Africa is facing an unprecedented moment of insecurity, marked by the deepening entrenchment of conflicts and the rising influence of external actors. In its latest analysis, titled “African Union Floating Adrift as a New Era of Insecurity Entrenches in Africa and Anarchy is Loosed Upon the World,” Amani Africa Media and Research Services presents a review of the continental organization’s shortcomings.
The report paints a sobering picture of a continent where the African Union (AU)—once the central guarantor of peace and security—is increasingly sidelined, and where protracted conflicts, resurgent military coups, and shifting global power dynamics challenge the effectiveness of its institutions.
Yared Nigussie of The Reporter sat down with Solomon Ayele Derso (PhD), founding director of Amani Africa Media and Research Services, to discuss the report’s key findings. They examine why the AU’s response has fallen short, how the nature of contemporary conflicts demands extraordinary and coordinated action, and why a new era of collective engagement and a common foreign policy is critical for Africa to navigate both regional and global threats. The conversation also touches on recent scenarios in the Horn of Africa and their implications for Ethiopia. EXCERPTS:
The Reporter: The 2025 Review of the Peace and Security Council describes the AU as “floating adrift” and being increasingly marginalized in diplomatic processes. Why are external actors—such as the United States, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE)—now driving peace outcomes in Africa’s most severe crises while the AU is reduced to merely “endorsing” them?
Solomon Ayele Derso (PhD): Our annual flagship report, which we publish ahead of the African Union Summit held at the beginning of each year, reviews the peace and security situation across the continent and assesses the AU’s performance in addressing various conflict settings. The 2025 edition of the report, as you rightly noted, presents a rather grim picture of Africa’s peace and security landscape, as well as the AU’s response to it. Regarding the AU’s performance, the title of the report itself is telling. By describing the organization as “floating adrift,” it underscores the concern that the AU, established to provide leadership in responding to the continent’s major conflict hotspots, has reached a point where its actions are increasingly outpaced by realities on the ground. Much of its engagement appears more ritualistic than consequential, with limited tangible impact on evolving crises.
The AU engages in meetings, expresses concern, and condemns violations, and issues communiqués and statements—only to repeat the same cycle again. Yet these actions rarely translate into effective collective measures capable of altering events on the ground or reshaping the trajectory of conflicts. What we are witnessing, therefore, is a widening gap between the growing scale and spread of conflicts across the continent and the steadily declining effectiveness of the AU’s response. This deterioration has reached a worrying level. In our report, we sought to capture this trend through a systematic analysis of data, examining both the evolution of conflict situations and the Union’s engagement, particularly the role of its key decision-making organ on peace and security, the Peace and Security Council. When you ask why we have arrived at this point, the answer lies in a number of underlying factors that help explain this troubling trajectory.
As the agency and effectiveness of the African Union continue to decline, other actors are increasingly stepping in to fill the vacuum, often displacing the organization in the process. Several factors account for this situation. Chief among them is the weakening commitment to the Union’s foundational policies and principles, particularly pan-Africanism and the notion of collective responsibility that underpins the AU’s mandate.
This erosion of political will is critical. The AU’s ability to function effectively depends on the commitment of its member states. Without sustained political will and adherence to collective action, the organization simply cannot operate as intended. The first and perhaps most significant factor, therefore, is this decline in commitment to pan-African ideals and to addressing continental challenges collectively.
As our report makes clear, fragmentation, mistrust, and tensions among member states have become defining features in many parts of the continent. This trend is evident in the Horn of Africa, the Great Lakes region, the Sahel, and West Africa. Across these regions, levels of trust and cooperation between states have steadily deteriorated, further undermining the AU’s capacity to act decisively and cohesively.
Another important factor concerns leadership. The leadership of member states is critical to the effective functioning of the African Union. Even more crucial, however, is the leadership of the AU Commission itself. Over roughly the past decade, the quality and assertiveness of the Commission’s leadership appear to have declined significantly.
This weakening of leadership has contributed to the current situation on the continent and to the growing displacement of the AU by external actors in responding to complex crises. Increasingly, the Union is not the first responder in major conflict situations.
For example, in the recent tensions between Ethiopia and Somalia, it was Ankara—not the AU—that took the lead in mediation efforts. In the case of Sudan, diplomatic initiatives have largely been centered in Jeddah and Washington, D.C. Similarly, regarding the crisis in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, key engagements have taken place in Doha and Washington, rather than under AU leadership. This pattern illustrates a broader concern that the AU is gradually losing its central role in managing and shaping responses to the continent’s most pressing security challenges.
If, as the report suggests, the AU’s sacred mandate is to advance peace and security, has the organization become performative rather than consequential in its actions?
The African Union does not lack decisions or policies. On the contrary, it has strong normative frameworks and well-established institutions to advance them. What is lacking is the effective mobilization and implementation of those commitments. Effective leadership requires building and sustaining consensus among member states. This means developing clear, targeted political strategies for each conflict situation and actively securing member states’ buy-in. It also requires mobilizing regional bodies, such as the Intergovernmental Authority on Development [IGAD], Southern Africa Development Community [SADC], and Economic Commission of West African States [ECOWAS], and leveraging international partners to support and reinforce these strategies.
What is missing, however, is this kind of robust, sustained political engagement, the ability to forge consensus, maintain collective resolve, and bring meaningful pressure to bear in order to change realities on the ground. The result is a widening gap between policy pronouncements and actual outcomes. Above all, what is lacking is political courage.
Those entrusted with advancing peace and security have become increasingly cautious, often shying away from difficult situations that demand moral clarity and political courage. Yet leadership is defined and tested precisely in such moments. It is during times of crisis that resolve and conviction matter most, and that is what is currently lacking.
As a result, the AU is often neither the first to speak nor the first to act. This marks a sharp contrast with the early 2000s, when the Union and its Peace and Security Council were launched with a firm commitment that no conflict on the continent would fall outside its mandate. Leaders at the time pledged that the AU would be the first to respond and to pronounce itself on crises. Today, as our 2025 review shows, that is rarely the case.
Your report describes 2025 as the year when “things fall apart” and anarchy is loosed upon the world. How has the “normalization” of conflict changed the way the PSC must operate, especially in light of ongoing crises, many of which are sustained?
The work of the Peace and Security Council must fundamentally change in light of current realities. We are entering a new era in which insecurity is becoming normalized. Conflicts are no longer short-term or isolated—they are increasingly protracted and entrenched. At the same time, the global order is unraveling, adding further instability to the peace and security landscape.
In these circumstances, the AU and its Peace and Security Council must respond with urgency. The scale and severity of crises on the continent demand emergency measures. Our report therefore calls for the declaration of a state of emergency in relation to major conflicts such as Sudan, where the situation has reached an unacceptable level.
The same applies to the Sahel, where the very survival of societies and states is at stake. In some regions, the crisis has assumed existential proportions and requires decisive, extraordinary action.
South Sudan is another alarming case, now at risk of descending into full-scale civil war. This is not a situation that can be addressed through routine peace and security mechanisms. It demands an extraordinary and exceptional response. That is why we have called for the declaration of a state of emergency and the establishment of a high-level emergency task force, led directly by the Chairperson of the African Union Commission, operating around the clock to address these major conflict situations. The immediate priority must be containment, creating the conditions to prevent further escalation and, ultimately, to pave the way for resolution.
Sudan, as our report highlights, is already de facto divided. The very survival of the Sudanese state is at stake. If the fragile peace process in neighboring South Sudan collapses, it could merge with an already grave regional crisis, amplifying instability across the Horn of Africa and beyond. Linked to the turmoil in the Sahel and Libya, such a convergence would not remain confined to the continent. It could spill over into the Red Sea corridor, one of the world’s most vital maritime routes connecting the Middle East, Asia, and Europe.
The gravity of the threat, therefore, extends beyond Africa. Yet the primary responsibility lies with Africa and the African Union. Business as usual will not suffice. What is ultimately at stake is the very credibility, and raison d’état, of the AU itself.
How is the proliferation of combat drones, described as “comparatively cheap but technologically advanced,” transforming African conflicts into asymmetric wars that the AU’s current Peace Support Operations are not equipped to handle?
Another key feature of today’s conflict landscape, highlighted in our report, is the transformation in the tools of warfare. In the past, the AK-47 symbolized the weapon of choice across many conflicts in this region. Today, that role is increasingly being played by drones.
In 2025, one of the most significant developments, particularly in Sudan, has been the widespread and easy access to drone technology, which has fundamentally altered the conduct of the war. Historically, control of the skies was largely the preserve of governments. Now, affordable drone technologies have enabled non-state actors, militias, and terrorist groups to acquire and deploy aerial combat capabilities.
This trend is deeply alarming and demands a shift in how conflicts are addressed on the continent. The proliferation of such technologies cannot be managed by individual states acting alone. It requires coordinated, collective action. In this regard, the African Union and its Peace and Security Council have a critical role to play, as platforms for developing a unified continental response to emerging security threats that no single country can effectively confront on its own.
The report makes a startling claim that the AU is inadvertently making “coup-making profitable again.” By failing to enforce Article 25(4) of the African Charter, which prohibits coup perpetrators from running in elections, has the AU effectively removed the disincentives for military takeovers?
One of the notable developments over the past six years on the African continent has been the resurgence of military seizures of power. While this trend has been most pronounced in West Africa, it has also affected Central Africa, the Horn of Africa, and parts of Eastern and Southern Africa, including Madagascar. In 2025 alone, we witnessed coups in Madagascar and Guinea-Bissau. Historically, this phenomenon has stretched across a belt from the Atlantic coast through the Sahel to the Red Sea, affecting countries from Guinea to Burkina Faso, Niger, Chad, and Sudan.
A key disincentive for military leaders taking power should be the AU’s strict stance against unconstitutional changes of government. Article 25(4) of the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance explicitly bars anyone who participates in a coup from contesting elections to restore constitutional order. Yet, in practice, this provision has been widely ignored. Military leaders who seize power face minimal consequences: if they succeed, they can often legitimize their rule through elections, as seen in Chad, Gabon, Guinea, and now potentially Guinea-Bissau and Madagascar.
By 2025, this failure of enforcement has left the law hollow. The AU and its Peace and Security Council did not even issue statements reaffirming their commitment to the Charter in response to recent coups, such as in Guinea-Conakry. As a result, what was meant to be a strong deterrent has lost all practical significance. It was therefore significant that the AU Chairperson, President João Lourenço of Angola, explicitly criticized the “whitewashing” of unconstitutional changes of government during the AU summit, emphasizing that restoration of constitutional order does not mean allowing coup leaders to assume the presidency through elections. However, the AU’s credibility has already been damaged by its prior acceptance of coup leaders, including in Guinea and Gabon. Without consistent enforcement, the Charter’s authority and the Union’s role as a guardian of democratic governance remain seriously undermined.
The influence of middle powers, particularly from the Middle East and the Gulf, now allegedly outweighs the influence of the immediate conflict parties in places like Sudan. Why does Africa still lack a common foreign policy to negotiate with these powers collectively rather than through fragmented bilateral channels?
The first key issue is the growing influence of external actors, which in some conflicts now outweighs the control of the direct parties themselves. Take Sudan, for example, resolving the conflict cannot be achieved solely by engaging the local actors. Success requires addressing the external forces that supply weapons, provide support, and fuel the conflict. Without neutralizing these influences, efforts targeting only the conflict parties are unlikely to succeed. This highlights the importance of understanding the true nature of modern conflicts and the type of response they demand.
The second point follows from this, managing external influence cannot be done through bilateral engagements by individual states alone. Power asymmetries and inequalities of influence mean that such isolated approaches are often ineffective. Instead, a collective, coordinated mechanism is necessary, particularly in dealing with increasingly influential Middle Eastern countries in the Horn of Africa. Individual engagement leaves countries vulnerable to external rivalries, allowing these actors to exploit divisions and weaken local responses. Only through structured, collective action can these imbalances be managed effectively.
Hence, one of the imperatives of this moment is the advancement of collective engagement. The need for a common foreign policy is driven not only by regional dynamics but also by global developments. Geopolitics has shifted dramatically, and Africa is increasingly becoming a theater of global rivalry and tension. To safeguard its interests and shield itself from the risks posed by these geopolitical contests, the continent must act collectively. This is precisely where the idea of a common African foreign policy becomes essential.
There appears to be an emerging geopolitical alignment around control and influence over the strategic Red Sea corridor. On one side, Saudi Arabia—along with Egypt, elements of the Sudanese Armed Forces under General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, and Türkiye—is often perceived as favoring a regional order that limits or opposes Ethiopia’s pursuit of direct access to the Red Sea. On the other side, the United Arab Emirates, Israel, and Ethiopia itself are seen as supporting arrangements that would enable Ethiopia to secure maritime access. How do you assess these competing alignments? Are they solid strategic blocs or fluid, interest-based partnerships?
It is true that towards the end of 2025 two contending geopolitical blocs are crystalizing in the Red Sea arena and projecting themselves into the wider Horn of Africa region. The first involves the tripartite alliance announced towards the end of 2025 involving Saudi Arabia, Türkiye and Egypt. The other that is currently taking shape appears to bring together UAE and Israel with Somaliland serving as key foothold from the Horn of Africa side of the territory. While there are ideological, economic and strategic factors that underpin the formation of these rival blocs, it is not clear if the contestation between the two camps is actually an existential one. It appears from the emergence of the first bloc that it is rather an attempt at defining and rallying around boundaries necessary for safeguarding interests in the region from perceived threat arising from the engagement or actions of the UAE or Israel as reflected in the actions Saudi took in relation to Yemen and the collective response of Saudi, Turkey and Egypt in relation to Israel’s recognition of Somaliland.
As such my assessment, informed by historical experiences of this region, is basically that this may not necessarily be longstanding and solid blocs. For countries in the region, it is therefore necessary to take cognizance of the long endured perspective and the adverse consequences of such rivalries in destabilizing regional relations. Particularly given that these alliances rise and fall depending on changing regional dynamics. Remember in 2015 it was Qatar, Turkey versus Saudi Arabia and UAE in one bloc. That ended. Now we have a new bloc. So, some years down the line, this bloc will disappear. That’s why I think it’s important not to be boxed into one of the blocs. That I think is one of the most important lessons of even recent history of this kind of tension and rivalry from the Gulf countries experience themselves.
Ethiopia is also eyeing Türkiye’s support for gaining sea access. Türkiye’s president Recep Tayyip Erdoğan warned that the Horn of Africa should not be turned into a battleground for foreign powers. Given Türkiye’s growing strategic footprint in the Horn, particularly in security, infrastructure, and mediation roles, do you see room for Ethiopia’s maritime ambitions and Türkiye’s broader regional doctrine to converge? Can Ethiopia’s push for sea access be framed in a way that aligns with Ankara’s stated commitment to stability and non-escalation?
Türkiye is one of the major actors in the Horn of Africa whose influence is deepening from Somalia to Ethiopia and then Sudan—it has become one of the major players outside of the region. You could recall that when Ethiopia signed the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with Somaliland and major fallout emerged as a result of that between Ethiopia and Somalia, it was Türkiye that stepped in to mediate and facilitate de-escalation of the tension between Ethiopia and Somalia. And the point of divergence between Ethiopia and Türkiye relates most recently to the question of the recognition of Somaliland. And one of the reasons as you know the Turkish president during his visit indicated is basically that Türkiye considers the recognition of Somaliland not a positive thing for the stability of the region. At the same time I don’t think that, for example, Türkiye has said that it opposes Ethiopia’s quest for access to the sea. And what that leaves you with is basically that there is still a room and a possibility for working on what possible other avenues and modalities could exist that Türkiye would be amenable to supporting as far as this quest for access to the sea is concerned.
Among the blocs, which camp is more likely to shape the future security and political architecture of the Red Sea region?
Rather than speaking in terms of camps, one thing that I would say will be crucial for shaping the future direction of this region is what countries in this region are able to do or what they fail to do. That is the most decisive factor. It’s not what others come and do here that is going to be decisive. It’s what countries in this region are willing to do or what they fail to do. That is decisive. And that is why the whole question of how you go about creating a condition that would provide a shield for the interest of the people of the region matters a great deal. Instead of thinking about the future direction of the region as a zero-sum game, it has to be thought of as a collective because the future of the peoples of this region is tied together. The fate of the countries of the region is tied together. So no country can rise and succeed while other countries are failing in this region. You swim or sink together, not unilaterally.
A few days after Erdoğan’s visit, Israel’s President Isaac Herzog touched down in Addis Ababa. Is the visit a diplomatic engagement with a key African partner? Or part of the deep strategic architecture taking shape across the Horn of Africa where regional influence, maritime security and global power footprints are increasingly layered?
These major high-level visits are indicative of a major geopolitical realignment that is currently underway. It’s not just a regional geopolitical realignment that is currently underway. It has different layers. It has a regional layer but beyond the regional dimension, it also has a global and international layer to it. And, I think it would be a very difficult time for countries in this region as these antagonistic geopolitical regional axes are being organized in an increasingly opposing way. How the countries in the region manage this with wisdom informed by historical experiences, recognizing that these blocs operate for their own interests, not for the interests of the countries of the region, is extremely important. These visits are signifiers and major signals of the kind of geopolitical alignment that is emerging on the Red Sea arena.
The fact that high-level visits from countries on both sides of the emerging blocs focused on Ethiopia suggests that Ethiopia’s role stands to shape how the rivalry between these two blocs would play itself out in the region. This suggests that instead of being forced to choose or instead of taking any one of the two sides, Addis Ababa actually has the possibility of playing the role of a bridge between the two blocs, an actor that could help mitigate the adverse consequences on the region of the fallout from the rivalry between the two camps.
How might Ethiopia navigate the strategic alliance blocs in the Horn of Africa while preserving its longstanding policy of strategic independence?
It’s a very testing time for Ethiopia and the entire region. That is why it is imperative to be informed by the historical experience of this region. It is imperative to try and keep an autonomous relationship, an autonomous standing that shies away and doesn’t lend itself to being taken over by one group or the other. What that requires is to maintain and display a level of autonomy by making sure that you are not played by one against the other.
The best way to go about it would be to build on these high-level visits from the different blocs and recognize these visits as affirmation and signal that Addis Ababa could be key in shaping the direction of the rivalry between the two blocs in the Horn of Africa region.
Ethiopia demands Eritrea’s withdrawal from its territory. At the same time there’s a looming war between the two countries, and the Ethiopian National Defense Force is reportedly mobilizing on the border. Do you think border disputes could be solved through the modalities of the Algiers Agreement?
This situation is very concerning. These two countries fought a bitter war between 1998 and 200, and its destructive consequences continue to reverberate to this day. The lesson from that is that it’s not clear if you can actually settle the disagreement and disputes through war.
Part of the question now is whether it would be fundamentally different from what happened last time. Whether the conditions are of such a nature that political and diplomatic resolution is beyond reach is the key issue. There is also the question of can this region; can these countries really afford engaging in hostilities? Because once you get into war, part of the challenge is that war will acquire a life of its own—a dynamic of its own. War is not necessarily inevitable. It’s not immediately clear that it would result in something different from what transpired previously. And most importantly given the regional and geopolitical dynamics at play, the outbreak of war may end up creating a dynamic that may go beyond the control of countries in the region.
