As Iran and the US oscillate between war, now in its third month, and negotiation, questions surrounding the Strait of Hormuz and the global economic impacts of its closure have only grown louder. The stalemate has also put the spotlight on the other key maritime chokepoint in the wider region: Bab el Mandeb.

At its narrowest point, the strait separates Djibouti and Yemen by less than 50 kilometers, and its strategic location has only been made more vital by the events unfolding in the Persian Gulf, and threats from Iran-allied Houthis in Yemen to shut down maritime traffic on the Red Sea.

Political and security analysts suggest Washington is already taking steps to secure the Red Sea’s western coast, and reports published in recent weeks appear to back their arguments.

Last week, The Wall Street Journal quoted US officials as saying that Washington seeks a rapprochement with Eritrea. Massad Boulos, a senior figure in the Trump administration, reportedly told foreign counterparts that the US is considering lifting some sanctions on Eritrea as part of a push to restore diplomatic ties, which have been all but severed over the past two decades.

Successive US administrations have opted not to appoint an ambassador to Asmara, and the post has remained vacant since 2010. In 2021, Washington levied a new round of sanctions on the regime of Isaias Afwerki in light of grave rights violations committed by the Eritrean military in Tigray during the two-year war.

Despite this, the Trump administration is looking to repair US relations with Eritrea as part of a scramble to establish a strong presence on the Red Sea. In a statement issued this week, the Eritrean embassy in Washington applauded what it described as “a shift towards engagement.”

“A fundamental reality must be recognized. Decades of pressure, sanctions, and isolation have not produced positive outcomes, neither for US policy objectives nor for regional stability. There is now increasing acknowledgment, even within US policy circles, that a shift towards engagement, rather than misplaced and unwarranted coercion, is both necessary and overdue,” reads the statement.

It hints that Isaias Afwerki’s government is open to collaborating with the US, but on its own terms.

““Eritrea’s position has been consistent and principled. Since independence, it has pursued a policy anchored in sovereignty, non-interference, and an independent development policy that eschews structural and perpetual dependency. Eritrea does not subscribe to dependency-based models. Instead, it promotes mutually beneficial partnerships rooted in trade, investment, and respect for national ownership of development priorities; an approach aligned with evolving global trends,” reads the statement.

Eritrea is not alone in stoking US interest recently.

Last week, US Senator Ted Cruz also renewed his calls for the Trump administration to recognize Somaliland as an independent and sovereign state, arguing the self-declared African republic would be a significant strategic partner if Washington were to formalize relations.

“Somaliland is a geo-strategic US maritime security partner in Africa,” Cruz said during a hearing on US counterterrorism approaches in Africa. “It sits along the Gulf of Aden near one of the world’s busiest shipping corridors and its forces actively contribute to counterterrorism and anti-piracy missions.”

In December, Israel became the first to recognize Somaliland as a sovereign nation. Earlier this month, Israel appointed Michael Lotem, former ambassador to Kenya, as its first non-resident ambassador to the Republic of Somaliland. The move drew criticism and condemnation from the African Union (AU) and a dozen governments, including those of Somalia, Sudan, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and Egypt.

Despite this, calls from US lawmakers to jump aboard the recognition bandwagon have intensified, and political analysts like Costantinos Berhutesfa (PhD) argue this is part of a recalibration of American presence in the wider region.

“The US aims to maintain control over the Red Sea and Indian Ocean relying not on the Gulf, but on North African and Horn countries,” he said, naming Egypt, Sudan, Eritrea, and Ethiopia as components of the strategy. Costantinos believes Somalia’s continued instability excludes it from the list of “candidates.”

The analyst argues the war in Iran has changed US perspective on the utility of military bases in the Gulf, and posits that Gulf countries’ pro-US stance has made them targets not only for Iran, but extremist groups.

“American military bases in the Gulf have proven they cannot do anything for US interests there,” said Costantinos.

Another Addis Ababa-based geopolitical analyst who spoke to The Reporter anonymously made a similar argument.

“Fundamentally, Iran wants the US military out of the Gulf. Iran has targeted Saudi, UAE, Qatar, and others because they host US military bases. Reports indicate the US has decided to reposition its military, from the Gulf to the African side. Now, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, and Somaliland are being seen as important assets. This is why the US is considering recognizing Somaliland and relief for Eritrea after decades of sanctions,” said the analyst.

He sees US intentions to lift sanctions on Eritrea as a “sensitive issue” for Ethiopia, and suggests America’s plans for Eritrea may have to wait until Isaias Afwerki is no longer at the helm.

On the other hand, Costantinos argues the situation could work out favorably for both Ethiopia and Eritrea.

“Ethiopia might realize its interest in sea access. Ethiopia looks to access Assab. Eritrea seeks to be free of sanctions and rejoin the international community to benefit politically, economically, and diplomatically,” said Costantinos, suggesting the Trump administration could push the two governments to come to an agreement.

However, the analyst contends this scenario is unlikely under current Eritrean leadership.

“The US is pandering to Eritrea most likely in exchange for a military base on its coast. But the problem is Isaias is too rigid to allow US military presence in Eritrea. His stance on the US is well known. He said it all in his speech in Russia,” said the analyst, referring to a 2023 address in Moscow in which the Eritrean President stated, “There is no Russia-Ukraine war. This is war declared by NATO.”

The analyst argues that continued resistance from the Eritrean government could mean “Isaias might not have much more time in power given America’s growing interest in Eritrea.”

However, he notes the situation is a complex web of relationships spanning the US, Israel, Somaliland, Djibouti, where the US operates a military base, and Yemen. The analyst predicts US military presence in Eritrea would immediately be countered by increased Chinese and Russian presence in Ethiopia.

At the moment, US plans to revive relations with Eritrea are not yet official, and neither is talk of recognizing Somaliland. However, observers say the odds of either of these being realized only grow bigger as the war in Iran drags on.

The signing represents a significant renewal of a ten-year partnership, aligning directly with the aspirations of Agenda 2063 and the collective vision of “The Africa We Want.”

Following the ceremony, the momentum shifted to a high-level roundtable titled “Fostering a Culture of Transformative Dialogue in the Africa Region.” The discussion convened senior AUC officials alongside representatives from KAICIID’s Board of Directors and host country Member States to explore practical pathways for regional stability.

The collaboration traces its roots back to the original 2013 agreement, a foundation that has allowed both organizations to revitalize the AU Interfaith Dialogue Forum. Over the years, this forum has moved across the continent—from Nigeria in 2016 and Chad in 2018 to Rwanda in 2023 and Namibia in 2025. By creating this structured continental space, the partnership has bridged the gap between religious leaders, policymakers, and civil society, allowing them to engage directly with Africa’s most pressing peace and security challenges.

At the ceremony, KAICIID’s Acting Secretary-General, Ambassador António de Almeida Ribeiro, emphasized that lasting peace and security in Africa require more than just political frameworks. By partnering with the AUC, KAICIID aims to empower religious leaders and local communities who possess the trust and influence necessary to drive “real change.”

Ribeiro noted that the collaboration focuses on shifting dialogue from an abstract concept into tangible, community-level outcomes.

Ribeiro is a Portuguese career diplomat with experience across multiple assignments in Europe and outside the region. Over the course of his diplomatic service, he has held responsibilities in several postings and has overseen a range of key departments within Portugal’s foreign ministry.

Since 2022, he has served as the first Deputy Secretary-General of KAICIID. In January 2025, he assumed the role of Acting Secretary-General.

The Reporter’s Abraham Tekle spoke with Ribeiro to get a better understanding of the partnership between KAICIID and the African Union, emphasizing the shift toward a more practical, “transformative” dialogue to address modern challenges. The discussion also highlighted several critical priorities, including empowering religious leaders as essential partners in diplomacy, engaging youth to foster a long-term culture of tolerance, and collaborating on urgent global issues like human rights and combating hate speech.  EXCERPTS:

The Reporter: Could you provide a comprehensive overview of the recent MoU between the AUC and KAICIID?

Ambassador Antonio de Almeida Ribeiro: We have officially renewed our Memorandum of Understanding with the African Union. While our previous agreement was established in 2016, we recognized the necessity of updating it to address emerging challenges and set new objectives that strengthen our partnership. Given that the regional landscape has changed significantly since 2016, our primary goal was to adapt this new memorandum to reflect the current realities in Africa.

Alongside the signing, we organized a roundtable with African Union officials to address critical thematic areas. The discussion also focused on human rights in Africa, conflict prevention, the promotion of dialogue, and strategies for combating hate speech. These were basically the topics that we have discussed in the roundtable.

If we look back at the last decade, what is the single most successful “on-the-ground” impact KAICIID has had in East Africa, and how does this new agreement improve upon it?

Since KAICIID’s inception in 2012, its founders have designated Africa as a high-priority region. From the very beginning, we have engaged with various African nations and the African Union, leading to our first MoU in 2016. Beyond this formal agreement, we have implemented active programs in countries such as Nigeria, the Central African Republic, and Mozambique, while participating in projects across several other nations. Africa remains central to our mission, and this new MoU further reinforces the priority KAICIID places on the continent.

Ambassador, during the signing ceremony, you highlighted the role of the Interreligious Council of Ethiopia (IRCE) in this mission, as part of the “transformative dialogue” model. In reality, Ethiopia is currently navigating complex internal conflicts and administrative restructuring. How can the model move beyond the conference rooms of the AU and practically assist the IRCE in cooling tensions in Ethiopia’s regional states?

We must recognize that approximately 80 percent of the world’s population identifies with a religion. Whether or not they are active practitioners, this connection means that religious leaders hold significant influence both within and beyond their own communities. When an important religious leader speaks, not only the community listens to him, but his message goes very often beyond its own religious community.

This influence is an essential factor to consider, as religious leaders should serve as close partners to policymakers and civil society. Lasting peace cannot be achieved through diplomacy and political talks alone. However, by engaging religious leaders to work alongside governments, we can better prevent conflict and promote a culture of dialogue between different religions and cultures. This is our primary aim in partnering with the African Union. By aligning with the agenda 2063 goals for peace and security, we are ready to undertake joint actions to achieve these objectives across the continent.

How does this concept of transformative dialogue specifically underpin the goals and objectives of the new MoU?

We view dialogue as the tool for societal transformation, that’s why we call it ‘transformative dialogue.’ In the absence of dialogue, tension and conflict often escalate into war. Our primary mission is to promote engagement among diverse religions, communities, and entities as the most effective means of preventing violence. Nobody wants war and we believe it can only be achieved by listening to, understanding, and tolerating one another. This commitment to fostering mutual understanding serves as the core objective of KAICIID.

As part of your mission, you have also met with Ethiopian Fellows Alumni, CSOs, and youth organizations. Looking at the high youth population in Ethiopia, what specific, scalable projects does the renewed MoU offer to ensure these young people are not just “participants” in workshops, but are leading peace initiatives in their own communities?

Youth are undeniably the future of their countries and communities, making their empowerment absolutely crucial. We believe it is essential to establish close contact with them from the outset, as they are the leaders of tomorrow. By working with them now to foster a culture of tolerance and dialogue, we ensure they become the practitioners of these values in the future. This approach aligns closely with Agenda 2063, and our MoU clearly recognizes this objective.

Were there any other significant positive outcomes from the workshops?

We hosted individuals from various regions of the world representing five major religions. As they conclude their program tomorrow, a key highlight of their experience was visiting various religious sites. This is vital because it allows participants from different backgrounds and faiths to gain a deeper understanding of other religions and their practitioners.

This initiative directly promotes dialogue, and I believe it was a highly valuable experience for them to visit the cathedral, the synagogue, and the Grand Mosque in Addis Ababa. We are confident these visits were beneficial for the participants, and it was equally rewarding for us to facilitate these visits and have everyone engaged in this collective experience.

There was also a cultural program and dinner showcasing Ethiopian heritage. So, beyond the symbolic value, how does KAICIID view Ethiopian cultural and religious “soft power” as a tool for broader continental diplomacy?

As a significant form of soft power, we promote platforms and meetings, participate in conferences, and manage our Fellows cohorts. In Europe, for example, we have the Muslim-Jewish Leadership Council (MJLC), which brings together prominent Rabbis and Imams to engage in dialogue. We believe that all religions share a fundamental commonality: the promotion of peace and human dignity.

By recognizing that these values are common to all religions, we establish the common ground necessary to speak with one another and foster meaningful dialogue.

East Africa is currently facing significant displacement driven by both conflict and climate stress. Your roundtable specifically addressed this intersection. What are the mechanics of KAICIID’s intervention here?

While we do not intervene directly in the various conflicts occurring in East Africa, we work through the African Union to support their initiatives. We remain hopeful that this Memorandum of Understanding will further enable us to assist the African Union in its efforts to promote peace throughout these troubled regions in East Africa.

Are you providing the AU with a new policy blueprint for handling climate-induced migration through a religious lens?

Climate change is another of our primary concerns, and we are eager to cooperate with the African Union in this specific area. We hope to support their projects addressing climate change and its consequences, particularly the social tensions that these environmental shifts are causing in so many societies.

Hate speech and divisive digital narratives are a rising concern in the Horn of Africa. The MoU mentions “countering hate speech through trusted local voices.” How will KAICIID identify and protect these voices in environments where the media landscape, especially the social media platform is often polarized?

Through this MoU, we are ready and eager to cooperate with the African Union on projects dedicated to preventing and addressing hate speech. This is a deeply negative phenomenon occurring not only in Ethiopia but in many other countries, including those in Europe. We hope this agreement provides the opportunity to work closely with African Union officials to implement actions that curb hate speech, given its extremely damaging impact on all societies.

What measurable impact or progress should be anticipated within the communities of the 55 member states following the signing of this MoU, particularly regarding the resolution of long-standing backlogs in peace and security initiatives?

We will now begin implementing specific activities through a joint steering committee composed of KAICIID and the African Union. This committee will monitor the various ways we can cooperate across diverse initiatives, maintaining a permanent dialogue with African Union officials. This ongoing collaboration will allow us to continually assess when, where, and how we can most effectively provide our support and cooperation.

With the recent transition in African Union leadership, how do you anticipate the East African perspective will influence the implementation of the MoU over the coming years?

We had a very productive meeting with the recently appointed Deputy Chairperson of the African Union. I have no doubt that under this new leadership, the African Union will continue its vital work across the continent to promote peace and dialogue while actively countering radicalization and extremism.

The protection of “sacred and cultural heritage” is a key pillar of your strategy. In areas of active conflict within East Africa including Ethiopia, how can KAICIID and the AU practically intervene to protect these sites when they are often targeted as part of the conflict?

You can only protect the religious sites if you have the cooperation from the religious leaders. By engaging them in dialogue, we can identify ways to prevent conflict at these locations. Since every faith has a vested interest in preserving its own sacred spaces, this is a shared objective. Promoting intercommunal dialogue fosters mutual respect for all sacred sites, which aligns with the goals of the African Union. We are committed to bringing communities together to protect these sites, especially where they may be at risk.

As human rights issues become increasingly critical both globally and across East Africa, what specific actions or solutions can KAICIID provide to address the atrocities committed in the region?

We believe that human rights are universal values, as all countries have signed the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Therefore, there is no excuse for failing to respect these fundamental rights. Our objective is to promote a culture of respect and tolerance, grounded in the unique dignity of every individual. Religious leaders play a vital role in this effort, as the respect for human life must be a core objective of every faith; it would be contradictory for it to be otherwise.

Regarding the issue of accountability, what are the expectations for both member states and KAICIID to ensure that perpetrators of human rights violations are held accountable?

This is very much related to the internal justice systems of all countries. What we can do from our side is to put all our interests and pressure through the African Union, which is also a very clear goal that they have, to promote human rights and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. It’s something that is valid everywhere in society.

The African Union’s Agenda 2063 is set with a vision of the “Africa we Want”. However, critics often say these high-level MoUs lack the funding to reach the grassroots. How is the implementation of this agreement being financed to ensure it reaches the village level and doesn’t remain an “Addis-only” initiative?

I am convinced that we can promote activities without a financial burden that would make things impossible to materialize. We must utilize our soft power through our various contacts, the meetings we attend, and our partnership with the African Union. While financial aspects can be important, the primary goal is to initiate dialogue and facilitate encounters between people. The most significant contribution we can make is providing governments, religious leaders, and communities with the right environment to foster dialogue among themselves.

Leveraging your expertise, what steps must be taken to achieve lasting peace in Ethiopia and the wider region, particularly to ensure that ongoing conflicts do not undermine sustainable development and prosperity?

I believe that mutual respect is essential; without it, there will never be peace in Ethiopia or any other country in the region. This is not a problem unique to Ethiopia, but our goal is to convince political leaders that collaborating with religious leaders is vital for the well-being of their nations and societies. That is our core message.

As I mentioned, the key is dialogue—specifically, transformative dialogue. The alternative to dialogue is war and tension, which I believe no one truly wants, as it results in disaster for everyone.

Do you have a message you would like to share with our readers?

I was extremely pleased with this visit to Addis Ababa and the meetings we held at the African Union, including the roundtable discussion. It was clear from all our contacts that these officials are deeply committed to making Africa a continent of peace, respect, and human rights. Additionally, hosting our latest cohort of fellows in Addis Ababa at the same time was a very rewarding moment for both me and KAICIID.

I am certain that the fellows found the program extremely valuable, as it allowed them to meet one another, visit sacred sites, and engage in meaningful exchange. It was a wonderful group that achieved a very fruitful dialogue, perfectly representing what I value most: the promotion of dialogue and diversity.

In a statement issued today, Chair Mahmoud Ali Youssouf said Kikwete will spearhead the AU’s efforts to address “the complex political, peace and security dynamics across the region.”

The role will largely revolve around facilitating dialogue and promoting cooperation in cooperation with organizations like IGAD and the Arab League, according to the statement.

“This coordinated engagement is particularly critical considering the strategic importance of the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea for international trade and the broader stability of the African continent,” it reads.

The most immediate challenge is economic. Ethiopia imports the bulk of its fuel, and disruptions in the Strait of Hormuz, one of the world’s most critical oil transit routes, have driven global oil prices upward. The resulting increase in fuel costs threatens to worsen inflation, strain foreign reserves, and increase the cost of transport and food. For a country already grappling with economic fragility, the shock could deepen hardship for ordinary citizens. Higher transportation costs inevitably translate into rising prices for food and essential goods, placing additional strain on households and businesses alike. It is therefore incumbent on it to accelerate efforts to diversify its energy sources, invest in renewable projects, and build strategic reserves to cushion against volatility. Energy resilience is not a luxury; it is a necessity in a world where global conflicts can upend supply chains overnight.

Diplomatically, Ethiopia must tread carefully. Ethiopia has long prided itself on a policy of non-alignment, but the current escalation makes “strategic ambiguity” increasingly difficult. The United States and Israel are longstanding partners.  Relations with Israel remain historically and culturally deep, recently elevated to a “higher strategic level” following the visit by President Isaac Herzog. Simultaneously, Ethiopia maintains security ties with Iran.  Compounding the challenge is the growing strategic importance of the Red Sea corridor, through which Ethiopia conducts the majority of its international trade via Djibouti. Several Gulf states that play a key role in the region’s economic and security architecture have also found themselves drawn into the tensions with Iran.

Under such circumstances, openly siding with one camp could jeopardize critical partnerships and expose Ethiopia to unnecessary risks. For this reason, a policy of careful neutrality and balanced diplomacy remains Ethiopia’s most viable course. Maintaining open lines of communication with all parties will help the country can safeguard its interests while contributing to calls for de-escalation. Its diplomatic posture should emphasize dialogue, restraint, and respect for international norms. The presence of the African Union in Addis Ababa further provides Ethiopia with a platform to advocate for peaceful resolution and reinforce its role as a voice for stability on the continent.

At home, the government must also consider the potential domestic repercussions of the conflict. Rising energy and food prices risk aggravating public frustration in a society already dealing with political tensions and economic hardship. If left unaddressed, such pressures could fuel social discontent and complicate efforts to maintain national cohesion. Targeted subsidies, social protection measures, and transparent communication about economic challenges will be essential in mitigating these risks and maintaining public trust. Strengthening internal resilience is equally important from a security perspective. External actors sometimes exploit periods of domestic vulnerability to advance their interests, and Ethiopia’s recent history demonstrates how economic stress can intersect with political instability. Ensuring that security institutions remain vigilant while upholding the rule of law will be vital in preventing the spillover effects of regional turbulence.

The challenges Ethiopia faces in this moment are therefore multifaceted. Economic shocks could undermine fragile recovery efforts, while shifting geopolitical dynamics might pressure the country into uncomfortable alignments. Instability along the Red Sea trade routes could further complicate commerce, and domestic unrest could magnify these difficulties. Yet this difficult moment also presents an opportunity for Ethiopia to demonstrate diplomatic maturity and strategic foresight. The legacy of Adwa reminds Ethiopians that sovereignty is safeguarded not only on the battlefield but also through wise statecraft and unity in the face of external pressures.

Ethiopia’s response to the U.S.–Israel war with Iran will shape its credibility as a regional actor. A measured approach that is anchored in staying neutral, strengthening energy resilience, engaging diplomatically, and protecting domestic stability can reinforce Ethiopia’s role as a stabilizing force in the Horn of Africa. The crisis is a test of its ability to balance external pressures with internal needs. Failure to act wisely could deepen instability, but a prudent response could demonstrate Ethiopia’s resilience and leadership in a volatile world.

As the war rages, Ethiopia must remember that its greatest strength lies in unity and foresight. Neutrality does not mean passivity; it means actively safeguarding national interests while refusing to be drawn into destructive alignments. Energy resilience, diplomatic engagement, and social protection are the tools Ethiopia needs to wield to weather this storm. Though the stakes are high, Ethiopia has faced existential challenges before. With careful navigation, it can emerge from this crisis not weakened, but strengthened, reaffirming its place as a sovereign nation capable of charting its own course in turbulent times.

The report from the American Enterprise Institute, titled “Fault Lines in the Horn of Africa,” identifies Ethiopia as a central “middle-power” player whose maritime ambitions have triggered a regional security crisis and a “battle for Red Sea influence” involving the Gulf States, Turkey, and Israel.

The report details how the Ethiopian government increasingly views its landlocked status as a strategic vulnerability that must be rectified.

“Abiy [Ahmed] has framed sea access as an existential issue and a natural right for Ethiopia, referring to the country’s landlocked status as a ‘geographic prison,” reads the report quoting the Prime Minister’s firm stance. 

The issue of sea access and regional security has taken center stage in recent weeks, with Addis Ababa hosting the presidents of both Turkiye and Israel.

Addressing the media during Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s visit, the PM described Ethiopia as a “geographic prisoner,” arguing that a nation of over 130 million people cannot sustain its growth while being denied access to the sea. He also characterized Ethiopia’s landlocked status as “historically unjust” and contrary to prevailing global practices and contemporary economic trends.

While acknowledging Ethiopia’s development ambition as “just” Erdoğan warned that “the Horn of Africa should not be turned into a battleground for foreign powers,” citing the external geopolitical competition that seeks to inflame regional divisions.

He urged that conflicts be resolved through regional cooperation and dialogue rather than military escalation or foreign interference. 

The AEI report further reads that Ethiopia is moving beyond rhetoric by actively rebuilding its naval capabilities.

After dissolving its original navy in the 1990s, the country re-established the branch in 2018 and has since secured training and technical agreements with France and Russia, according to the report.

It added that the ambition reached a boiling point following a controversial memorandum of understanding (MoU)with Somaliland, which promised Ethiopia a 50-year lease on a naval base in exchange for potential diplomatic recognition.

However, the AEI report notes that the move has “fractured” regional alliances.

In response, a “status quo” axis comprising Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Eritrea has emerged to contain Ethiopia’s expansion, reads the report. According to the report, Egypt, in particular, views Ethiopia’s maritime rise—coupled with the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD)—as a direct threat to its historical dominance over the Nile and the Red Sea.

The report concludes that these tensions are compounded by domestic instability and warns that the Horn of Africa now faces a heightened risk of interstate conflict, with international powers like the UAE and Turkey backing opposing sides in a standoff over one of the world’s most vital maritime corridors.

In an opinion piece published in The Reporter, Muauz Gidey (PhD) of the Tigray Institute for Policy Studies argued that the federal government’s ambition for “both-and” economic sovereignty through maritime access has forced Eritrea into an “either-or” defensive posture, where it views the TPLF as a necessary, albeit temporary, proxy to destabilize the Ethiopian highlands.

According to Muauz, this creates a paradoxical endgame.

“Eritrea is currently protecting the very TPLF leadership it once sought to eliminate, solely to ensure that Addis Ababa remains too internally fragmented to project power toward the coast,” it reads, adding that the United States and the UAE are applying a transactional logic, offering to mediate only if Ethiopia accepts an “either-or” limitation on its Nile sovereignty and Red Sea ambitions.

In his article, Muauz stated that each international pressure creates a “Möbius strip of causality, where the local actors perform “Either-Or” military maneuvers to attract “Both-And” international support.”

Media reports indicate the trip is part of Israel’s efforts to expand its ties in Africa, and the announcement of Herzog’s visit speaks volumes not only about Israel’s desire to gain a stronger foothold in the continent, but also about the increasing volatility and geopolitical importance ascribed to relations between the Horn of Africa and the Middle East.

News of Herzog’s planned trip comes in the immediate wake of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s visit to Addis Ababa.

During a joint press brief on Tuesday, PM Abiy Ahmed stated that he had formally requested Turkiye’s backing for Ethiopia’s quest for maritime access. The Prime Minister underlined that Ethiopia, with a population of over 130 million, has remained landlocked for decades contrary to global norms, describing the condition as historically unjust.

Abiy framed the issue as an economic necessity, asserting that Ethiopia has been made a prisoner of geography for years, and called for the support of friendly countries such as Turkiye.

Whether that support will be granted remains to be seen, and Erdogan’s statements in Addis Ababa seemed to suggest otherwise.

“I would like to especially underline our stance of valuing the sovereignty and territorial integrity of states in the area where Ethiopia is located,” said the Turkish president. “We believe regional countries need to find solutions to the problems of the region and for the Horn of Africa not to become a competition field for foreign forces. In that regard, I would like to emphasize that Israel’s recognition of Somaliland does not benefit Somaliland or the Horn of Africa.”

In December, Israel became the first country to recognize Somaliland as a state. Ethiopia, which signed an MoU with Somaliland in January 2024 as part of a purported sea access-for-recognition deal, is expected to be among the countries to recognize Somaliland sovereignty next but has yet to make the move.

Erdogan’s speech in Addis Ababa this week drew criticism from Somaliland.

“The Republic of Somaliland condemns the recent remarks by the President of the Republic of Türkiye as unacceptable interference aimed at discouraging relations between Somaliland and regional partners,” reads a statement issued by Hargeisa on Wednesday.

Analysts observe Ankara has a vested interest in protecting Somalia’s territorial integrity.

It was Turkiye that mediated between Ethiopia and Somalia in December 2024 following the year-long fallout the MoU caused between the two countries. Seven months earlier, Mogadishu and Ankara had inked a deal of their own granting Turkish Petroleum the right to explore and develop onshore and offshore natural gas and oil in Somalia.

Reports indicate the agreement permits Turkey to recover 90 percent of its operational costs before sharing profits with Somalia.

“Somalia has provided strategic investment and resource concessions, including offshore gas, to Turkiye in exchange for security guarantees and military assistance from Ankara. Therefore, it is not surprising for Erdogan to urge Ethiopia not to recognize Somaliland,” an Ethiopian diplomat told The Reporter, speaking anonymously.

Unsurprisingly, Somalia also continues to reject Israel’s recognition of breakaway Somaliland.

During an interview with Talk To Al Jazeera a week ago, Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud stated that Turkiye and other allies, which include Egypt, would provide Mogadishu with military support if Israel continues to advance its position in Somaliland.

“Somaliland’s agreement with Israel includes providing a military base for Israel in Somaliland coastal areas, accepting Gaza peoples whom Israel displaced from Gaza, and signing the Abraham Accords. This violates the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Somalia. Will never allow the establishment of an Israeli base in Somaliland and will confront any such move. If Israel moves to bring their military to Somaliland, we will fight Israel and our allies will provide us support,” said Hassan Sheikh.

Whether Israel’s allies, including Washington, will back it in Somaliland remains to be seen.

Although some US lawmakers have repeatedly called for the recognition of Somaliland, and the proposal was weighed in Trump election documents last year, Washington has yet to follow in Israel’s footsteps.

However, both the US and Israel have stated they see Somaliland as a strategic military stepping stone for the fight against Yemeni Houthis across the Red Sea.

The Houthi conflict also involves Iran on the other side, and growing tensions between the two groups threaten to pull the world into another large-scale conflict, leading analysts to suggest that Somaliland could yet come to play a larger role in global politics.

Ethiopia, on the other hand, has been vocal in advancing its growing national interest in access to the sea, as unjust landlockedness hampers its development endeavors.

But behind the regional tensions and finger-pointing that have defined the Somaliland recognition saga over the past two years lies an intense and complex scramble among outsiders for influence in the Horn of Africa.

As Erdogan hinted in his speech in Addis Ababa this week, the Horn is a battleground in a cold war between foreign powers.

Notable among these powers are Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). In recent months, Saudi forces attacked UAE positions in Yemen while Somalia closed its airspace to the UAE and the Egypt-backed SAF reasserted control over Khartoum.

The events suggest the UAE’s influence in the region may be waning, placing its allies in a state of uncertainty and opening the door for others, such as Turkiye and Egypt, whose foothold in the Horn is expanding.

Like Turkiye, Egypt has a growing military presence in Somalia.

On February 11, Hassan Sheikh Mohamud joined Egyptian military leaders in Cairo to witness a formal deployment parade. The ceremony marked the official assignment of the Egyptian Armed Forces to Somalia.

Egypt is reportedly deploying around 1,100 troops to Somalia, supplied with a variety of Mine-Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicles and Armoured Personnel Carriers (APC) designed for high-threat environments.

Just a month before coming to Addis Ababa, Erdogan was in Cairo, where he signed a military pact with Egyptian president El Sisi.

The military cooperation agreement included the purchase of Tolga short-range air defense system (a platform designed to detect and defeat aerial threats including drones and low-flying aircraft) by Egypt for USD 130 million.

The deal also covers joint production of unmanned ground vehicles, following up on a similar agreement for the production of vertical take-off and landing (VTOL) drones from August 2025.

The two countries have also agreed on joint naval exercises, which Erdogan claims will help support regional peace.

Just a couple of days  following his visit to the Ethiopian capital, senior Egyptian and Turkish air force commanders met in Cairo to discuss deeper military collaboration.

The diplomat notes Turkiye is the second largest source of foreign direct investment (FDI) in Ethiopia, next to China. Turkiye also supplies drones to Ethiopia.

“If Ethiopia disregards Erdogan’s warning and proceeds to recognize Somaliland, Turkiye might reconsider these leverages. Turkiye might also start directly backing Egypt’s interest over GERD [Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam], apart from offering support to Ethiopia’s regional foes. Turkiye’s concerns are not for the safety of the Horn, but stem from a desire to gain a foothold in Somalia and Sudan by cutting off the UAE,” said the diplomat.

Türkiye has been a strategic member of NATO since 1952, boasting the alliance’s second-largest military and acting as a crucial southeastern anchor. While it is a long-standing candidate for European Union membership and part of the EU Customs Union, it is not a member of the EU.

Observers argue that Turkiye’s frustrations with the EU have forced it to turn its attention southward.

“After losing the bid to become an EU member, Turkiye has turned its face towards pursuing influence in the Gulf and Horn regions. That’s why it is supporting Egypt and Somalia. Turkiye also seeks to resolve the Sudan crisis. All this to assert itself in the Horn,” said the diplomat.

He remarked that the UAE’s close ties to Israel, with which Turkiye cut all diplomatic relations in 2024, mark Abu Dhabi as an adversary in the eyes of Ankara.

“Ultimately, the tensions and rivalries between the Arab world on one side and the west on the other have placed the Horn of Africa in a precarious situation,” said the diplomat. “Not only have Arab countries Arabized the Red Sea and cut Ethiopia off from access, but they are moving to implement a new map that will enable them to control the Horn for the coming decades. Meanwhile, the US is taking a transactional approach, which involves swapping critical resources in exchange for security, and is already working against China’s strong presence in Africa, particularly in the Horn.”

While analysts have differing views on how the power struggle in the Horn will unfold, they all seem to agree that in all scenarios, the countries of the Horn themselves stand to lose.

“The situation will lead to further fragmentation and protracted conflicts under the influence of foreign powers, unless the East and North African nations reach a consensus under the umbrella of AU and REC [regional economic community] integration principles. The AU and RECs must assert their principles on the fair use of African maritime territory by Africans,” an analyst from Addis Ababa University’s School of Geography and Development Studies told The Reporter, speaking anonymously.

“African countries, especially in the Horn, must stop availing themselves to the political market. As long as we are availing our nations and national interest to the market, it is easy for foreign powers to scramble to control us.”

The President’s remarks were delivered in Mekelle during the 51st anniversary of the founding of the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF). 

Against a backdrop of stalled provisions in the Pretoria Peace Agreement—specifically regarding the return of displaced persons and the restoration of regional borders—Tadesse sought to reassure a restive public. He affirmed that while Tigray’s priority is to avoid a return to full-scale conflict, the region maintains the resolve and right to safeguard its security should peaceful options be depleted.

Tadesse’s remarks signal a critical juncture for the region as it balances the fragile Pretoria peace process against growing security concerns on its borders.

However, even three years after the signing of the Pretoria Agreement between the federal government and the TPLF, regional tensions show no sign of abating.

Relations have been further strained by a shifting geopolitical landscape, where reports of a new alignment between Tigrayan leadership and Asmara have raised fears that northern Ethiopia may once again transform into a central battleground.

This buildup follows years of escalating friction fueled by unresolved disputes between the federal government and the Tigray forces

Compounding the security crisis is the internal fragmentation within the region, marked by reports of military engagements between the Tigray Defense Forces (TDF) and a dissident faction, the Tigray People’s Forces (TPF).

Adding to the volatility, regional diplomats have observed significant troop movements and equipment transfers by both the federal government and Eritrea toward the northern Tigray region, a development observers warn could lead to a catastrophic return to full-scale war and possible collapse of the 2022 Pretoria Agreement.

However, for President Tadesse there “are still questions that remain unimplemented and must be answered,” citing the Pretoria Agreement, the return of displaced people, and the restoration of Tigray’s borders.

According to him, the federal government, as one of the signatories to the peace deal, is expected to provide peaceful and political solutions, reminded that “any path taken instead of giving a peaceful solution will complicate the problem and is not viable”.

Just last week, the TPLF issued another open letter to the African Union, urging it to safeguard the Pretoria Agreement and alleging that federal troops are currently mobilizing toward Tigray’s borders.

Nonetheless, actors like Tsadkan Gebretensae (Lt. Gen.) argue the situation is a problem that should concern all Ethiopians.

He said any outbreak of war would negatively impact the entire country, and noted there remains an opportunity to spare Tigray from further conflict.

Should that fail, the priority must shift to reducing both the length and the humanitarian cost of the war, said the general.

“The war being waged (against Tigray), we must make it very short and resolve it at a small cost,” he said.

A report from the Pan African Agenda Institute described the Pretoria peace deal as a “negative peace” agreement that fails to deliver “positive peace.”

“Three years after the Pretoria Agreement was signed, its implementation has led to what scholars refer to as negative peace or the cessation of active fighting, while failing comprehensively to deliver positive peace, which would encompass constitutional restoration, justice, reconstruction, and sustainable reconciliation,” reads the research.  

In its latest report, titled “Ethiopia, Eritrea and Tigray: A Powder Keg in the Horn of Africa”, the International Crisis Group also issued a stark warning that deadly war threatens to return to Ethiopia’s northern Tigray region and neighboring Eritrea.

The report links the ongoing tensions to Ethiopia’s quest to obtain a seaport.

“A war would be devastating for all three players in a region where past conflicts have cost hundreds of thousands of lives,” it reads, warning the war would also overlap with the fighting in neighbouring Sudan, dragging in powerful states from outside the Horn of Africa and further roiling the volatile Red Sea region.

The UN Security Council also warned the war in Sudan might engulf Ethiopia and South Sudan, among others. “The security situation in Blue Nile State has also worsened as recent reports indicate renewed clashes and the risk of escalation as armed groups mobilize in southern and western parts of the state, heightening fears of broader instability in the border region with Ethiopia and South Sudan,” reads UNSC monthly forecast for February.

During last week’s 39th African Union (AU) summit, Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed (PhD) underscored that securing maritime access is a non-negotiable, existential priority for Ethiopia’s 130 million people.

He argued that Ethiopia’s status as a landlocked nation is a “historically unjust” structural bottleneck that stifles its rapid economic growth and limits its contribution to regional stability.

Abiy framed the issue as a matter of “functional sovereignty,” calling for a cooperative continental framework where shared port access serves as a foundation for regional prosperity rather than conflict.

According to him, peaceful resolution is inevitable for the continent’s second-most populous nation.

“The security and stability of the Horn of Africa depend on Ethiopia gaining sea access,” he said, adding that Ethiopia’s interest is an economic and demographic necessity that should be treated as a matter of regional prosperity.

The group calls for all stakeholders to engage in quiet diplomacy to deter the “onset of conflict”.

Using social media, Yemane Gebermeskel, Eritrean foreign minister, dismissed Ethiopia’s ambitions for Red Sea maritime influence, characterizing the suggestion that littoral states cannot manage regional security without Ethiopian naval power as a “ludicrous” distraction from Ethiopia’s internal instability.

This emerging crisis did not materialize overnight. The reconciliation that followed the 2018 rapprochement was always fragile, built more on political will at the top than on deeply institutionalized trust. Since early 2025, that fragile calm has steadily eroded, primarily after Ethiopia’s renewed push to secure reliable maritime access. As a landlocked nation with a fast-growing population and economy, Ethiopia views access to the sea as a strategic necessity. Eritrea, however, interprets Ethiopia’s assertiveness on this front as a potential encroachment on its sovereignty and territorial integrity. The language from leaders on both sides has grown sharper, framing the dispute not as a negotiable disagreement but as a matter of national survival.

Complicating matters further is the broader geopolitical environment. The Red Sea corridor has evolved into a zone of intense international competition. Gulf states continue expanding their military and economic footprints. Turkey has deepened its engagement in Somalia. Major global powers maintain strategic interests in Djibouti. Against this backdrop, friction between Addis Ababa and Asmara risks becoming entangled in larger rivalries. What might begin as a bilateral disagreement could easily draw in external actors seeking influence or advantage. Historical mistrust, strategic anxieties, and regional fragility together form a volatile combination—one that could ignite with little warning.

The cost of renewed war would be staggering. Both Ethiopia and Eritrea remain haunted by memories of the brutal 1998–2000 border conflict, which claimed tens of thousands of lives and inflicted lasting trauma. Entire communities were torn apart, and the psychological scars have never fully healed. Another confrontation would not only devastate both nations economically and socially; it would destabilize the entire Horn of Africa. Critical Red Sea shipping routes, vital to global commerce, could face disruption. Border regions—particularly areas already recovering from previous conflicts—would once again become battlegrounds. Civilians, especially those in northern Ethiopia who have only recently emerged from years of violence, understandably fear being thrust back into turmoil.

Humanitarian consequences would follow swiftly. Displacement would surge. Food insecurity could worsen in already vulnerable communities. Economic hardship would deepen given both countries are struggling with inflation, unemployment, and reconstruction. Neither Ethiopia nor Eritrea can afford another destructive war. Yet rhetoric and military signaling suggest that miscalculation remains a real risk.

Avoiding such catastrophe requires immediate and deliberate action. First and foremost, both governments must acknowledge that armed conflict offers no viable solution. Ethiopia’s aspiration for dependable maritime access is legitimate from an economic standpoint, but it must be pursued through diplomacy rather than coercion. Clear, consistent messaging from political and military leaders is essential to reduce misunderstandings and signal peaceful intent. Mixed signals or ambiguous statements only fuel suspicion and heighten tensions.

Eritrea, for its part, is justified in safeguarding its sovereignty. However, responding to perceived threats with brinkmanship risks triggering the very instability it seeks to avoid. Dialogue, however challenging, remains the only sustainable path forward. Durable solutions can only emerge through structured negotiation that recognizes each side’s core interests without resorting to ultimatums.

Regional and global actors also bear responsibility. The African Union should not remain on the sidelines while tensions escalate between two of its member states. Its Peace and Security Council has both the mandate and the moral obligation to engage in preventive diplomacy. Early mediation, confidence-building initiatives, and high-level dialogue could help defuse tensions before they spiral. The United Nations and influential global powers must likewise avoid neglecting this brewing crisis amid competing international priorities. Proactive engagement is far less costly than crisis management after violence erupts.

Practical confidence-building measures could make an immediate difference. Both countries should consider scaling back visible troop deployments near their shared border and refrain from inflammatory public statements. Establishing or revitalizing joint border mechanisms, improving communication between military commanders, and enhancing transparency regarding troop movements would reduce the risk of accidental escalation. Even modest steps toward rebuilding trust can help prevent catastrophic misjudgments.

Equally important is the role of civil society. Citizens in both Ethiopia and Eritrea understand the human cost of war more intimately than policymakers do. Religious leaders, community elders, youth organizations, and advocacy groups should be encouraged to champion reconciliation and dialogue. Peace cannot be sustained solely through elite agreements; it must be supported by public sentiment that rejects violence as a political instrument.

Economic cooperation offers another pathway away from confrontation. Both nations face significant economic pressures. Ethiopia seeks outlets to global markets; Eritrea needs investment and revitalization. Instead of framing maritime access as a zero-sum contest, creative arrangements—such as negotiated port access, joint infrastructure development, or mutually beneficial trade agreements—could transform a source of friction into a foundation for partnership. Economic interdependence, if carefully structured, can become a stabilizing force.

The warning signs are unmistakable, but war is not inevitable. Escalation is the product of decisions, and different decisions can still be made. Ethiopia and Eritrea stand at a pivotal moment. Choosing diplomacy over defiance, cooperation over confrontation, and prudence over pride would spare millions from renewed suffering. The Horn of Africa has endured too much turmoil. Preventing another war is not only a strategic necessity—it is a moral imperative.

In an open letter issued on February 12, 2026, TPLF said the situation in Tigray and the broader Ethiopian context has deteriorated despite commitments made under the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement (CoHA) signed in November 2022.

According to the statement, key provisions of the agreement remain partially implemented.

It added that the “renewed military mobilization, rising tensions, and measures restricting civilian life risk reversing progress achieved since the signing of the accord.” The letter cited restrictions on movement, economic pressure, and political exclusion as actions that undermine confidence in the peace process.

The restriction, according to the statement, increases the risk of renewed confrontation in the region.

“As the continent’s principal mediator and custodian of this agreement, the Union carries political and moral responsibility to safeguard implementation and ensure that commitments translate into protection and stability for civilians,” it reads, calling for the restoration of constitutional order and the safe return of IDPs in the region. 

On the same day, TPLF Chairman Debretsion Gebremichael (PhD) told local media that federal forces are mobilizing toward Tigray. During his address, he warned that the “TPLF would not remain passive if federal troops launch an attack.”

He added that the people of Tigray have paid a price for peace for three years and described the current situation as a matter of survival.

“The people of Tigray are still in the systematic genocide where many died of hunger and starvation,” he said, citing Hitsats IDP center in Shire, where food has grown scarce. “The region is facing a new test that affects its national integrity.”

The chairman also called on the African Union to convene and facilitate structured political dialogue between the signatories of the Pretoria agreement to address political, security, and governance issues affecting the region.

Although the Pretoria agreement ended two years of fighting between federal and Tigray forces, disagreements have continued over disarmament, restoration of services, territorial administration, and political arrangements in the region.

In May 2025, federal authorities revoked the legal status of the TPLF as a political party, a decision the party rejected immediately.

Last week, hostilities in parts of Tigray led Ethiopian Airlines to suspend flights to Mekelle, citing security concerns. Diplomatic missions and humanitarian agencies expressed concern over rising tensions and the risk of escalation.

In a related development, reports indicate that banks have closed the accounts of several senior TPLF officials, including Amanuel Assefa, vice president of the Tigray Interim Administration.

Human Rights Watch is among those that have called for the UN secretary-general, AU leaders, and international partners attending the summit to act quickly to prevent a return to conflict in northern Ethiopia.

In a statement issued on Friday, the watchdog said the recent hostilities in Tigray are the result of widespread displacement.

“Signatories and non-signatories to the November 2022 Pretoria Cessation of Hostilities Agreement are obliged to protect civilians and prioritize the implementation of key provisions on civilian protection, aid access, access to basic services and transitional justice,” it reads.

The UN Committee on the Rights of the Child has expressed alarm over what it says is a significant increase in grave violations against children, including killing and maiming, sexual violence, abduction, and denial of humanitarian access, under the context of conflict in Ethiopia.

The Committee published its findings on the child rights situation in Ethiopia this week after officials from the Ministry of Justice and UN delegates submitted a series of reports to it over the past months.

The Committee urges Ethiopia to comply with applicable international law and to end and prevent such grave violations, and to allow timely and unimpeded humanitarian access.

It also called on the government to facilitate access to encampments to enable the identification of children and their transfer to civilian child protection actors, to hold perpetrators accountable, and to provide medical care, including reproductive health, psychosocial support and legal aid to conflict-affected children.

Among the points that stood out in the reports was the high prevalence of violence against children, including domestic violence, abuse, neglect, sexual and gender-based violence, bullying and online sexual exploitation and abuse, states the UN document.

The Committee has called on Ethiopia to adopt national comprehensive child protection legislation and to establish a national database on cases of violence against children. It also called for independent and thorough investigations into all allegations of violence, including alleged crimes related to gender-based violence and ill-treatment in detention centers, and for bringing perpetrators to justice.

Concerning independent monitoring, the Committee wants to see a more independent Ethiopian Human Rights Commission and of the Ethiopian Institution of the Ombudsman, including with regards to their funding, mandate, and immunities.

The Committee urges the Ethiopian government to consider replicating good practices from the Benishangul-Gumuz and Afar regional states, where special procedures allow for mothers detained with their children to be released on bail.

The document also cites Kaliti High Security Detention Center, where children detained with their mothers are provided day care service within the prison.

Members of the Committee demanded to know what is preventing Ethiopia from introducing a uniform child right code across the country.

The Ethiopian delegation, led by Tsegab Kebebew Daka, permanent representative to the UN Geneva office, responded by saying that although child rights are enshrined in the constitution, regional administrations also have a say in the matter.

The Committee also put in an official request to raise the child criminality age up from the current age of nine.

“The Committee takes note of the fact that the State party [Ethiopia] has been seriously affected by the complex emergencies including armed conflicts in northern Ethiopia, inter-ethnic conflicts, large-scale displacement, earthquakes in northern Ethiopia and severe effects of climate change resulting in recurrent droughts and floods, coupled with severe economic instability exacerbated by inflation, that have all had a negative impact on the realization of the rights and on the welfare of children in the country,” reads the document.

“The Committee also acknowledges and deeply regrets that the State Party has been confronted with considerable cuts in the support provided by the international cooperation that left millions of children and families in urgent need of food aid, which have provoked hundreds of hunger-related deaths, slowed the economic development and forced the State Party to focus on debt repayment at the expense of investment in basic social services.”