The Rights Commission presented its assessment of the proceedings ahead of the June 1 vote to election and security officials on Thursday. The Commission deployed 55 teams to 1,007 polling stations in highly contested constituencies and those that have seen the most complaints from political parties, voters, and candidates.

The assessment, which did not cover Tigray, uncovered a number of glaring issues that sparked debate and contention from the meeting’s participants, which included NEBE officials, regional security heads, police chiefs, and representatives of the Political Parties Joint Council.

Among the concerning findings was the establishments in police stations, inside military camps, and alongside liquor stores.

“Some polling stations are in areas prohibited by law. In some areas, more than one polling station is duplicated. Some polling stations are located where they cannot be seen clearly,” said Mekdes Amenu, civil and political rights director at EHRC, who presented the findings.

Election officials argued that some polling stations are sited in police barracks, not police stations. They also stated stations located in and around military camps are legal, and are intended for the use of voters in the ENDF.

As for the liquor store accusations, officials said they were taking measures.

The Commission also found that the location of some polling stations does not match with GPS data provided by the Board, citing such cases in Ambo, West Shewa. Election officials said GPS coordinates are only available for around half of the 49,000 polling stations set to host voters in a few weeks.

The major bone of contention during the meeting, however, was alleged interference from security  and government officials, and members of the ruling party, in election preparations.

“Security forces and members must refrain from involvement in the election process. Government officials must refrain from interfering in the election process,” the Commission recommended based on its findings, though it declined to specify instances of interference.

“We recommended security officials and government officials should refrain from interfering in the election process. But this does not mean they are interfering now. For instance, when the ruling party rallies, some police members might join. That is human nature and individual incidents. We do not include such individual incidents in this report. For instance, in some cases, security officers also might proceed to detain some individuals. At such points, we interfere, explain the issue and tell them to release them. Such issues happen due to lack of awareness,” said Berhanu Adello, EHRC chief. “In general, we are not hiding any findings. There is nothing we hide from the public in fear of anyone. We are not secretive. We will give all evidence of this finding to NEBE, but not to political parties.”

The Commission did, however, note gaps in the equal treatment of political parties, citing opposition party complaints about a lack of resources and access to constituents.

“For instance, EPRP [Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Party] was denied rallies and campaigns in Addis Ababa. EPRP also planned to conduct rallies in 10 other cities and towns, but was denied,” read documents from the presentation.

The Commission notes that the Ethiopian Social Democratic Party’s plans for rallies in Dawro Zone met a similar fate, and so did campaign efforts from the Benishangul People’s Freedom Movement, the Freedom and Equality Party, and ONLF.

Opposition parties also say they are being denied their right to use public spaces.

On the other hand, the report found that the citizens were pushed to join rallies organized by the ruling Prosperity Party in places like Mizan Tepi. 

Election officials say they have facilitated the opposition’s access to public spaces, and attempted to pin the complaints on regional administrations.

The report also noted shortcomings in the participation of civil society organizations (CSOs), 169 of which have been accredited by NEBE to carry out programs on awareness, literacy, and access to information.

“CSOs reported they are unable to conduct election education and civic literacy activities owing to a lack of funding,” said Berhanu, noting the troubles are linked to foreign funding cuts.

The Commission noted that media involvement in the lead up to elections has been limited.

Response from Security Agencies

The heads of several regional peace and security bureaus, police commanders and commissioners, and other senior security officials were present during the discussions on EHRC’s findings.

Kasaye Gemechu of the Oromia peace and security bureau, said there have been “no major problems.”

“We are working hard and making every effort to make sure the election will take place without security problems. We are protecting and facilitating election kits and materials to arrive safely. Citizens have registered freely without fear. We conducted election preparations successfully. On election day, we are working to ensure the vote takes place without security problems,” said Kasaye. “We are also working to make sure all security forces equally serve all parties. We are making sure security forces in Oromia are neutral. So far, there is no major problem.”

Kasaye stated that over 25 million voters registered in Oromia. This figure is half of the over 50 million total voters registered, as per the report.

Zerihun Duguma, from the Oromia Police Commission, had another take.

“Oromia is vast. There are insurgents who are working to make obstacles so that the election does not take place successfully. A command post is working hard to counter these peace forces. There are also social media actors trying to obstruct the election; we are handling them cautiously,” said Zerihun.

EHRC monitoring covered almost all of Oromia, except some parts of Wollega.

Other security officials, including from Addis Ababa, also stated the pre-election process is proceeding peacefully.

“The entire government and the Prosperity Party is working to ensure a peaceful and democratic election,” said Meles Alemu, an executive member of the incumbent and member of the Political Parties Council. “We are ready to act on all the gaps mentioned in the EHRC monitoring findings. All stakeholders must discharge their roles to make the election successful.”

The region of vast plain land with approximately seven million people still struggles with accessibility, droughts, and other climate-related problems, but conditions appear to have improved markedly from the insecurity and instability of previous decades. The region also hosts major natural gas and fertilizer production projects positioned to play a key role in the government’s development ambitions.

As the country prepares to head to the polls, The Reporter’s Ashenafi Endale sat down with Mustafe to get his take on the region’s progress and future plans. The wide-ranging conversation touches on development, security, investment, elections, relations with Somaliland, the region’s role in Ethiopia’s pursuit for maritime access, and other pertinent topics. EXCERPTS:

The Reporter: A large number of public projects are underway in towns, villages, and cities across the Somali Regional State. How do you evaluate the peace dividend?

President Mustafe Omer: After the 2018 political change, we primarily focused on ensuring peace and then developing infrastructure and critical public provisions, which were completely missing at the time. Because the Somali region is so vast and lowland, developing infrastructure and providing basic services is very expensive.

When we came to office eight years ago, only 20 percent of the Somali population had access to water. Since then, we have developed over 360 underground water wells. Dams, reservoirs, and pipelines that connect villages and households have been developed; for areas where there is very scarce rain and where underground water is not available.

In the health sector, there were only nine hospitals in the region. Most of them have been serving for the past 50 years. We have renovated them and expanded them. We have built 21 new hospitals since we came to power. In general, we have over 30 hospitals now.

In the education sector, we have built over 700 new schools, of which over 100 are secondary schools. We built 12 boarding schools.

Several rural and urban roads have been developed to connect not only communities but also economic value chains and business areas. These are strategically selected roads for livestock markets. But because the Somali region is so vast, the roads built so far are relatively few.

Since Somali is mostly pastoralist, the shift to farming was very minor at 350,000 hectares when the political change took place in Ethiopia. Imagine, the Somali region has over 10 million hectares of arable land. Last year, 1.6 million hectares of land was cultivated and our plan is to reach two million hectares this year.

In general, there are significant improvements in the life of the people of the region. But the pillar of all these achievements is peace and stability. The private sector, especially the service sector, is highly active now. Hospitality, trade, and agro-processing are top investment sectors now. Over the past years, over 70 billion Birr in investment has been injected into the region by the private sector.

In a nutshell, the Somali region is a national model now. In terms of human rights, the region has substantially improved the bad situation before the political change. There is no public discontent in Somali now. The public can ask, demand anything and hold the government accountable. Regarding the political space, ONLF was the leading opposition party in our region. There are some five regional parties including ONLF. Including national parties, there are 12 parties running in the Somali region for the upcoming election. With ONLF, we have resolved disagreements and geopolitical discontents peacefully. Hence, there is no conflict or instability in the region.

What can you tell us about your administration’s efforts in terms of resource mapping, attracting more private capital, and ensuring productivity and economic transformation?

The government’s role is creating an enabling environment for the private sector to come. The government cannot replace the private sector and bring the capital on its own. Peace, stability and property rights are ensured in Somali. These are key elements for private investors. Our primary work is ensuring nobody should be worried about his life’s safety, and his property. All these are guaranteed in our region.

The rest is promoting the resources and investment potential in the region. We are doing that. Over 4,000 investors have come to the region since we took office, with over 70 billion Birr. This has substantially improved the region’s GDP.

The other thing we are providing is incentive provisions. Investors are seeking to get involved mainly in agriculture, health, education and others. We are providing land and other support. In and around Jijiga, we even provide industrial zones to minimize the initial costs of investors.

Natural gas and fertilizer production projects in the region are said to be making good progress. How will the Somali region and communities in and around the gas deposits in Calub benefit from these projects? Will they receive anything more than the seven percent royalty fee dictated by law?

The Somali region will get its fair share of the profit to be generated by the projects once they are finalized. The profit proceeds are first split between the federal and the producing region. Then the federal pie is again divided to all regions. Hence, the producing region benefits in two ways.

The proclamation gives around fifty percent to the producing region. This will be very huge. In terms of injecting more capital, rebooting the region’s budget, creating jobs, innovation and technology, and infrastructure developments; the natural gas and fertilizer projects will be a big game changer for the Somali region.

Apart from the fertilizer, the natural gas will also generate 1,000MW of electricity. The benefits from these projects will radically change livelihoods in the region and spur development.

During the EPRDF era, certain regional states like Somali, were widely considered as being marginalized and underdeveloped. Do you think this still holds true?

Under the previous regime, the Somali region was not part of the federal decision making process. We were excluded. Past agriculture policies marginalized developing regions. If you go to South Omo, Benishangul, or Afar, they are no different from us. Despite the Somali region having vast resources, the past regime could not capitalize on this. Hence, marginalized states like Somali were underdeveloped.

Due to this marginalization, the sense of Ethiopian nationalism was also loose in the past. We have done a lot of work to reverse this. Now, there is huge aspiration and eagerness in the people of the Somali region. The interest of all Somali now is how to link and integrate with the rest of Ethiopia’s economy. Somali people currently ask what is our share and role in the national economy? They are also asking why there are no industrial parks in the Somali region. All public questions are now linked to development.

Before, there was an attitude that our people were marginalized based on their ethnic identity. Today, our region’s only question is development. There is no other question.

Do you believe you achieved this success as an individual leader or as a senior member of the ruling Prosperity Party? If it is the latter, why hasn’t the peace dividend we see in the Somali region been replicated in other regional states?

I believe the political change is positively impacting all regional states and city administrations. Every part of Ethiopia has benefited from the change. Be it in urban development, industry, or agriculture; all are benefiting. There are regions who are performing better than the Somali region.

But the changes and progress achieved in the Somali region in the past several years were not mine alone. The leadership, from federal to local governments, have worked in unity. The commitment is huge. I might have discharged my duties well, but this success has been realized because all federal and regional leadership have discharged their duties. They work daily. We do it collectively. But for every failure, I take responsibility.

Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed is the leading contributor behind our success. The PM allowed us to work freely. For any challenge and question we raise as government and as a party, the PM provides solutions and support. The PM also provided the leadership to onboard mega projects worth USD 10 billion to the Somali region. The PM also initiated and implemented the Shebelle Resort. This is the first major tourism destination in Somali, and the PM did this to reboot tourist flow to the region. The PM took risks, and acted under the entrepreneurial state concept.

Unless the government takes initiative and starts such projects, the private sector cannot take steps. So in general, the successes have been achieved by all of us.

Recently, the exiled ONLF wing has been threatening to start an armed struggle. The recent release of the former regional president from prison, who was convicted for crimes, is also creating certain narratives. Do you think the revival of such narratives can reverse the progress in the Somali region? Do you condone the release of Abdi Illey?

I have no belief that anyone will drag back the Somali region into another chapter of conflict. No one will return the Somali region to conflict, because there is no Somali person who wants conflict. Different forces have tried in the past several years, but none of them succeeded. In the past seven and a half years, several attempts were made to mobilize the public to get involved in conflict. All of it failed, because the people well understand the value of peace.

Regarding ONLF, from the beginning, there were certain elements based in the diaspora. These diaspora-based ONLF members are very extremist. Most of the ONLF members who were on the ground are integrated into the government. They are now active in agriculture, business, and supporting government security forces. There is a good understanding with them.

I do not expect any such efforts to cause conflict in the region again.

Regarding former Somali leaders, in relation to the upcoming seventh national election, they are trying to cause some issues here and there. They completely deny all the work done in the Somali region. They intentionally paint a bad image of the peace dividends and development progress Somali has seen since the political change in the country.

In general, none of these have substantial power on the ground to threaten the current administration.

The seventh national election is less than two months away. In the meantime, the national dialogue and transitional justice processes are underway. All of them have certain overlaps. How and which initiative can effectively address the challenges the country has been facing, including conflict?

The national dialogue is hoped to bridge differences on major national topics. That will bring everyone together to a shared consensus. For instance, all thoughts and inputs from all regional states are collected. Some of them are polarized. When such a stark difference occurs on a certain agenda, it will be resolved through referendum, elections, or other alternatives. Not all Ethiopian are expected to have the same position and attitude on everything. That cannot happen in the world. But on the main national interest agendas, there is not much difference.

It is ethnic issues and political views that are dividing the elite. The elite argue Ethiopia should be led by this or that idea. The division is among the elite. The Ethiopian population is always united, it is the elite who is divided. The public in every part of Ethiopia is always one. Therefore, the national dialogue will resolve the differences among the elites and bring together everyone. Once a roadmap of the elite is drawn from that national dialogue, then it will be simple for all to come together. Any polarized view will be resolved based on that elite roadmap.

In any part of the world, there are extremists and outliers. In Ethiopia too, I don’t expect everyone to happily accept the outcomes of the national dialogue. But the critical mass will reach consensus through the national dialogue. We don’t have a very deep national division in Ethiopia, for that matter. Political sabotage, extremism, and power interest are being used as instruments for people to kill each other. Except for these, the country is in a very stable, progressive scenario.

The necessity of transitional justice is never questionable in Ethiopia. It is crucial to cleanse any misdeeds. Commissions will be established to lead the transitional justice process.

How do you see the growing presence of Turkiye and Egypt in neighboring Somalia affecting Ethiopia? What are the opportunities and advantages for Ethiopia’s national interests in this scenario of shifting geopolitical alliances?

Foreign powers are competing in our region of the Horn. The primary impact of these foreign forces is disrupting the peace and stability of the Horn region. This is the disadvantage. These foreign forces work to weaken Ethiopia, not to strengthen Ethiopia. It could be deploying proxy armed forces or disrupting trade routes and ports. These foreign forces are working to affect Ethiopia’s national interest, they also lobby other forces to affect Ethiopia. There are no major impacts on the Somali region so far but they are making efforts. At different times, these foreign forces are coming in the form of Al-Shabaab, ISIS and other terrorist forces to affect Somali and the national interest of Ethiopia. But they are neutralized while trying to enter the Somali region. There are still efforts to create ethnic and religious clashes in Somali. The extremists also use media campaigns.

Ethiopia is intent on gaining sea access. What is your take on this?

Having sea access is a huge benefit for Ethiopia. It will be a big pillar, a big legacy of this generation. Ethiopia already has a huge population and economy in the region. With sea access, it will be very influential. We already have a strong state and low corruption compared to other African countries. Having sea access on top of all this will make Ethiopia a very strong economy. As a region, we are ready to provide any support to the sea access pursuit.

What is your take on Somaliland efforts to secure statehood recognition? How will it affect the Somali region?

Our region has a good relationship with Somaliland. Most of our trade goes via Somaliland. The northern part of the Somali region has especially strong relations with Somaliland via trade in livestock and other goods.

Any good thing that comes Somaliland’s way will be good for the Somali region too. However, if other forces who oppose Somaliland recognition resort to conflict, they will try to expand the conflict to the Somali region as well. We already have seen these signs. Two years ago, there were cross border conflicts and clashes. Since it is Foreign Ministry that works on Ethiopia’s foreign policy, our role is providing information to the Ministry. Our main role as a region is preventing cross-border conflicts from happening. We are doing that.

Many still question the ideology of the Prosperity Party, and some argue it is unclear what its plans are for the next term if it wins a majority in June’s elections. What can you tell us about this?

The Prosperity Party has published its manifesto for the upcoming election. Regarding politics, PP aims to bridge the extremist ideologies in Ethiopia’s politics. Our way is the middle road. There are political forces in Ethiopia who run on extremist ethnic politics. On the other end sit political forces who consider ethnic politics as a danger. PP aims to close that extremism.

Our primary and ultimate goal is strengthening national unity. PP has done a lot on this so far. For instance, before, the Adwa Victory was seen as a source of conflict. Today, Adwa is celebrated together by all Ethiopians. It is seen as a victory of all Ethiopians.

PP has done a lot on ethnic politics, to close the differences. But now, we are focusing on strengthening national unity. The key issue is we must work hard on patriotism. Democracy is critical for Ethiopia. Regarding elections and peaceful power transition, there were huge deficits in the past half a century. We must lead these with law, and instill constitutionalism.

PP is working to ensure more opposition party members will be part of the government and work with the government in the next term. The presence of different views in the governance organs is crucial for nation building and development.

Professor Berhanu Nega of Ezema is working with the government. But Berhanu and Ezema still have different ideologies and perspectives from PP. However, both are working for the national interest. This is what would become a culture. Whatever difference we have, we must work together for the interest of our country.

The national dialogue has identified agendas on which different groups have different views and positions. The initiative will draw solutions for these disagreements. Then everyone, every political force, despite any difference, will be able to work together for the benefit of the country.

Regarding economic development, PP has clear principles. We have managed to reduce national debts. Ethiopia is paying its debts. Despite the successes, there can be ups and downs. Due to our economic reform, Ethiopia has departed from dependence on debt and aid. We made the country self-sufficient in forex, food security, and others. Exports especially have grown by a large margin. This is a major outcome of the economic reform. The economic growth sources are diversified to several sectors like manufacturing, tourism, mining, ICT, and others. In social aspects, health, education and other provisions have substantially increased.

The housing problem is identified as a critical challenge. Therefore, one of our next big tasks is in maximizing housing provisions. Several more projects are already in the pipeline currently.

But the ultimate role of PP is protecting Ethiopia’s sovereignty, ensuring that Ethiopia’s national interest agendas like sea access are well accepted among the international community.

The assessment comes as preparations for the seventh national elections enter their final phase against a backdrop of discontent among opposition parties, glaring security concerns, logistical hurdles, and budgetary concerns.

Melatwork Hailu, NEBE chair, had indicated the taskforce will include representatives from political parties, civil society organizations, and election observers operating in areas identified as security-sensitive.

The teams are tasked with assessing conditions on the ground and providing recommendations aimed at ensuring a safer electoral environment in regions facing heightened risk, according to election officials.

Opposition parties and the NEBE have been in disagreement over official security assessments. Last month, the Board published a map portraying the vast majority of constituencies as safe and ready to conduct voting. Opposition figures responded by saying they have not been able to field candidates or conduct campaigns in many of the constituencies the Board had highlighted in green on the map.

Meanwhile, election officials say more than 50 million citizens (27.4 million men and 23.1 women) have registered to vote on June 1, 2026. Five million of them registered online.

A total of 195,000 electoral administrators have been deployed nationwide, and around 70,000 of them have already received payments totaling one billion Birr, according to the NEBE. They are deployed at nearly 49,000 polling stations across 614 constituencies.

The government has allocated 10 billion Birr for the election process; however, officials stated that the amount is insufficient under current operational demands, prompting a formal request for additional funding, which is still pending a response.

Political parties have received a total of 81 million Birr to facilitate their engagement in the election process, and the Board confirmed that 37 media organizations have been accredited for election coverage, with 1,131 journalists issued official press badges.

In addition, 169 civil society organizations have been registered as election observers. International observation missions from the African Union and IGAD are also expected to monitor the electoral process.

Officials acknowledged that electoral activities have faced challenges in parts of Oromia, Amhara, Harar, and Sidama regions, where some polling sites were disrupted due to alleged irregular voter registration practices.

Nationwide, 22 polling stations have been closed following reported irregularities.

Regarding Tigray, officials say they have no open communication lines with the TPLF, which itself is no longer qualified to take part in an election.

With preparations accelerating, officials confirmed that the 7th national election will be held in less than six weeks, marking the final stretch toward election day as the newly announced security review committee prepares to begin its assessment work next week.

The political landscape is fraught with concerns that the ongoing conflicts in Oromia and Amhara, coupled with the exclusion of Tigray from the electoral cycle,  and opposition figures argue that the election may render competitive voting physically impossible in large swathes of the country.

A central point of contention is the National Election Board of Ethiopia’s (NEBE) controversial “traffic light” security map. By categorizing constituencies as Green (safe), Yellow (minor concerns), or Red (high risk), the NEBE sought to provide operational clarity. However, this has met significant pushback from opposition parties who claim the “Green” designations are overly optimistic and rely too heavily on state-provided data.

In a bid to resolve these discrepancies, the Board has deployed a joint monitoring task force—comprising NEBE officials, political party representatives, and civil society members—specifically to re-evaluate conditions in contested “Green” zones where the opposition maintains a free and fair environment is non-existent.

Amidst this volatility stands Merera Gudina (Prof.), a man whose biography is inextricably woven into the fabric of modern Ethiopian politics.

Merera is the current Chairman of the Oromo Federalist Congress (OFC) and a founding architect of the Medrek coalition, representing a formidable multi-ethnic challenge to the country’s historical power structures. A veteran of the struggle, he has long championed a “stem and branches” philosophy: the belief that Oromia is the indispensable heart of Ethiopia, and that its people must secure self-rule and shared-rule within a unified, democratic state rather than through secession.

Today, as he navigates the shifting winds of the current administration, Merera remains a definitive voice of the “old guard.” His perspective is tempered by the over five decades of activism, leading him to argue that Ethiopia still lacks the genuine political will required for the deep-seated dialogue that could resolve its dynamic crises.

The Reporter’s Abraham Tekle sat down with Merera to get his views on current political developments, security dynamics, and policy debates in Ethiopia, offering a sobering assessment of the drawbacks facing the national vote. EXCERPTS:

The Reporter: Ethiopia is preparing for its 2026 general election and your party will be taking part. How does the OFC assess the credibility and inclusiveness of the upcoming election, particularly in light of ongoing security concerns and questions about political space?

Merera Gudina (Prof.): Other than the ’97 election [referring to the 2005 National Election], in the history of elections in Ethiopia, no vote has ever even reached the stage of being a “competition.” There are times where situations change due to the process. But the main issue is that a democratic and fair election, even one that reached the level of a competition on Ethiopian soil, was only that of the ’97 election.

And because Ethiopia has been unable to do even that, it has failed to fulfill three basic national desires for the last 50 years. The first thing is that it hasn’t been possible to bring lasting peace and stability during those five decades. The other one is, for the last 50 years, the country hasn’t been able to create a democratic system. This “change” we’ve been struggling for for 50 years has just been spinning us from one crisis to another crisis, and still, we are in another crisis now. It hasn’t been possible to get out of that.

Thirdly, since most of the country’s wealth goes toward these conflicts—because we can’t get out of the cycle of conflict—it hasn’t been possible to bring meaningful economic development and prosperity. The people’s current standard of living and situation show this clearly.

Before the upcoming election, we repeatedly asked the government—along with other political parties—for the basic changes needed for a free and fair election by raising basic issues related with the election. The government, instead of moving toward that, kept pushing in the direction it was already headed. Starting from the structure of the Election Board, to security issues, to the political space which is becoming extremely narrow—we kept asking about these things. It didn’t work out for us.

The [OFC] Central Committee leadership convened a meeting with representatives from across the Oromia region and Addis Ababa to assess whether conditions permitted a free and fair election in our primary constituencies. Following these deliberations, we concluded that the political environment remained unfavorable. However, recognizing that current laws prevent us from boycotting the election entirely, and acknowledging that fundamental issues remain unresolved, we have decided to limit our participation and participate only in select areas of Addis Ababa/Finfinne, maintaining our stance that this election is unlikely to foster national peace or stability.

We are also closely monitoring the escalating situations in the Oromia and Amhara regions, while noting that Tigray continues to follow its own course. The impact of the vote on these dynamics will be revealed in a month and a half; however, our internal evaluation concludes that the upcoming election will fail to establish either a democratic system or lasting peace.

There is a condition where a woman’s abdomen swells as if she were pregnant, yet she never gives birth—a phenomenon sometimes referred to as a “Satan’s pregnancy.” Ethiopian democracy over the last 50 years has mirrored this. The “pregnancy” is visible; the struggle, the sacrifice, and the rhetoric are all present. Yet, there is no result. No tangible progress has been realized on the ground. Ultimately, democracy in Ethiopia did not emerge from politics nor elections.

There are persistent rumors and reports suggesting the ruling Prosperity Party (PP) may opt out of certain constituencies to allow “government-affiliated” opposition parties to secure parliamentary seats. What is your assessment of the rumors regarding “seat-sharing” between the ruling party and specific invited opposition groups?

Ideally, an election is a process where candidates assert their superiority and seek a popular mandate; there is no greater civic engagement than this competition. However, if the process is one-sided—driven by the government and parties brought in through negotiation—it forces a dynamic where dissent is suppressed. Being told when to show support or when to withhold opposition directly contradicts the fundamental principles of a free, fair, and democratic election.

Furthermore, an election represents the ultimate right of the people to establish their own government and choose their leaders. The current circumstances undermine these democratic foundations. As such, this process fails to break the cycle of the last 50 years; as previously stated, it remains an election where no tangible democratic progress is born.

Does this strategy marginalize grassroots parties like the OFC?

It doesn’t bring about any change. Significant political shifts have occurred in the past; for instance, during the 1997 election, our organization emerged as the primary opposition force. At that time, we secured approximately 53 to 57 parliamentary seats and 125 regional seats in Oromia. Despite these gains at both the regional and national levels, we were unable to effect substantive change for the people beyond amplifying their grievances. We faced immense challenges even in sustaining our own organization, illustrating that electoral success did not translate into tangible progress.

Globally, parliaments—the assemblies where people’s representatives convene—generally function at one of three levels. A strong parliament is characterized by its ability to pass robust legislation that improves citizens’ lives while actively monitoring the executive branch to ensure those laws are implemented. This oversight is the primary hallmark of a high-functioning representative body.

At the second level, a parliament may still possess the desire and capability to pass quality legislation; however, it lacks the authority to hold the executive accountable. In this scenario, the executive branch implements laws at its own discretion. The third and lowest level of parliament is one that can neither pass effective laws nor monitor the executive. Its only remaining function is to serve as a forum where the grievances of the people can be heard.

Therefore, a parliament that doesn’t qualify as one of the above three cannot be referred to as a parliament.  

Opposition parties have called for the NEBE to revise its assessment of security conditions and the map it recently published. How does the OFC respond to the NEBE’s designation of “Green” zones in Oromia where your members still face arrests and other dangers as you describe it? How do you view this situation?

Since entering the political arena, we have engaged in discussions with the government, the National Election Board, and the diplomatic community. Our consistent assessment is that the necessary conditions for a free and fair election in Ethiopia do not exist. Given that the situation in the country’s four major regions—including Oromia, Amhara, and Tigray—is far from conducive, participating under such circumstances serves no one’s interest. Instead, we have repeatedly advocated for essential pre-election measures, including a formal ceasefire, genuine negotiations, the expansion of political space, and, most critically, the resolution of security concerns.

The government and the Election Board frequently maintain that “conducive conditions” are in place. However, as we live among the people, we know this is not the case. In previous cycles, I campaigned extensively through the Amhara region, in cities such as Bahir Dar, Dessie, and Kombolcha. In Oromia, my reach extended to the Kenyan border at Moyale, the Somali border at Ginnir, and across Harar, Jimma, Illubabor, and Wollega. I navigated not just the central hubs, but the most remote areas of the country.

While elections were indeed conducted in the past, the environment for political mobilization was entirely different. Back then, we could move freely and campaign by gathering hundreds of thousands of supporters, often coordinating convoys of five to ten vehicles. It was under those specific operational conditions that we were able to conduct our outreach and engagement.

So, how do you assess the Board’s decision to designate the areas you described as dangerous as “green”?

At times, the government’s assertions appear to be a joke. For instance, it is well-documented that bank robberies occur repeatedly in towns near the capital, and travelers on the road to Gojjam are frequently intercepted and robbed. Furthermore, widespread and recurring conflicts continue to plague areas such as Ambo, Metasbeia, Chobi, Jeldu, Ginde Beret, and Meta Robi.

For the past five or six years, a mafia-like group—allegedly involving elements of the government and other entities—has been operating in the Ambo area. This group has been responsible for shocking public killings and the mistreatment of civilians. The formation of this group and its recent activities have caused significant outcry across Oromo areas.

Given these prevailing conditions, a “green light” from the government or the Election Board does not reflect the actual security environment. The reality on the ground is well-known to the public and the government alike. While these facts may be obscured from the international community, the government remains fully aware of the situation; it is not a secret.

The OFC recently also stated it would not field candidates in active conflict zones in Oromia. But beyond that, what specific alternative negotiation framework does your party propose to halt the violence in the region?

We have tried a lot to bring a lasting solution to the problems both locally and internationally. Several international organizations—including the Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy (NIMD), the National Democratic Institute (NDI), and various South African institutions—have facilitated extensive training for both government officials and opposition leaders. These high-level study tours to The Hague, Belfast, and Robben Island focused on democratic transitions, conflict resolution, and the dismantling of systemic oppression. These programs were designed to share global experiences on how other nations have successfully navigated long-standing internal conflicts and established democratic systems.

Beyond international efforts, numerous domestic forums have been held across Ethiopia, from Adama to Arba Minch, involving political leaders at all levels. During the transition of power from the EPRDF era, current ministers and high-level officials participated in collective planning in Bishoftu to establish a unified vision for the country’s future. Despite this wealth of training, planning, and shared knowledge, the core obstacle remains a lack of political commitment.

I would say the government appears more focused on suppressing opposition than on maintaining stability through the promotion of democratic processes in the country.

Security challenges—including armed conflicts in multiple regions—have raised concerns about voter access and electoral legitimacy. To what extent do you believe the current security environment could affect voter turnout and the legitimacy of the electoral process? What is your party’s position on the ongoing tensions and how should the federal government manage relations with regional armed actors?

We have consistently informed the government, through public statements and various other channels, that the current situation requires a resolution. For instance, last year at Elilly Hotel, we held a week-long convention with the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF), prominent intellectuals, university professors, and Abba Gadaas. This gathering also included religious leaders, such as priests and sheikhs, who met for several days to deliberate on necessary actions for the Oromia region. Following these discussions, we submitted a formal proposal outlining sixteen key solutions; however, the government has since failed to respond or engage further.

Throughout this period, we have remained vocal, expressing our concerns through both direct and indirect means. Our evaluation remains that the primary obstacle is the government’s lack of political commitment. Until this fundamental issue is addressed, there is little hope for meaningful progress.

The intensified political tensions, recent clashes, and internal divisions within the proscribed Tigray People’s Liberation Front, including the term extension of the Interim Administration of Tigray, have raised fears of renewed conflict despite the Pretoria Agreement. How do you assess the current relationship between the federal government and Tigray forces?

As you know, within the movement we call the Medrek Coalition, Arena Tigray is included. We maintain a collaborative approach; for example, we recently joined Arena Tigray in issuing a critique of the National Dialogue Commission. Our joint conclusion was that the current issues cannot be resolved through existing methods, as they lack the necessary political commitment. We must determine how to apply lessons from the past to move forward effectively, as continuing with outdated strategies will only hinder progress.

Based on my observations and assessments, Tigray has essentially achieved a state of de facto independence. It is an area where the federal government cannot exercise authority at will and where the Ethiopian National Defense Force lacks freedom of movement. Furthermore, the federal government’s claims of “enforcing the rule of law” are not recognized there. This situation has persisted for some time—not through constitutional means, but in practice—and it remains uncertain how much longer this lack of central control will continue.

As the situation escalates, there appears to be a lack of sincere effort to alleviate the underlying problems, which are ultimately rooted in a struggle for power. The primary focus seems to be on maintaining dominance: whether the TPLF will retain its authority or whether the federal government will succeed in bringing the region under the same level of control as other states. Consequently, I see no genuine commitment to fully implementing the Pretoria Agreement or resolving negotiations regarding constitutional and territorial matters.

As I have previously stated on social media, the region is currently characterized by a “witch politics of blame,” where each side holds the other responsible for the ongoing crisis. I leave it to the people of Tigray to determine which party—the federal government or the TPLF—bears the true responsibility for being the witch.

What would be the most possible solutions to resolve these disputes?

The most viable path forward is to engage in negotiations rooted in democratic principles. To that end, the parties reached and signed the Pretoria Agreement. However, instead of prioritizing the implementation of this accord at every opportunity, there appears to be a consistent effort to undermine it. While both sides publicly affirm their commitment to the Pretoria Agreement, they simultaneously accuse one another of violating its terms.

This contradiction is compounded by the fact that the full details of what was negotiated behind closed doors remain unknown to the public.

While the signing of the agreement was publicized, the specific terms and the process by which they were reached remain opaque. For instance, the Ethiopian government negotiated and signed the accord directly with the TPLF, rather than with any other entity. It is therefore contradictory that the federal government, upon returning to Addis Ababa, demanded the TPLF obtain new legal certification from the Election Board. After negotiating with an entity previously designated as illegal, turning around to demand its re-legalization appears to be a vague and inconsistent stance.

From my perspective, these shifting demands seem to be a search for excuses to stall the process. Similarly, while the TPLF officially accepted the various stages of disarmament requested by the federal government, the reality on the ground does not show that their forces are actually disarming. Consequently, it appears that both sides are engaging in political posturing rather than genuine implementation.

In a statement issued today April 2, 2026, the National Election Board of Ethiopia (NEBE) said it is carrying out a range of pre-election activities to ensure the seventh general election is “free, fair, credible and peaceful,” including the ongoing voter registration process being conducted in accordance with its schedule.

However, the Board disclosed that it has received reports indicating the occurrence of illegal practices during this critical phase. These include door-to-door campaigns pressuring citizens to obtain voter cards, as well as attempts to link voter registration with access to public services and even salary deductions.

“The Board has observed reports suggesting the implementation of unlawful acts, ranging from house-to-house mobilization urging citizens to collect voter cards, to exerting pressure by associating voter registration with public services and salary deductions,” the statement reads.

The Board clarified that, under the law, voter education can only be conducted by the Board itself, or by civil society organizations and educational institutions authorized by it. Separately, political parties registered to contest in the election are permitted to carry out campaign activities.

Based on the complaints it has received, NEBE said it has formally notified all regional and city administrations to ensure that officials at all levels refrain from engaging in door-to-door mobilization and from exerting undue pressure that effectively makes voter registration mandatory.

“Any entity cannot go door-to-door in violation of the law and instruct citizens to register, nor can institutions compel employees to register as voters,” the Board stated. “Threatening employees by saying ‘your salary will be cut if you do not take a voter card’ is an illegal act, and the Board strongly condemns it.”

NEBE further warned that it is closely monitoring the situation and will publicly expose institutions and actors found to be involved in such practices. It added that failure to take corrective measures could lead to more serious action, including identifying specific constituencies and polling stations where such activities occur and suspending voting in those areas.

The Board emphasized that voting is a constitutional right of citizens and that participation in voter registration must be based solely on individual consent and personal decision. It reiterated that registration is not mandatory and that failure to register does not result in salary deductions.

In its concluding remarks, NEBE called on citizens to cooperate by reporting any individuals or institutions that attempt to undermine this fundamental right, noting that such information is critical for the legal measures it intends to take.

Officials at the National Election Board of Ethiopia (NEBE) report that more than nine million voters have signed up since registration opened a week ago, while thousands of polling stations remain inactive due to security and logistical challenges.

Speaking at a press conference held Friday at the Skylight Hotel in Addis Ababa, NEBE Chair Melatwork Hailu disclosed that nearly 6,400 polling stations across the country remain inactive, mainly because of security concerns and delays in the delivery of election materials.

Despite this, election officials say more than nine million voters have registered over the past week, 600,000 of whom registered digitally. The Board has deployed more than 187,000 election officials and administrators to manage voter registration and the election process.

Still, the Board acknowledged several challenges affecting the registration process. These include shortages of vehicles during material distribution, fuel shortages, lack of cooperation from regional administrations, and damage to election materials caused by rain. In one incident in Dallol, election materials were reportedly burned.

The board also reported technical challenges related to the new digital voter registration system, including network interruptions, system update issues, language barriers among voters, and difficulties with voters correctly filling out their full names.

NEBE said it is currently engaging with seven regional states regarding security issues affecting the election process.

In addition, the Board revealed that it had dismissed several election officials after investigations found cases of unethical conduct, absenteeism, and individuals simultaneously serving as both candidates and election officials.

Other incidents involved individuals attempting to photograph voter cards and bribe officials, the chairwoman said.

On political party affairs, NEBE announced that it has transferred funds to 36 political parties, while 23 parties are yet to receive funding. Board officials also said it has established an independent media committee to organize political party debates ahead of the election.

The Chairwoman stated that while the Board has made efforts to begin election preparations in Tigray, the regional interim administration has remained unresponsive.

Earlier this week, Federal High Court judges lifted an injunction they had placed earlier on the Board’s decision to limit elections to federal representation in five constituencies contested between the Amhara and Tigray regions.

With less than a month to go before its mandate expires, the fate of the Tigray Interim Administration (TIA) has become a major concern, with opposition party leaders and political experts warning that a TPLF-led faction is leveraging this looming deadline to seize control of the region’s leadership.

In an interview with The Reporter on March 13, 2026, Dejen Mezgebe (PhD), chairman of the Tigray Independence Party (TIP), accused the TPLF, which was stripped of federal recognition last year, of conspiring to take control of the regional government structure in an attempt to steer Tigray’s politics in a direction it wants. He stated the group is threatening, arresting, and dismissing all forces that oppose its approach.

“They have taken sole control of Tigray’s politics and want to resolve everything by force,” Dejen told The Reporter.

Under the terms of the November 2022 Pretoria Agreement, the TIA was established as a temporary governing body to oversee the region’s transition until elections could occur. However, internal divisions within the TPLF and friction between Mekelle and Addis Ababa have stalled progress on key provisions, including the full disarmament of regional forces and the return of displaced persons.

Now, with the TIA’s legal mandate set to expire early next month ahead of elections, Tigray appears to be heading for a power vacuum that opposition leaders claim TPLF is rushing to fill despite no longer qualifying as a political party.

Opposition leaders in the region say the situation remains unclear, and claim the federal government has ceased all formal contact with regional leadership.

“Currently, we understand that the federal government has disowned the Tigray interim administration,” Dejen said. “My information is that there is no communication, even by phone.”

A political analyst from the Tigray region, speaking on condition of anonymity, described the current status of the Pretoria Agreement as under threat.

The expert noted that the federal government remains distant as the administration’s term nears its end.

“The silence of the federal government can be interpreted in several ways,” said the expert. “It could be a tactical move to see how the TPLF reacts, or it could be a sign of a deeper rift and a lack of a clear strategy.”

The analyst further noted that the lack of communication between the two parties increases regional tension.

“The end of the term of the interim administration is a critical juncture,” the expert added. “Some believe that the TPLF will try to install its own government, while others think that the federal government will intervene.”

Both the political analyst and the TIP chairman state that Tigray is currently experiencing high levels of uncertainty and tension.

The expert cited the recent arrest of Shewit Gebreegziabher, a member of the Salsay Weyane Tigray (SAWET) party and a university professor, as an example of the TPLF-led administration’s efforts to control the region.

In a statement issued Friday, Salsay Weyane Tigray reported that security personnel, acting under orders from the TPLF-led administration and dressed in civilian attire, took Shewit into custody.

The party’s statement alleges that the TPLF has repeatedly threatened summary arrests against critics, opposition members, and journalists for exercising their freedom of expression. The party described these actions as part of a “zero-tolerance” policy toward dissent.

“We condemn this act in the strongest possible terms and demand the immediate release of our member,” reads the statement.

As the less in a month window closes, the federal government has not confirmed whether it seeks to extend the TIA mandate or restore the pre-war government structure. However, Dejen warned that the current trajectory points toward a departure from civilian politics, stating, “It seems they are preparing to restore the government of Tigray that was dismantled under the Pretoria agreement, or to administer the region under martial law.”

The expert added that the “lack of transparency and communication between the two parties is exacerbating the situation”.

“The coming days are a very delicate moment for the region,” he said.

The injunction had been issued after Simeret Party filed a lawsuit against the Election Board following the Board’s public acknowledgment of the House of Federation’s decision.

The letter sent by the House of Federation to the Election Board indicated that the five constituencies—whose administrative status has been contested between the Amhara and Tigray regional governments—should conduct elections independently and directly for representation in the House of Peoples’ Representatives, outside the jurisdiction of the Tigray regional government, until the territorial dispute is resolved.

However, the plaintiff, Simeret Party, announced on March 11, 2026, that it had withdrawn the lawsuit it filed before the First Electoral Bench of the Federal High Court.

The party said it decided to withdraw the case after confirming that the letter sent from the House of Federation to the Election Board had not been approved by the Council’s plenary session, but was instead issued solely by the Speaker of the House.

According to the party, a decision can only be considered legally binding if it is discussed and approved by members during a plenary session and adopted through a vote.

“A decision that can be considered legally valid by the Council is one that is discussed by its members in a plenary session, included on the agenda, and approved through a vote. The letter issued by the Speaker does not represent the Council’s legal position and was not known to the members of the Council,” the party stated.

The party said that continuing the legal dispute based on a document lacking a proper legal foundation would waste both the court’s valuable time and public resources, which is why it decided to withdraw the case.

Following the withdrawal of the lawsuit on March 11, 2026, the Federal High Court today lifted the injunction it had imposed on the Election Board.

The registration of voters for the seventh national election scheduled for June 1, 2026 is underway. Officials of the National Election Board of Ethiopia (NEBE) have set a one-month window for registration, with the deadline falling on April 7.

Voters follow political candidates, who finalized their registration last month. A total of 10,934 candidates have submitted their credentials. Of these, nearly 2,200 will be in the running for a seat in the House of Peoples’ Representatives while the remaining will contend for seats on regional councils across city and regional administrations.

The number of candidates this time around is significantly higher than the 8,209 candidates registered for the sixth national election held in 2021.

Nearly 75 percent of candidates are men. The pool is composed of candidates from 47 political parties (including two coalitions and one front) and no less than 73 independents, four of which are women. The 2021 vote also saw the participation of 47 parties, though there were 125 independent candidates.

The candidate registration period was initially intended to last one month. However, following formal requests from various political parties, the NEBE extended the deadline by 15 days, concluding the process on February 24.

During a press briefing held on Friday, NEBE Chairperson Melatwork Hailu detailed the progress of pre-election activities undertaken so far and outlined the Board’s next steps.

Melatwork confirmed that registration remained active until the final day of the extension and said the Board is working to put up displays listing the names and affiliations of political candidates at polling stations across Ethiopia to ensure transparency and allow for public oversight.

The Chairperson highlighted that the Board is currently facing various challenges in its effort to begin voter registration.

Although originally planned to start earlier in February, the schedule was adjusted, and voter registration is now set to take place from March 7 to April 7, 2026. With only 87 days remaining until the general election, the Board is operating under a tight timeframe to ensure all necessary materials are in place.

One of the primary concerns raised during the briefing was the logistical difficulty of transporting election materials to certain regions of Ethiopia. The Chairperson reported that while the Board has successfully moved supplies to regional hubs, some regional administrations have been uncooperative in providing the necessary transport to reach local districts.

Furthermore, ongoing security concerns in specific areas have created barriers for the safe delivery of equipment. These security issues remain a top priority for the NEBE as it seeks to ensure that every eligible citizen has the opportunity to register, according to Melatwork.

She disclosed the Board has tentatively categorized polling stations as green, yellow, or red based on the level of perceived security risk. Election officials and opposition party leaders are expected to convene again to discuss the categorization in the near future.

Despite protests from opposition parties to the contrary, Melatwork stated again the Board’s stance that conditions across the country are conducive for conducting the vote.

She declined to comment on recent controversy surrounding a decision from the House of Federation and constituencies in areas disputed by the Tigray and Amhara regional states.

On Monday, February 23, 2026 the House of Federation formally notified the National Election Board of Ethiopia of a decision to proceed with federal elections in five contested constituencies outside the jurisdiction of the Tigray Regional State, pending resolution of an ongoing territorial dispute with the Amhara Regional State.

In a letter sent to the Board, the House stated that until disagreements between the Tigray and Amhara regional governments over five electoral constituencies are resolved, elections for federal representatives in Humera, Adi-Remets, Korem-Oflah, Tselemti and Raya Alamata would be conducted separately and directly, outside the administrative authority of the Tigray Regional State.

The decision immediately drew opposition in Tigray.

On February 27, demonstrations were held in several areas across the region in protest. Addressing supporters during the protests, Debretsion Gebremichael, chairman of the board proscribed Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), accused federal authorities of escalating tensions and undermining post-war arrangements.

“The decision passed by the House of Federation is aimed at preventing the people of Tigray and Amhara from being united and at causing bloodshed,” Debretsion said.

He called on “the Amhara people and elites” to understand the situation and to continue what he described as their stance to avoid war.

Debretsion further alleged that the federal government had violated the Pretoria Agreement, which ended the two-year conflict that erupted in 2020, and had declared intention to resume hostilities.

He accused unnamed actors of implementing what he described as the federal government’s objectives and referred to them as “traitors,” urging them to refrain from their actions and “stand with the people.”

He also claimed that efforts were underway to drag Tigray into sustained confrontation with neighboring regions.

“We will not allow harm to be inflicted upon our people, nor will we permit the constitutional territories of the region to be dismantled,” he said, adding that the threat facing the region “cannot be averted by fleeing.”

“The youth of Tigray may flee the region, but they cannot escape the blade of prosperity,” Debretsion said, in a reference to the ruling Prosperity Party. He argued that the risk must be confronted collectively and warned that renewed conflict would not remain confined to Tigray.

“If war breaks out, it will not remain confined to the Tigray region alone,” he said, cautioning that the consequences would extend to the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea region.

Tadesse Werede, president of the Tigray Interim Administration (TIA), also weighed in on the matter, questioning the legal basis of the decision.

Tadesse argued that the decisions of the House of Federation and the National Election Board are not legally grounded, calling for a political solution.

According to the Interim President, the question of the region’s territorial integrity and the return of displaced persons should not be framed as causes of war, but as consequences of the war that ended under the Pretoria Agreement. He said the failure to resolve these matters over the past three years has contributed to mounting tensions.

Tadesse urged reconsideration of what he described as ongoing efforts to initiate war against the region, stressing the need to strengthen unity to prevent renewed conflict.

Describing the current situation as “a bomb that could explode at any moment,” he warned that there would be no scenario in which one side suffers while the other remains unaffected.