encampment or prolonged dependency in another country and lose their ancestral heritages.

The current humanitarian practices that inadvertently incentivize protracted displacement must be openly questioned and reformed. The traditional humanitarian-led approach of actively searching for and registering every person who has crossed the border and forcing them to stay in protracted situations without initially allowing them to find their own solution must be openly examined. Reforms must be introduced to prevent humanitarian actors from inadvertently incentivizing prolonged displacement or dependency for the self-interest of avoiding an existential threat.

Dejene Kebede, MD, MPH, MBA, is a medical doctor with advanced training in public health and health services administration. He is a PhD candidate researching evidence-based practice in the context of Industry 4.0 technologies, with nearly two decades of experience managing public health programs in refugee operations, including involvement in the Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework launched at the UN General Assembly in 2016.

Contributed by Dejene Kebede (MD)

A Vision Twenty-Five Years in the Making

As someone who involved in the early groundwork that helped establish the Great Ethiopian Run, I have seen the event grow from an ambitious idea into one of Africa’s leading mass participation road races. From the beginning, the Great Ethiopian Run was built with a clear intention. It was not created as a one-day event, but as a sustainable business venture capable of influencing national culture and turning running into a way of life for millions.

Haile Gebrselassie provided an inspirational foundation, elevating the pride of the country on international stages and helping to define running as part of our identity. Richard Nerurkar brought professionalism and an unwavering work ethic that shaped the organization. His discipline and strategic clarity influenced all of us who worked there. Dagmawit Amare carried the event into institutional maturity by offering stability, operational precision, and strong leadership. These individuals created more than an event. They created a national institution that continues to inspire and unite the country.

Meaning Making and Sponsorship

Society creates meaning of activities, objects, and actions through practice, norms, and tradition. Yet the meaning that society assigns does not always reflect the true nature of a thing. As the saying goes, the world is not what it is, but what you are. In the same way, the concept of sponsorship is ill-defined and widely misunderstood in our society. Many people describe sponsorship as a gift, philanthropy, or a donation. In reality, these acts fall under corporate social responsibility. They are not sponsorship.

True sponsorship is an investment made with the expectation of measurable return. Sponsorship is, at its core, a business transaction. Whether the investment is in cash or in kind, it is made in an event (e.g., Great Ethiopian Run), individual (e.g., Haile and Adidas), or any other property (e.g., a league, a national team, a global event, a venue) with the expectation of receiving marketing objectives in return (e.g., exposure, educating, image building, sales). When a sponsor provides money, products, or services, the intention is to reach the property audience, whether fans, participants, or customers, and to advance the sponsors’ business objectives.

Sponsorship typically follows a four-stage communication and marketing process. The first stage is awareness or exposure, which focuses on making the audience aware that the sponsor or its brand exists. The second stage is knowledge or education, where audiences learn about the sponsors’ product, service, or brand. The third stage is image building or brand enhancement, where the partnership helps shape or improve the audiences’ perception of the sponsor. The final stage is reciprocity or sales, where the ultimate goal is to drive consumer action, loyalty, and purchasing behavior. For any sponsor, the bottom line is sales, and each stage along this continuum is designed to move toward that outcome. Different sponsors enter partnerships seeking different outcomes along this continuum. For example, when Rakuten sponsors the US basketball team Golden State Warriors, the primary objective is to create brand awareness Rakuten and to enter the American market.

And, people may go to school to learn, and they may read books, articles, and scholarly work to understand the subject matter of sponsorship or any other matter. But in my view, Ethiopian sport organizations do not need to search far for examples of sponsorship excellence. The textbook is already in front of them. All they need to do is study what the Great Ethiopian Run has been doing for twenty-five years.

The Significance of Bank of America Partnership

There is a well understood concept in sponsorship known as the reverse image effect. When an established global brand aligns itself with a property, the credibility and strength of the sponsor are transferred to the property in a meaningful way. The involvement of Bank of America offers exactly that type of elevation to the Great Ethiopian Run. This partnership immediately enhances the brand value of the event, strengthens its credibility, and creates opportunities for future commercial growth.

The implications go far beyond the Great Ethiopian Run itself. This partnership signals to the entire Ethiopian sporting sector that global brands are ready to invest when an organization demonstrates professionalism, structure, and clear commercial value. It is an invitation for every sport in the country, including football, basketball, volleyball, athletics, and others, to ask what they need to change in order to attract partnerships of this scale.

Football and the Urgent Need for Reform

For almost two years, two years back, I led and authored a deep and comprehensive study commissioned by the Ethiopian Premier League to examine the multi-dimensional development of football in the country. The study is presented in a three-hundred-and-seventy-page document that draws on the experiences of more than one hundred and forty countries. It incorporates interviews with nearly ninety individuals from fifteen different but direct stakeholder of Ethiopian football (e.g., the federation leaders, coaches, players, agents, journalists, sport professors, etc.). It includes an analysis of national, continental, and FIFA’s policy frameworks and is supported by more than two hundred scholarly sources.

The findings are clear and consistent. Football in Ethiopia is financially unsustainable under its current model. Most Premier League clubs rely entirely on local government budgets. The most conservative estimate shows that clubs spend around seventy-five million birr every year, and about seventy five percent of that amount goes directly to salaries, and rest to transport, accommodation. Very little remains for infrastructure, development, marketing, or long-term growth. This is not a sustainable way to build a sport industry. It is similar to pouring water on sand.

A Homegrown Solution Based on Community Ownership

The most important solution that emerged from the study is a homegrown community based ownership model. This model reflects what Ethiopian sport policy already states, that the role of the government is to facilitate development and that the community should own the clubs.

Under the commissioned study’s recommendation, club ownership would be divided among registered fans, the public, and the government in a structure of thirty percent, forty percent, and thirty percent, suggested based on empirical data. The term public is not abstract. It includes local business owners, residents of the area who are not necessarily registered fans, owners of small hotels or motels, teachers, banks, universities, beer factories, and members of the diaspora. In the long term it can also include responsible foreign investors. This model promotes accountability and makes it possible for qualified sport business managers to lead the clubs. If they do not perform, the community can replace them without depending on political structures or government budgets. This approach opens the door for bright sport managers, investment, commercial growth, and genuine development. It is aligned with global best practices and, more importantly, it is built on the cultural and economic realities of Ethiopia.

The Textbook Is Already Here

Sport organizations in Ethiopia do not need to travel abroad or search for complex concepts to understand how to build a successful sporting property. The example is already here at home. The Great Ethiopian Run shows, in practice, what professionalism, clear governance, community engagement, and commercial discipline can achieve over time. It has done what many clubs and federations are still struggling to do. It has turned a local idea into a national institution and an attractive global partner.

The Great Ethiopian Run operates in the same economic and political environment as other Ethiopian sport organizations. It faces the same infrastructure constraints and the same market realities. Yet its choices have been different. It has treated sport as a business, sponsorship as an investment, and the public as a community of participants and partners rather than as passive observers. In doing so, it has applied in real life the very principles that many try to learn from books and international case studies.

The event has become a model of sponsorship excellence by understanding the continuum from awareness and knowledge to image building and, ultimately, to reciprocity and sales. It has delivered value to sponsors, not as charity or philanthropy, but as a return on investment. The recent partnership with Bank of America is not a coincidence. It is a logical outcome of two and a half decades of credible delivery, professional management, and consistent brand building.

For federations, leagues, and clubs that still depend almost entirely on government budgets, the lesson is simple and powerful. Instead of pouring resources into structures that do not generate long term value, they can study how the Great Ethiopian Run plans, negotiates, delivers, and measures its partnerships. It is difficult to imagine a clearer lesson for the rest of Ethiopian sport. The textbook is not in a foreign capital. It is on the streets of Addis Ababa every year when tens of thousands of people take part in the Great Ethiopian Run.

A Moment for Reflection and Celebration

As the Great Ethiopian Run celebrates its twenty fifth year, it also delivers a national lesson. When a sporting organization is managed with integrity, discipline, and commercial vision, the world takes notice. The partnership with Bank of America is evidence of that. It is more than a sponsorship agreement. It is a validation of two decades of work and a roadmap for the future of Ethiopian sport.

So, what is the implication of all of this? Back in 2006, while studying Sport Management at in England (an opportunity that I got through the Great Ethiopian Run connections), I wrote an article titled “Everyone Is a Winner in the Great Ethiopian Run.” Even then, it was clear to me that the Great Ethiopian Run was far more than a road race. Its sporting, health, societal, historical, political, economic, and cultural significance is profound.  The Great Ethiopian Run has become a national institution, one that unites people, inspires generations, stimulates the economy, elevates our global image, and reinforces running as part of our cultural identity. Its influence is woven into the fabric of modern Ethiopian life. For this reason, the country must continue to treasure, celebrate, and honor the leaders who envisioned it, built it, protected it, and elevated it to its present level. Their work is not ordinary. It is nation building.

A Well-Deserved Congratulations

I want to express my deepest appreciation to the visionary living legend Haile Gebrselassie. His accomplishments on the track and on the road lifted our flag to the highest stages and made our national anthem echo through some of the world’s greatest arenas. Yet his legacy extends far beyond medals and victories. He transformed running into a national lifestyle, a cultural identity, and a unifying force for Ethiopia. His influence helped lay the foundation for what the Great Ethiopian Run has become.

I am fortunate to have been among a handful of people involved in the earliest years of establishing the Great Ethiopian Run. Building a foundation is important, but sustaining it for twenty-five years, growing it, and elevating it to where it stands today requires vision, discipline, and relentless dedication. What the Great Ethiopian Run has achieved did not happen by chance. It is the result of leadership and commitment at the highest level. For this reason, I extend my sincere admiration and congratulations to Richard Nerurkar. His leadership and strategic vision have guided the event through its most formative stages. His belief in the potential of Ethiopian running and his unyielding work ethic shaped the Great Ethiopian Run into one of the most respected and influential sporting events on the African continent.

I thank Dagmawit Amare for guiding and sustaining the organization during its years of significant growth. And I welcome Bank of America for placing trust in this remarkable event. This partnership marks the beginning of a new chapter. May the rest of our sporting institutions look inward, learn from this example, and take decisive steps toward a more sustainable and prosperous future for Ethiopian sport.

Gashaw Abeza (PhD) is an Associate Professor of Sport Business Management at Towson University (Maryland, USA). He was involved in the early foundation years of the Great Ethiopian Run, an experience that later inspired him to establish the Grand African Run in the United States, now in its seventh year. Gashaw is the author of the widely circulated book Sport Sponsorship Insights. He advises sport organizations around the world on sport business strategy and teaches senior level courses on sponsorship and sport marketing. He also supervises doctoral students at Munich Business School (Germany) on topics related to sport business.

Contributed by Gashaw Zergaw Abeza (PhD)

What is Tokenizing Debt?

Tokenizing debt converts traditional financial instruments such as Treasury Bills, Notes, and Bonds into digital tokens on a blockchain, a secure and decentralized ledger. Each token represents part or full ownership of the underlying asset. At the core of this system is the IOU, or “I Owe You,” which formalizes the debt a government owes its creditors. In the United States, these IOUs form the foundation of the world’s largest sovereign debt market. As of late 2025, the US gross federal debt exceeds USD 36 trillion—the result of decades of borrowing.

Digital currencies are a crucial part of this process. Unlike traditional money, they exist solely online and include cryptocurrencies, stablecoins, and central bank digital currencies. Stablecoins are particularly important because they maintain a stable value compared to fiat currency or other assets, often backed by reserves such as Treasuries, fiat, or gold. Blockchain technology records every transaction across multiple computers, ensuring transparency, security, and traceability. Smart contracts, which are self-executing codes built into the blockchain, automatically enforce ownership rules, interest payments, and redemption schedules. This reduces reliance on middlemen, minimizes errors, and speeds up the transaction process.

In the United States, tokenized Treasury securities are already reshaping the USD 36 trillion debt market, combining government-backed stability with the efficiency of blockchain. This approach demonstrates how traditional debt can be digitized while maintaining security and investor confidence.

“Trust is the currency of the future.”

The Promise of Tokenization: Expanding Access and Opportunity

Tokenization offers far more than technical innovation; it has the potential to transform how finance works. By converting debt into digital tokens, Ethiopia could broaden investor access and create a more inclusive financial system. Small-scale investors, from farmers in Hawassa to students in Bahir Dar, could participate in government debt markets using mobile apps. This inclusivity allows citizens to become stakeholders in national development while deepening public engagement in economic growth.

It also diversifies the creditor base, reducing reliance on domestic banks and mitigating systemic risks. Smart contracts automate payments and compliance, increasing trust and reliability. In the US, tokenized Treasuries already support stablecoins and decentralized finance platforms. Ethiopia could leverage tokenized T-Bills to stabilize local markets and attract international investment, building a more resilient economy.

Tokenization also streamlines traditional processes that are often slow and dependent on multiple intermediaries. Blockchain enables near-instant settlements, immutable records, and automated management, reducing errors and operational costs. By providing verifiable audit trails, it strengthens transparency and accountability.

Diversifying Risk, Strengthening Resilience

Tokenization’s global reach diversifies Ethiopia’s creditor base, reducing reliance on domestic banks and mitigating systemic risks. Smart contracts — self-executing blockchain programs — automate interest payments, redemptions, and compliance, minimizing errors and building trust. In the United States, tokenized Treasuries anchor stablecoins and decentralized finance (DeFi) protocols. Ethiopia could similarly use tokenized T-Bills to stabilize local markets and attract international funds, creating a more resilient financial system.

“The greatest danger in times of turbulence is not the turbulence, it is to act with yesterday’s logic.” — Peter Drucker

Efficiency and Transparency

Traditional debt issuance and settlement in Ethiopia are slow, complex, and heavily reliant on intermediaries, increasing both costs and risks. Blockchain enables near-instant settlements, immutable transaction records, and automated processes. In the United States, these features have reduced operational costs and boosted investor confidence. For Ethiopia, tokenization could streamline debt management, reduce errors, and provide verifiable audit trails, fostering accountability.

A Democratic Financial Future

Tokenized debt goes beyond technical upgrades; it fosters financial democracy. When citizens can invest directly in government debt, they gain a stake in national success. Such financial democracy also reinforces public trust by ensuring transparency in how national debt is managed. By enabling broad participation, Ethiopia could build an economy where growth is shared, aligning financial systems with public empowerment.

“The small landholders are the most precious part of a state.” — Thomas Jefferson

Navigating Challenges

The US experience highlights risks Ethiopia must manage carefully. Cybersecurity threats to smart contracts and digital wallets require robust safeguards. Regulatory uncertainty could undermine investor confidence, making clear guidance from the National Bank of Ethiopia essential. Public trust is equally important and can be fostered through education campaigns that demystify digital finance.

Around-the-clock trading could amplify volatility, as seen in US stress tests. Geopolitically, tokenization may enhance Ethiopia’s role in global finance, but competitors like China could introduce alternative digital systems that challenge dollar dominance.

A Roadmap for Ethiopia

To harness tokenization, Ethiopia should develop regulations for blockchain-based assets, ensuring compliance with securities laws, foster collaboration between the Ministry of Finance, National Bank of Ethiopia, and Fintech innovators to build secure platforms, invest in digital infrastructure, including wallets, digital IDs, and payment gateways. Educate the public to build trust and literacy in digital finance.

A pilot program tokenizing short-term T-Bills could serve as a low-risk starting point, allowing regulators to refine systems before scaling up.

Conclusion

The US experiment with tokenized debt offers Ethiopia a blueprint for financial transformation. By embracing blockchain, Ethiopia can expand funding sources, empower investors, diversify risks, and enhance transparency. This is not just about modernizing markets—it is about building an inclusive, resilient economy where every citizen has a stake.

“The illiterate of the 21st century will not be those who cannot read and write, but those who cannot learn, unlearn, and relearn.” — Alvin Toffler

Contributed by Cherenet Daba