Zegeye had been serving on the commission since its establishment to facilitate national dialogue and foster consensus among Ethiopians on key political and national issues. He was widely regarded for his sharp perspectives on nation-building, governance, and national consensus.

A prominent figure in Ethiopia’s political history, Zegeye also played a significant role during the transition period following the fall of the imperial regime. As Minister of Agriculture at the time, he was involved in the implementation of the landmark “Land to the Tiller” land reform proclamation under the Derg government.

Trained as a lawyer at Addis Ababa University and the University of Wisconsin–Madison, Zegeye dedicated decades to public service. Over the course of his career, he held ministerial positions in several government institutions, including the Ministry of Land Reform and Administration, the Ministry of Agriculture and Settlement, the Ministry of Justice, and the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs.

The Rights Commission presented its assessment of the proceedings ahead of the June 1 vote to election and security officials on Thursday. The Commission deployed 55 teams to 1,007 polling stations in highly contested constituencies and those that have seen the most complaints from political parties, voters, and candidates.

The assessment, which did not cover Tigray, uncovered a number of glaring issues that sparked debate and contention from the meeting’s participants, which included NEBE officials, regional security heads, police chiefs, and representatives of the Political Parties Joint Council.

Among the concerning findings was the establishments in police stations, inside military camps, and alongside liquor stores.

“Some polling stations are in areas prohibited by law. In some areas, more than one polling station is duplicated. Some polling stations are located where they cannot be seen clearly,” said Mekdes Amenu, civil and political rights director at EHRC, who presented the findings.

Election officials argued that some polling stations are sited in police barracks, not police stations. They also stated stations located in and around military camps are legal, and are intended for the use of voters in the ENDF.

As for the liquor store accusations, officials said they were taking measures.

The Commission also found that the location of some polling stations does not match with GPS data provided by the Board, citing such cases in Ambo, West Shewa. Election officials said GPS coordinates are only available for around half of the 49,000 polling stations set to host voters in a few weeks.

The major bone of contention during the meeting, however, was alleged interference from security  and government officials, and members of the ruling party, in election preparations.

“Security forces and members must refrain from involvement in the election process. Government officials must refrain from interfering in the election process,” the Commission recommended based on its findings, though it declined to specify instances of interference.

“We recommended security officials and government officials should refrain from interfering in the election process. But this does not mean they are interfering now. For instance, when the ruling party rallies, some police members might join. That is human nature and individual incidents. We do not include such individual incidents in this report. For instance, in some cases, security officers also might proceed to detain some individuals. At such points, we interfere, explain the issue and tell them to release them. Such issues happen due to lack of awareness,” said Berhanu Adello, EHRC chief. “In general, we are not hiding any findings. There is nothing we hide from the public in fear of anyone. We are not secretive. We will give all evidence of this finding to NEBE, but not to political parties.”

The Commission did, however, note gaps in the equal treatment of political parties, citing opposition party complaints about a lack of resources and access to constituents.

“For instance, EPRP [Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Party] was denied rallies and campaigns in Addis Ababa. EPRP also planned to conduct rallies in 10 other cities and towns, but was denied,” read documents from the presentation.

The Commission notes that the Ethiopian Social Democratic Party’s plans for rallies in Dawro Zone met a similar fate, and so did campaign efforts from the Benishangul People’s Freedom Movement, the Freedom and Equality Party, and ONLF.

Opposition parties also say they are being denied their right to use public spaces.

On the other hand, the report found that the citizens were pushed to join rallies organized by the ruling Prosperity Party in places like Mizan Tepi. 

Election officials say they have facilitated the opposition’s access to public spaces, and attempted to pin the complaints on regional administrations.

The report also noted shortcomings in the participation of civil society organizations (CSOs), 169 of which have been accredited by NEBE to carry out programs on awareness, literacy, and access to information.

“CSOs reported they are unable to conduct election education and civic literacy activities owing to a lack of funding,” said Berhanu, noting the troubles are linked to foreign funding cuts.

The Commission noted that media involvement in the lead up to elections has been limited.

Response from Security Agencies

The heads of several regional peace and security bureaus, police commanders and commissioners, and other senior security officials were present during the discussions on EHRC’s findings.

Kasaye Gemechu of the Oromia peace and security bureau, said there have been “no major problems.”

“We are working hard and making every effort to make sure the election will take place without security problems. We are protecting and facilitating election kits and materials to arrive safely. Citizens have registered freely without fear. We conducted election preparations successfully. On election day, we are working to ensure the vote takes place without security problems,” said Kasaye. “We are also working to make sure all security forces equally serve all parties. We are making sure security forces in Oromia are neutral. So far, there is no major problem.”

Kasaye stated that over 25 million voters registered in Oromia. This figure is half of the over 50 million total voters registered, as per the report.

Zerihun Duguma, from the Oromia Police Commission, had another take.

“Oromia is vast. There are insurgents who are working to make obstacles so that the election does not take place successfully. A command post is working hard to counter these peace forces. There are also social media actors trying to obstruct the election; we are handling them cautiously,” said Zerihun.

EHRC monitoring covered almost all of Oromia, except some parts of Wollega.

Other security officials, including from Addis Ababa, also stated the pre-election process is proceeding peacefully.

“The entire government and the Prosperity Party is working to ensure a peaceful and democratic election,” said Meles Alemu, an executive member of the incumbent and member of the Political Parties Council. “We are ready to act on all the gaps mentioned in the EHRC monitoring findings. All stakeholders must discharge their roles to make the election successful.”

If ratified by Parliament, the proclamation would bar an insurer holding a standard insurance business license from engaging in business as a reinsurance provider. Similarly, an insurer would require a separate license to offer Takaful insurance services.

Under the terms of the draft, these licenses would be granted by the Ethiopian Insurance Regulatory Authority, which is slated to take over as industry regulator from the National Bank of Ethiopia (NBE).

The NBE has regulated the nascent insurance industry for three decades, alongside banks, microfinance institutions, reinsurance, and lease financing. Insurers have long argued the NBE’s focus on banking growth has stifled their own.

The authority proposed in the amendment will be led by a seven-member board, which will include representatives from the NBE and Ethiopian Capital Market Authority, and will be responsible for issuing licenses and enforcing compliance.

The draft also proposes to open the insurance industry to foreign investment, following up on liberalization under the Banking Business Proclamation of early 2025. If approved, foreign insurers will be able to establish a partially or fully owned subsidiary in Ethiopia, as well as acquire shares in existing Ethiopian insurers.

The draft limits “strategic” foreign investors to 40 percent of an insurer’s subscribed shares, while “non-strategic” foreign nationals can own up to 10 percent of shares.

Foreign nationals and foreign-owned Ethiopian organizations fully owned by foreign nationals shall invest in an insurer only through foreign direct investment in foreign currency.

The Authority may, on the application of a foreign reinsurer, grant a license for the establishment by the foreign reinsurer of a representative office in Ethiopia, according to the draft.

It also features several provisions related to mergers and acquisitions in the insurance industry, including one granting the Authority the power to step in and enforce a statutory merger to “rescue problem insurers and/or to create a more viable and stronger insurer.”

Abdulmenan Mohamed (PhD), a seasoned financial analyst and keen observer of the Ethiopian financial sector, observes the draft has several shortcomings.

“The separation of the insurance licensing categories could attract more investors to the industry. But since the Ethiopian insurance industry is nascent and small, it is not clear on what logical basis the establishment of a new regulatory authority is necessitated. The new bill is vast and incorporates a lot of provisions from around the world. Establishing such a huge regulatory institution might be too much for such a small industry,” said Abdulmenan.

He questions the financial implications involved in setting up the new regulator.

“Where will the funding come from to finance the authority’s huge responsibilities? It needs new offices, new officers, vehicles, and operational capital. Licensing fees and other revenue streams will be insufficient to cover the expenditures,” said the analyst.

He urges regulators at the NBE to focus on developing more efficient regulatory mechanisms rather than attempting to set up an outsized regulatory institution.

“The bill has too many provisions. Existing insurers will need to acquire new licenses under new categories. This will be difficult for them,” said Abdulmenan.

On the other hand, Ethiopian insurers have long been calling for an autonomous regulator. Many in the industry believe that an independent regulator would allow it to receive the attention and support it needs for growth, help attract international investment, and advocate more actively on its behalf.

“An independent regulatory agency that will focus on insurance is vital. So far, our operations, activities, and concerns are relegated to second place because the NBE appears to prioritize the banking sector,” Hibret Insurance CEO Meseret Bezabih told The Reporter last year.

Tuesday’s voting also saw Kiros Hagos sworn in as speaker of the regional council, which had been suspended since the two-year war.

During the discussions that led up to the appointment of Debretsion, council members and TPLF leaders criticized the federal government for failing to implement the terms of the 2022 Pretoria Agreement, which ended the war, and accused it of cutting Tigray off from federal budget subsidies and fuel supply networks.

The vote came just a couple of weeks after TPLF, which was struck off the political party registry last year, held a general assembly in Axum. That meeting also featured criticism of the federal government, and TPLF leaders had hinted at their intentions to remove the “unilaterally elected” TIA president.

Tadesse took over at the helm of the interim administration from Getachew Reda in April 2025, and last month the federal government announced its decision to extend the TIA’s mandate, and Tadesse’s presidency, by one year.

However, the reinstatement of the regional council and the swearing in of the TPLF chairman are the culmination of a political leadership crisis that has been haunting Tigray since the war ended in late 2022. This week’s developments have essentially created two separate regional administrations, once again stoking fears that Tigray might soon find itself embroiled in conflict.

While these concerns are widely shared, political observers note the TPLF has maintained its control of the region throughout the tenure of the TIA, arguing that Getachew Reda and Tadesse Werede held no real power over Tigray’s military apparatus and its zonal and woreda administrations.

The TPLF’s decision to revitalize the pre-war council and elect its president without the federal government’s blessing seemingly brings everything back to square one. In 2020, the regional administration’s decision to hold elections without federal approval was among the key events that led to war.

What is more striking is that this time around, the TPLF is not even recognized as a political party as the National Election Board of Ethiopia (NEBE) revoked its license last year. Furthermore, the terms of the Pretoria Agreement grant the federal government the power to appoint the TIA president.

This week’s development could therefore have far-reaching implications for peace and security in the region, including the prospect of another bloody conflict that could feature the involvement of an array of foreign actors.

The federal government has not yet broken its silence over the reinstatement of the Tigray regional council. Sources in Tigray told The Reporter that a fighter jet was spotted over Mekelle on Tuesday in what they believe was a reconnaissance mission.

“Tadesse could have asserted his power and stopped both the federal government and TPLF before things got worse. But Tadesse remained silent, creating a conducive environment for both sides to pursue their divergent interests,” said one insider, speaking anonymously.

Multiple inside sources who spoke to The Reporter said the TPLF’s move to elect its own regional president three years after the Pretoria Agreement is based on precise calculations. It coincides with the rebuilding and rearmament of its military force, and is linked to domestic and external alliances, they argue.

High on the list of TPLF’s priorities is the return of territories like Wolkait, Humera, and Raya, which are the subject of heated contention with the neighboring Amhara regional administration.

“TPLF believes the federal government intentionally denied the return of these territories to Tigray. They believe the informal forces controlling those disputed areas now are working with the federal government. TPLF will use any means, including armed conflict, to reassert control of these areas. It might then sit for negotiations with the federal government, with better bargaining power,” said the leader of an opposition party in Tigray, who spoke to The Reporter anonymously.

The region’s opposition parties have been engaged in closed meetings in the days following Debretsion’s appointment as president, analyzing whether to side with the federal government or the regional council.

Meanwhile, the TPLF is reportedly moving to cement alliances with newly emerging forces in the region in its bid to wrest control of the disputed territories, according to people familiar with the situation.

These forces include the Agaw Democratic Movement and the Kimant Democratic Movement. The first has a presence in Wag Hemra, and despite having previously come to an agreement with the Amhara regional administration and laid down its arms, has since resumed armed struggle, according to inside sources. The latter is linked to aspirations for the creation of a separate regional state for the Kimant ethnic group.

Both groups operate in the disputed territories separating northern Gonder and western Tigray.

“These forces have been supported financially and trained by TPLF forces. Some of them were trained by TPLF’s Army 70, which is also active in Sudan. There are also other armed militants who are being supported by TPLF. These forces are now reviving in Benishangul and Gambela. TPLF has an alliance with OLA in Oromia and Fano in Amhara. Additionally, TPLF is seeking to initiate an armed struggle in the Somali region if ONLF gains land, and also backing another armed group in southern Ethiopia,” said one source keeping a close eye on the developments.

The source posits TPLF is leaning on these alliances for two reasons.

“First, TPLF knows it cannot win a war against the federal government alone. Secondly, TPLF has assessed that the Tigray public is not willing to mobilize for another bloody war alone. Therefore, TPLF is mobilizing other militants across the country, and from abroad,” the source told The Reporter.

Others argue the TPLF’s primary objective is to create immense pressure on the federal government from all directions, and force it to sign a new agreement.

“TPLF does not want the Pretoria Agreement. TPLF wants a new agreement, which reinstates its license, returns western Tigray to pre-war territorial status, and brings everything back to normal,” said another political party leader from the region.

TPLF’s newfound appetite for alliances is not confined to Ethiopia’s borders. The group has forged strong links with external actors, including Sudan, Egypt, and Eritrea. Eritrea was a key federal ally during the two-year war, and Eritrean troops stand accused of committing grave rights violations in Tigray. The Eritrean government also continues to maintain control of territories within Tigray.

Meanwhile, TPLF’s regional elections coincided with flaring tensions between Ethiopia and Sudan. Earlier this week, the federal government accused the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and Sudan’s military government of providing support to “TPLF mercenaries” and violating Ethiopia’s territorial integrity.

The accusations were levied in a statement issued by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on Tuesday, and came a day after the Sudanese government accused Ethiopia and the UAE of orchestrating drone attacks on Khartoum International Airport and military sites.

“The people of Ethiopia and Sudan share a historic and enduring bond of friendship. In recognition of the fraternal ties between the two nations, the Government of Ethiopia has exercised restraint and refrained from publicizing the grave violations of Ethiopia’s territorial integrity and national security committed by some belligerents in the Sudanese civil war. These violations include, among others. The extensive use of TPLF mercenaries in the conflict,” reads the statement.

“The Sudanese armed forces have also provided arms and financial support to these mercenaries, thereby facilitating their incursions along Ethiopia’s western frontier. The activities of TPLF mercenaries in Sudan are a matter of public record, and there is simple and credible evidence showing that Sudan is serving as a hub of various anti-Ethiopian forces. It is evident that these hostile actions, as well as the recent and earlier series of allegations by officials of Sudanese Armed Forces, are undertaken at the behest of external patrons seeking to advance their own nefarious agenda,” it continues.

Late Monday night, the Sudanese Foreign Minister and military spokesperson held a press conference where they stated they had “conclusive evidence” that drone attacks on Khartoum International Airport and several Sudanese military sites earlier in the day were launched from Bahir Dar.

The Sudanese Foreign Minister said his country is “ready to enter into an open confrontation with Ethiopia.” The Sudanese government has since recalled its ambassador to Ethiopia.

The TPLF has issued a response to the federal government’s accusations.

“At a moment when the region demands restraint and constructive engagement, such claims serve only to inflame tensions and obscure the urgent need for accountability and genuine peace efforts, the TPLF has never engaged in, nor supported, any activities that undermine regional stability. The people of Tigray have been waiting for the full and faithful implementation of the CoHA, including the safe, voluntary and dignified return of IDPs to their homes. Our forces, including those in western Tigray, remain committed to ensuring that these returns are carried out peacefully, securely and in an orderly manner,” it reads.

The statement also reflected on the regional aspect of re-emerging conflicts.

“We are deeply concerned by a consistent pattern of conduct that risks dragging Ethiopia – and by extension the wider region – into renewed instability and conflict. Escalatory rhetoric, external entanglements, opportunistic alignments with competing regional agendas reflect short-sighted calculations that endanger long-term peace. Such actions not only strain relations with neighboring countries but also risk entrenching Ethiopia in conflict that does not serve the interests of its people,” it reads.

Regarding Eritrea, the federal government of Ethiopia has repeatedly accused Asmara of supporting TPLF and anti-Ethiopian mercenaries. During the 2020-2022 war, Asmara was a staunch supporter of the Ethiopian government, but relations quickly soured after the peace deal.

Today, TPLF and a faction dubbed ‘Tsimdo’ are alleged to be working closely with Asmara.

Eritrea might also soon see sanctions levied on its leaders and military by the US under President Joe Biden in 2021 lifted as the Trump administration considers a rapprochement with Asmara in light of concerns about maritime routes.

Reports over the past weeks indicate the US government is weighing the lifting of sanctions in return for a strategic alliance on the Red Sea, where Yemen’s Houthis have threatened to shut down maritime traffic as a response to Washington’s invasion of Iran.

As a result, Eritrea could see itself break out of decades-long isolation and sanctions and transition into an important US ally in the region.

Analysts warn this could have detrimental effects on Ethiopia.

“The US is looking to relieve Eritrea of its sanctions following Egypt’s lobbying for Asmara. Eritrea, Al-Burhan’s SAF, and Egypt are working together against Ethiopia. They are also supporting armed forces and proxies against Ethiopia. They seek to stop Ethiopia from advancing its sea access agenda and force the country to negotiate over GERD. The US might even move to install a military base on the Eritrean coast in exchange for lifting sanctions. This will deter Ethiopia’s efforts to gain access to the Red Sea,” said a diplomat and geopolitical analyst who spoke to The Reporter anonymously.

The diplomat asserts that with this external support, TPLF could be emboldened to push for Tigray’s secession.

“The ultimate move for TPLF, if it runs out of options to pressure the federal government, will be to announce Tigray as a de facto state. If this happens, its foreign allies will have a pretext to officially support the TPLF. Turkiye, Somalia, Egypt, Sudan, and Eritrea will use this pretext to stop Ethiopia from recognizing Somaliland, creating a tit-for-tat scenario,” said the diplomat.

Analysts agree that the situation in Sudan is also critical for what happens next in Ethiopia as well as the Horn of Africa.

“Addressing the forces behind Sudan’s warring parties is critical to address issues in the Horn of Africa. Ethiopia is highly concerned that Al-Burhan’s SAF is supported by the Muslim Brotherhood and Egypt. If this force becomes Sudan’s government, Sudan will become a harbor for Islamic extremists forces while relentlessly attacking Ethiopia,” said one analyst. “The US could stop the forces behind Sudan’s warring parties, however Washington does not want to upset Egypt by opposing SAF. Trump continues appeasing El-Sisi to secure Egypt’s backing in the way out of the Gaza crisis. The US also believes that as long as Eritrea is contained, what happens in Ethiopia is a domestic issue.”

“The people of Ethiopia and Sudan share a historic and enduring bond of friendship. In recognition of the fraternal ties between the two nations, the Government of Ethiopia has exercised restraint and refrained from publicizing the grave violations of Ethiopia’s territorial integrity and national security committed by some belligerents in the Sudanese civil war. These violations include, among others. the extensive use of TPLF mercenaries in the conflict,” reads the statement.

“The Sudanese armed forces have also provided arms and financial support to these mercenaries, thereby facilitating their incursions along Ethiopia’s western frontier. The activities of TPLF mercenaries in Sudan are a matter of public record, and there is simple and credible evidence showing that Sudan is serving as a hub of various anti-Ethiopian forces. It is evident that these hostile actions, as well as the recent and earlier series of allegations by officials of Sudanese Armed Forces, are undertaken at the behest of external patrons seeking to advance their own nefarious agenda,” it continues.

Late Monday night, the Sudanese Foreign Minister and military spokesperson held a press conference where they stated they had “conclusive evidence” that drone attacks on Khartoum International Airport and several Sudanese military sites earlier in the day were launched from Bahir Dar.

The Sudanese Foreign Minister said his country is “ready to enter into an open confrontation with Ethiopia.” The Sudanese government has since recalled its ambassador to Ethiopia.

Last month marked three years since civil war erupted in Sudan, with fighting between the SAF and Rapid Support Forces (RSF) killing at least 150,000 people, displacing over 14 million, and leaving millions more in the grip of famine and disease.

Experts at the National Bank of Ethiopia (NBE) have finalized a draft proclamation that proposes to relieve the central bank of its mandate to regulate the insurance industry, instead granting it to the soon-to-be Ethiopian Insurance Regulatory Authority.

The draft Insurance Business Proclamation promises to address long-standing calls for autonomous regulation from insurers, and marks the industry as next for liberalization as part of ongoing economic reforms. 

The NBE has regulated the nascent insurance industry for three decades, alongside banks, microfinance institutions, reinsurance, and lease financing. Insurers have long argued the NBE’s focus on banking growth has stifled their own.

The authority proposed in the amendment will be led by a seven-member board, which will include representatives from the NBE and Ethiopian Capital Market Authority, and will be responsible for issuing licenses and enforcing compliance.

The draft also proposes to open the insurance industry to foreign investment, following up on liberalization under the Banking Business Proclamation of early 2025. If approved, foreign insurers will be able to establish a partially or fully owned subsidiary in Ethiopia, as well as acquire shares in existing Ethiopian insurers. 

The draft limits “strategic” foreign investors to 40 percent of an insurer’s subscribed shares, while “non-strategic” foreign nationals can own up to 10 percent of shares. 

The region of vast plain land with approximately seven million people still struggles with accessibility, droughts, and other climate-related problems, but conditions appear to have improved markedly from the insecurity and instability of previous decades. The region also hosts major natural gas and fertilizer production projects positioned to play a key role in the government’s development ambitions.

As the country prepares to head to the polls, The Reporter’s Ashenafi Endale sat down with Mustafe to get his take on the region’s progress and future plans. The wide-ranging conversation touches on development, security, investment, elections, relations with Somaliland, the region’s role in Ethiopia’s pursuit for maritime access, and other pertinent topics. EXCERPTS:

The Reporter: A large number of public projects are underway in towns, villages, and cities across the Somali Regional State. How do you evaluate the peace dividend?

President Mustafe Omer: After the 2018 political change, we primarily focused on ensuring peace and then developing infrastructure and critical public provisions, which were completely missing at the time. Because the Somali region is so vast and lowland, developing infrastructure and providing basic services is very expensive.

When we came to office eight years ago, only 20 percent of the Somali population had access to water. Since then, we have developed over 360 underground water wells. Dams, reservoirs, and pipelines that connect villages and households have been developed; for areas where there is very scarce rain and where underground water is not available.

In the health sector, there were only nine hospitals in the region. Most of them have been serving for the past 50 years. We have renovated them and expanded them. We have built 21 new hospitals since we came to power. In general, we have over 30 hospitals now.

In the education sector, we have built over 700 new schools, of which over 100 are secondary schools. We built 12 boarding schools.

Several rural and urban roads have been developed to connect not only communities but also economic value chains and business areas. These are strategically selected roads for livestock markets. But because the Somali region is so vast, the roads built so far are relatively few.

Since Somali is mostly pastoralist, the shift to farming was very minor at 350,000 hectares when the political change took place in Ethiopia. Imagine, the Somali region has over 10 million hectares of arable land. Last year, 1.6 million hectares of land was cultivated and our plan is to reach two million hectares this year.

In general, there are significant improvements in the life of the people of the region. But the pillar of all these achievements is peace and stability. The private sector, especially the service sector, is highly active now. Hospitality, trade, and agro-processing are top investment sectors now. Over the past years, over 70 billion Birr in investment has been injected into the region by the private sector.

In a nutshell, the Somali region is a national model now. In terms of human rights, the region has substantially improved the bad situation before the political change. There is no public discontent in Somali now. The public can ask, demand anything and hold the government accountable. Regarding the political space, ONLF was the leading opposition party in our region. There are some five regional parties including ONLF. Including national parties, there are 12 parties running in the Somali region for the upcoming election. With ONLF, we have resolved disagreements and geopolitical discontents peacefully. Hence, there is no conflict or instability in the region.

What can you tell us about your administration’s efforts in terms of resource mapping, attracting more private capital, and ensuring productivity and economic transformation?

The government’s role is creating an enabling environment for the private sector to come. The government cannot replace the private sector and bring the capital on its own. Peace, stability and property rights are ensured in Somali. These are key elements for private investors. Our primary work is ensuring nobody should be worried about his life’s safety, and his property. All these are guaranteed in our region.

The rest is promoting the resources and investment potential in the region. We are doing that. Over 4,000 investors have come to the region since we took office, with over 70 billion Birr. This has substantially improved the region’s GDP.

The other thing we are providing is incentive provisions. Investors are seeking to get involved mainly in agriculture, health, education and others. We are providing land and other support. In and around Jijiga, we even provide industrial zones to minimize the initial costs of investors.

Natural gas and fertilizer production projects in the region are said to be making good progress. How will the Somali region and communities in and around the gas deposits in Calub benefit from these projects? Will they receive anything more than the seven percent royalty fee dictated by law?

The Somali region will get its fair share of the profit to be generated by the projects once they are finalized. The profit proceeds are first split between the federal and the producing region. Then the federal pie is again divided to all regions. Hence, the producing region benefits in two ways.

The proclamation gives around fifty percent to the producing region. This will be very huge. In terms of injecting more capital, rebooting the region’s budget, creating jobs, innovation and technology, and infrastructure developments; the natural gas and fertilizer projects will be a big game changer for the Somali region.

Apart from the fertilizer, the natural gas will also generate 1,000MW of electricity. The benefits from these projects will radically change livelihoods in the region and spur development.

During the EPRDF era, certain regional states like Somali, were widely considered as being marginalized and underdeveloped. Do you think this still holds true?

Under the previous regime, the Somali region was not part of the federal decision making process. We were excluded. Past agriculture policies marginalized developing regions. If you go to South Omo, Benishangul, or Afar, they are no different from us. Despite the Somali region having vast resources, the past regime could not capitalize on this. Hence, marginalized states like Somali were underdeveloped.

Due to this marginalization, the sense of Ethiopian nationalism was also loose in the past. We have done a lot of work to reverse this. Now, there is huge aspiration and eagerness in the people of the Somali region. The interest of all Somali now is how to link and integrate with the rest of Ethiopia’s economy. Somali people currently ask what is our share and role in the national economy? They are also asking why there are no industrial parks in the Somali region. All public questions are now linked to development.

Before, there was an attitude that our people were marginalized based on their ethnic identity. Today, our region’s only question is development. There is no other question.

Do you believe you achieved this success as an individual leader or as a senior member of the ruling Prosperity Party? If it is the latter, why hasn’t the peace dividend we see in the Somali region been replicated in other regional states?

I believe the political change is positively impacting all regional states and city administrations. Every part of Ethiopia has benefited from the change. Be it in urban development, industry, or agriculture; all are benefiting. There are regions who are performing better than the Somali region.

But the changes and progress achieved in the Somali region in the past several years were not mine alone. The leadership, from federal to local governments, have worked in unity. The commitment is huge. I might have discharged my duties well, but this success has been realized because all federal and regional leadership have discharged their duties. They work daily. We do it collectively. But for every failure, I take responsibility.

Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed is the leading contributor behind our success. The PM allowed us to work freely. For any challenge and question we raise as government and as a party, the PM provides solutions and support. The PM also provided the leadership to onboard mega projects worth USD 10 billion to the Somali region. The PM also initiated and implemented the Shebelle Resort. This is the first major tourism destination in Somali, and the PM did this to reboot tourist flow to the region. The PM took risks, and acted under the entrepreneurial state concept.

Unless the government takes initiative and starts such projects, the private sector cannot take steps. So in general, the successes have been achieved by all of us.

Recently, the exiled ONLF wing has been threatening to start an armed struggle. The recent release of the former regional president from prison, who was convicted for crimes, is also creating certain narratives. Do you think the revival of such narratives can reverse the progress in the Somali region? Do you condone the release of Abdi Illey?

I have no belief that anyone will drag back the Somali region into another chapter of conflict. No one will return the Somali region to conflict, because there is no Somali person who wants conflict. Different forces have tried in the past several years, but none of them succeeded. In the past seven and a half years, several attempts were made to mobilize the public to get involved in conflict. All of it failed, because the people well understand the value of peace.

Regarding ONLF, from the beginning, there were certain elements based in the diaspora. These diaspora-based ONLF members are very extremist. Most of the ONLF members who were on the ground are integrated into the government. They are now active in agriculture, business, and supporting government security forces. There is a good understanding with them.

I do not expect any such efforts to cause conflict in the region again.

Regarding former Somali leaders, in relation to the upcoming seventh national election, they are trying to cause some issues here and there. They completely deny all the work done in the Somali region. They intentionally paint a bad image of the peace dividends and development progress Somali has seen since the political change in the country.

In general, none of these have substantial power on the ground to threaten the current administration.

The seventh national election is less than two months away. In the meantime, the national dialogue and transitional justice processes are underway. All of them have certain overlaps. How and which initiative can effectively address the challenges the country has been facing, including conflict?

The national dialogue is hoped to bridge differences on major national topics. That will bring everyone together to a shared consensus. For instance, all thoughts and inputs from all regional states are collected. Some of them are polarized. When such a stark difference occurs on a certain agenda, it will be resolved through referendum, elections, or other alternatives. Not all Ethiopian are expected to have the same position and attitude on everything. That cannot happen in the world. But on the main national interest agendas, there is not much difference.

It is ethnic issues and political views that are dividing the elite. The elite argue Ethiopia should be led by this or that idea. The division is among the elite. The Ethiopian population is always united, it is the elite who is divided. The public in every part of Ethiopia is always one. Therefore, the national dialogue will resolve the differences among the elites and bring together everyone. Once a roadmap of the elite is drawn from that national dialogue, then it will be simple for all to come together. Any polarized view will be resolved based on that elite roadmap.

In any part of the world, there are extremists and outliers. In Ethiopia too, I don’t expect everyone to happily accept the outcomes of the national dialogue. But the critical mass will reach consensus through the national dialogue. We don’t have a very deep national division in Ethiopia, for that matter. Political sabotage, extremism, and power interest are being used as instruments for people to kill each other. Except for these, the country is in a very stable, progressive scenario.

The necessity of transitional justice is never questionable in Ethiopia. It is crucial to cleanse any misdeeds. Commissions will be established to lead the transitional justice process.

How do you see the growing presence of Turkiye and Egypt in neighboring Somalia affecting Ethiopia? What are the opportunities and advantages for Ethiopia’s national interests in this scenario of shifting geopolitical alliances?

Foreign powers are competing in our region of the Horn. The primary impact of these foreign forces is disrupting the peace and stability of the Horn region. This is the disadvantage. These foreign forces work to weaken Ethiopia, not to strengthen Ethiopia. It could be deploying proxy armed forces or disrupting trade routes and ports. These foreign forces are working to affect Ethiopia’s national interest, they also lobby other forces to affect Ethiopia. There are no major impacts on the Somali region so far but they are making efforts. At different times, these foreign forces are coming in the form of Al-Shabaab, ISIS and other terrorist forces to affect Somali and the national interest of Ethiopia. But they are neutralized while trying to enter the Somali region. There are still efforts to create ethnic and religious clashes in Somali. The extremists also use media campaigns.

Ethiopia is intent on gaining sea access. What is your take on this?

Having sea access is a huge benefit for Ethiopia. It will be a big pillar, a big legacy of this generation. Ethiopia already has a huge population and economy in the region. With sea access, it will be very influential. We already have a strong state and low corruption compared to other African countries. Having sea access on top of all this will make Ethiopia a very strong economy. As a region, we are ready to provide any support to the sea access pursuit.

What is your take on Somaliland efforts to secure statehood recognition? How will it affect the Somali region?

Our region has a good relationship with Somaliland. Most of our trade goes via Somaliland. The northern part of the Somali region has especially strong relations with Somaliland via trade in livestock and other goods.

Any good thing that comes Somaliland’s way will be good for the Somali region too. However, if other forces who oppose Somaliland recognition resort to conflict, they will try to expand the conflict to the Somali region as well. We already have seen these signs. Two years ago, there were cross border conflicts and clashes. Since it is Foreign Ministry that works on Ethiopia’s foreign policy, our role is providing information to the Ministry. Our main role as a region is preventing cross-border conflicts from happening. We are doing that.

Many still question the ideology of the Prosperity Party, and some argue it is unclear what its plans are for the next term if it wins a majority in June’s elections. What can you tell us about this?

The Prosperity Party has published its manifesto for the upcoming election. Regarding politics, PP aims to bridge the extremist ideologies in Ethiopia’s politics. Our way is the middle road. There are political forces in Ethiopia who run on extremist ethnic politics. On the other end sit political forces who consider ethnic politics as a danger. PP aims to close that extremism.

Our primary and ultimate goal is strengthening national unity. PP has done a lot on this so far. For instance, before, the Adwa Victory was seen as a source of conflict. Today, Adwa is celebrated together by all Ethiopians. It is seen as a victory of all Ethiopians.

PP has done a lot on ethnic politics, to close the differences. But now, we are focusing on strengthening national unity. The key issue is we must work hard on patriotism. Democracy is critical for Ethiopia. Regarding elections and peaceful power transition, there were huge deficits in the past half a century. We must lead these with law, and instill constitutionalism.

PP is working to ensure more opposition party members will be part of the government and work with the government in the next term. The presence of different views in the governance organs is crucial for nation building and development.

Professor Berhanu Nega of Ezema is working with the government. But Berhanu and Ezema still have different ideologies and perspectives from PP. However, both are working for the national interest. This is what would become a culture. Whatever difference we have, we must work together for the interest of our country.

The national dialogue has identified agendas on which different groups have different views and positions. The initiative will draw solutions for these disagreements. Then everyone, every political force, despite any difference, will be able to work together for the benefit of the country.

Regarding economic development, PP has clear principles. We have managed to reduce national debts. Ethiopia is paying its debts. Despite the successes, there can be ups and downs. Due to our economic reform, Ethiopia has departed from dependence on debt and aid. We made the country self-sufficient in forex, food security, and others. Exports especially have grown by a large margin. This is a major outcome of the economic reform. The economic growth sources are diversified to several sectors like manufacturing, tourism, mining, ICT, and others. In social aspects, health, education and other provisions have substantially increased.

The housing problem is identified as a critical challenge. Therefore, one of our next big tasks is in maximizing housing provisions. Several more projects are already in the pipeline currently.

But the ultimate role of PP is protecting Ethiopia’s sovereignty, ensuring that Ethiopia’s national interest agendas like sea access are well accepted among the international community.

Trade Minister Kassahun Gofe (PhD), who leads Ethiopia’s negotiations with the WTO, mentioned vehicle import reconsiderations while addressing the seventh Working Party Meeting on Ethiopia’s accession earlier this week.

“We have lifted the import ban on used clothing and replaced it with an applicable customs duty in line with WTO requirements. We intend to take a similar approach regarding the import restrictions on fuel-powered automobiles and three-wheelers prior to accession,” Kassahun members of the working party, which was established when Ethiopia first formally requested accession in 2003.

The federal government restricted the import of fuel-powered vehicles in early 2024 as part of its pursuit for an energy shift to EVs. However, accession requirements could soon see a return to non-EV imports.

Tages Mulugeta, international trade negotiator at the Trade Ministry, explained that while the WTO’s rules would compel Ethiopia to lift import restrictions, this does not mean that import trends will revert to their pre-2024 norms.

“Under the WTO requirements, countries cannot restrict imports. If we want WTO accession, we cannot prohibit imports. Free flow of commodities is a basic requirement under WTO terms. The Minister wanted to mention that in the next steps, Ethiopia will lift the restrictions on vehicles,” Tages told The Reporter.

“However, that does not mean we will completely allow the import of fuel cars to Ethiopia. We will introduce other measures that can discourage the import of fuel cars. The Ministry of Finance and other stakeholders will discuss and decide on this in the future. Environmental concerns and other measures like taxation might be proposed to discourage the import of fuel cars. Therefore, the restriction on import of fuel cars might be lifted in order as part of our negotiations to join WTO, but that does not necessarily mean import of fuel cars will technically be allowed in fully. It does not mean we return to the previous scenario,” added Tages.

Ethiopia’s 23 year bid to join the WTO has made headway over the past year, and Kassahun says efforts are at “a critical juncture.”

Ethiopia has intensifed efforts to respond to the specific concerns raised by members during the last working party meeting in September 2025, and less than 10 bilateral agreements remain outstanding, according to the Minister.

Among the points he emphasized in his address to the working party is the consolidation of state-owned enterprises under Ethiopian Investment Holdings (EIH) to “enforce rigorous financial discipline, transparency, and international accounting standards.”

“Through the introduction of independent professional boards and clear performance-based metrics, the government is actively separating political objectives from corporate governance, ensuring that SOEs now operate with a private-sector mindset that prioritizes efficiency, profitability and competitiveness while systematically opening formerly closed sectors to private investment,” reads a copy of his address.

The document reveals that information on the total assets under SOEs is still under review.

It also outlines other reforms, such as the liberalization of import, export, wholesale, and retail trades to foreign participation, expansion of foreign currency accounts and guarantees on retention, and a customs valuation rework as part of efforts to realize accession.

“As we approach the final stages of this accession process, the importance of our collective momentum cannot be overstated. Through the constructive engagement and support of Members in advancing Ethiopia as a credible candidate for the WTO membership, we have made significant strides in aligning our policies and legislative framework with WTO rules. This collective exercise has strengthened our institutional arrangements, and I wish to reaffirm that Ethiopia stands prepared indeed ready, even today, to assume the obligations of the membership,” stated Kassahun.

Experts at the Information Network Security Administration (INSA) have tabled a draft proclamation as a framework to guide efforts to curb increasingly frequent cyber threats on Ethiopia’s growing digital visibility of sensitive national data and information.

The ‘Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity Proclamation,’ which has been under legal review at the Ministry of Justice for more than two years, was tabled to Parliament this week.

The legislation comes as more and more of Ethiopian citizens’ data is being uploaded to the cloud via the National ID program, banking and mobile money platforms, electronic procurement process, single window government services and others.

These fast growing databases become more vulnerable to cyber threats as they expand in size. The Administration reported 8,000 cyberattacks on Ethiopia in 2023/4, up from under 100 attacks a year on average two decades ago.

In order to avoid complications during implementation, the proclamation identifies 11 sectors as key areas that should be protected as key infrastructure. At present, INSA primarily focuses on cybersecurity relating to financial institutions and electric power infrastructure.

The draft proposes to expand its purview to include transport, health, education, water, agriculture, trade, government services, and communications.

If approved, institutions categorized as critical infrastructure will be subject to periodic cybersecurity audits by INSA. Both public and private institutions can qualify as critical infrastructure, which the draft defines as “any infrastructure or institution the disruption or compromise of which due to a cyberattack would have a significant negative impact on national security or national interests.”

A key provision added in the final drafting stages proposes to allow third-party IT firms to provide cyber security services and conduct these audits in addition to INSA itself.

However, third-party service providers will need to fulfil several stringent requirements and pass a screening process before they can offer their services.

Anyone who provides cybersecurity services without proper licensing will face penalties of up to two million Birr, while repeat offenders can be fined three times as much, according to the draft.

Lawmakers are currently reviewing the proclamation, which is widely expected to be ratified in the near future.

Africa is receiving only 11 percent of the USD277 billion climate finance required annually until 2030. Although Africa contributes less than four percent of global greenhouse gas emissions, it remains among the region’s most vulnerable to climate change, according to latest statement from UNECA.

African climate leaders, negotiators, policymakers and partners kicked off the seventh Africa Climate Talks this week, with a strong call to move the global climate agenda from commitments to credible implementation. The meeting was attended by senior officials including Fitsum Assefa, Minister of Planning and Development of Ethiopia, among others.

Held under the theme “Africa’s Road to COP32: From Commitments to Credible Implementation,” the meeting comes at a decisive moment for global climate action, as countries prepare for COP31 in Türkiye and COP32, which will be hosted by Ethiopia in 2027.

Claver Gatete, Executive Secretary of UNECA underscored COP32 must be a turning point for restoring trust in the multilateral climate system.

“COP32 will be a defining test of credibility,” Gatete said. “A test of whether we can move from commitments to results. A test of whether trust in the multilateral system can be restored through delivery. And a test of whether Africa’s priorities will finally be matched with action at scale.”

Gatete noted that climate impacts are worsening faster than current responses, with rising temperatures, floods, droughts, unpredictable weather and sea-level rise threatening food security, water supply, infrastructure and public finances across Africa.

 “This is where the narrative must change,” Mr. Gatete said. 

“To define Africa solely by vulnerability would be to miss the full picture. The continent also offers significant solutions, from abundant renewable energy resources and rich biodiversity to a young population driving innovation and green growth.”

The seventh Africa Climate Talks, convened by the African Climate Policy Centre of ECA in collaboration with ClimDevAfrica partners, aims to consolidate Africa’s post-COP30 climate agenda and refine the continent’s approach to COP31 and COP32. The discussions will focus on climate finance, adaptation, loss and damage, the Global Stocktake, just transitions, carbon markets, trade and climate, and the role of climate action in advancing Africa’s structural transformation.

The executive secretary emphasized that adaptation must be treated as a development priority for Africa, as it directly supports food security, protects infrastructure, stabilizes economies and improves wellbeing. He also called for stronger data systems, expanded early warning coverage, better integration of adaptation into national budgets, and reforms to make climate finance more predictable, concessional and accessible.

Looking ahead to COP32, the executive secretary outlined five priorities for Africa’s collective engagement: positioning COP32 as an implementation-focused conference; scaling and reforming climate finance; integrating adaptation into development planning; using climate action to drive industrialization, energy access, job creation and poverty reduction; and strengthening Africa’s coherence and influence in global climate negotiations.