{"id":50262,"date":"2026-04-18T10:38:04","date_gmt":"2026-04-18T07:38:04","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.thereporterethiopia.com\/?p=50262"},"modified":"2026-04-18T14:09:12","modified_gmt":"2026-04-18T11:09:12","slug":"upcoming-vote-will-fail-to-establish-democracy-or-lasting-peace-professor-merera-gudina","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.thereporterethiopia.com\/50262\/","title":{"rendered":"\u201cUpcoming Vote will Fail to Establish Democracy or Lasting Peace\u201d: Professor Merera Gudina"},"content":{"rendered":"

As Ethiopia moves toward its seventh National Election on June 1, 2026, the country finds itself at a high-stakes crossroads where democratic aspirations collide with deep-seated security challenges. While the government frames the upcoming vote as a milestone for institutional maturity, highlighting the introduction of digital voter registration and a surge of thousands of candidates, opposition groups and analysts warn of a “hollow victory.” <\/em><\/p>\n

The political landscape is fraught with concerns that the ongoing conflicts in Oromia and Amhara, coupled with the exclusion of Tigray from the electoral cycle,  and opposition figures argue that the election may render competitive voting physically impossible in large swathes of the country.<\/em><\/p>\n

A central point of contention is the National Election Board of Ethiopia\u2019s (NEBE) controversial “traffic light” security map. By categorizing constituencies as Green (safe), Yellow (minor concerns), or Red (high risk), the NEBE sought to provide operational clarity. However, this has met significant pushback from opposition parties who claim the “Green” designations are overly optimistic and rely too heavily on state-provided data. <\/em><\/p>\n

In a bid to resolve these discrepancies, the Board has deployed a joint monitoring task force\u2014comprising NEBE officials, political party representatives, and civil society members\u2014specifically to re-evaluate conditions in contested “Green” zones where the opposition maintains a free and fair environment is non-existent.<\/em><\/p>\n

Amidst this volatility stands Merera Gudina (Prof.), a man whose biography is inextricably woven into the fabric of modern Ethiopian politics.<\/em><\/p>\n

Merera is the current Chairman of the Oromo Federalist Congress (OFC) and a founding architect of the Medrek coalition, representing a formidable multi-ethnic challenge to the country’s historical power structures. A veteran of the struggle, he has long championed a “stem and branches” philosophy: the belief that Oromia is the indispensable heart of Ethiopia, and that its people must secure self-rule and shared-rule within a unified, democratic state rather than through secession.<\/em><\/p>\n

Today, as he navigates the shifting winds of the current administration, Merera remains a definitive voice of the “old guard.” His perspective is tempered by the over five decades of activism, leading him to argue that Ethiopia still lacks the genuine political will required for the deep-seated dialogue that could resolve its dynamic crises. <\/em><\/p>\n

The Reporter\u2019s Abraham Tekle sat down with Merera to get his views on current political developments, security dynamics, and policy debates in Ethiopia, offering a sobering assessment of the drawbacks facing the national vote. EXCERPTS:<\/strong><\/em><\/p>\n

The Reporter<\/em>: Ethiopia is preparing for its 2026 general election and your party will be taking part. How does the OFC assess the credibility and inclusiveness of the upcoming election, particularly in light of ongoing security concerns and questions about political space?<\/strong><\/p>\n

 <\/strong><\/p>\n

Merera Gudina (Prof.): <\/strong>Other than the ’97 election [referring to the 2005 National Election], in the history of elections in Ethiopia, no vote has ever even reached the stage of being a “competition.\u201d There are times where situations change due to the process. But the main issue is that a democratic and fair election, even one that reached the level of a competition on Ethiopian soil, was only that of the ’97 election.<\/p>\n

And because Ethiopia has been unable to do even that, it has failed to fulfill three basic national desires for the last 50 years. The first thing is that it hasn’t been possible to bring lasting peace and stability during those five decades. The other one is, for the last 50 years, the country hasn’t been able to create a democratic system. This “change” we\u2019ve been struggling for for 50 years has just been spinning us from one crisis to another crisis, and still, we are in another crisis now. It hasn’t been possible to get out of that.<\/p>\n

Thirdly, since most of the country’s wealth goes toward these conflicts\u2014because we can’t get out of the cycle of conflict\u2014it hasn’t been possible to bring meaningful economic development and prosperity. The people’s current standard of living and situation show this clearly.<\/p>\n

Before the upcoming election, we repeatedly asked the government\u2014along with other political parties\u2014for the basic changes needed for a free and fair election by raising basic issues related with the election. The government, instead of moving toward that, kept pushing in the direction it was already headed. Starting from the structure of the Election Board, to security issues, to the political space which is becoming extremely narrow\u2014we kept asking about these things. It didn\u2019t work out for us.<\/p>\n

The [OFC] Central Committee leadership convened a meeting with representatives from across the Oromia region and Addis Ababa to assess whether conditions permitted a free and fair election in our primary constituencies. Following these deliberations, we concluded that the political environment remained unfavorable. However, recognizing that current laws prevent us from boycotting the election entirely, and acknowledging that fundamental issues remain unresolved, we have decided to limit our participation and participate only in select areas of Addis Ababa\/Finfinne, maintaining our stance that this election is unlikely to foster national peace or stability.<\/p>\n

We are also closely monitoring the escalating situations in the Oromia and Amhara regions, while noting that Tigray continues to follow its own course. The impact of the vote on these dynamics will be revealed in a month and a half; however, our internal evaluation concludes that the upcoming election will fail to establish either a democratic system or lasting peace.<\/p>\n

There is a condition where a woman\u2019s abdomen swells as if she were pregnant, yet she never gives birth\u2014a phenomenon sometimes referred to as a “Satan’s pregnancy.\u201d Ethiopian democracy over the last 50 years has mirrored this. The “pregnancy” is visible; the struggle, the sacrifice, and the rhetoric are all present. Yet, there is no result. No tangible progress has been realized on the ground. Ultimately, democracy in Ethiopia did not emerge from politics nor elections.<\/p>\n

There are persistent rumors and reports suggesting the ruling Prosperity Party (PP) may opt out of certain constituencies to allow “government-affiliated” opposition parties to secure parliamentary seats. What is your assessment of the rumors regarding “seat-sharing” between the ruling party and specific invited opposition groups? <\/strong><\/p>\n

Ideally, an election is a process where candidates assert their superiority and seek a popular mandate; there is no greater civic engagement than this competition. However, if the process is one-sided\u2014driven by the government and parties brought in through negotiation\u2014it forces a dynamic where dissent is suppressed. Being told when to show support or when to withhold opposition directly contradicts the fundamental principles of a free, fair, and democratic election.<\/p>\n

Furthermore, an election represents the ultimate right of the people to establish their own government and choose their leaders. The current circumstances undermine these democratic foundations. As such, this process fails to break the cycle of the last 50 years; as previously stated, it remains an election where no tangible democratic progress is born.<\/p>\n

Does this strategy marginalize grassroots parties like the OFC?<\/strong><\/p>\n

It doesn\u2019t bring about any change. Significant political shifts have occurred in the past; for instance, during the 1997 election, our organization emerged as the primary opposition force. At that time, we secured approximately 53 to 57 parliamentary seats and 125 regional seats in Oromia. Despite these gains at both the regional and national levels, we were unable to effect substantive change for the people beyond amplifying their grievances. We faced immense challenges even in sustaining our own organization, illustrating that electoral success did not translate into tangible progress.<\/p>\n

Globally, parliaments\u2014the assemblies where people\u2019s representatives convene\u2014generally function at one of three levels. A strong parliament is characterized by its ability to pass robust legislation that improves citizens’ lives while actively monitoring the executive branch to ensure those laws are implemented. This oversight is the primary hallmark of a high-functioning representative body.<\/p>\n

At the second level, a parliament may still possess the desire and capability to pass quality legislation; however, it lacks the authority to hold the executive accountable. In this scenario, the executive branch implements laws at its own discretion. The third and lowest level of parliament is one that can neither pass effective laws nor monitor the executive. Its only remaining function is to serve as a forum where the grievances of the people can be heard.<\/p>\n

Therefore, a parliament that doesn\u2019t qualify as one of the above three cannot be referred to as a parliament.  <\/p>\n

Opposition parties have called for the NEBE to revise its assessment of security conditions and the map it recently published. How does the OFC respond to the NEBE\u2019s designation of “Green” zones in Oromia where your members still face arrests and other dangers as you describe it? How do you view this situation?<\/strong><\/p>\n

Since entering the political arena, we have engaged in discussions with the government, the National Election Board, and the diplomatic community. Our consistent assessment is that the necessary conditions for a free and fair election in Ethiopia do not exist. Given that the situation in the country\u2019s four major regions\u2014including Oromia, Amhara, and Tigray\u2014is far from conducive, participating under such circumstances serves no one’s interest. Instead, we have repeatedly advocated for essential pre-election measures, including a formal ceasefire, genuine negotiations, the expansion of political space, and, most critically, the resolution of security concerns.<\/p>\n

The government and the Election Board frequently maintain that “conducive conditions” are in place. However, as we live among the people, we know this is not the case. In previous cycles, I campaigned extensively through the Amhara region, in cities such as Bahir Dar, Dessie, and Kombolcha. In Oromia, my reach extended to the Kenyan border at Moyale, the Somali border at Ginnir, and across Harar, Jimma, Illubabor, and Wollega. I navigated not just the central hubs, but the most remote areas of the country.<\/p>\n

While elections were indeed conducted in the past, the environment for political mobilization was entirely different. Back then, we could move freely and campaign by gathering hundreds of thousands of supporters, often coordinating convoys of five to ten vehicles. It was under those specific operational conditions that we were able to conduct our outreach and engagement.<\/p>\n

So, how do you assess the Board\u2019s decision to designate the areas you described as dangerous as \u201cgreen\u201d?<\/strong><\/p>\n

At times, the government\u2019s assertions appear to be a joke. For instance, it is well-documented that bank robberies occur repeatedly in towns near the capital, and travelers on the road to Gojjam are frequently intercepted and robbed. Furthermore, widespread and recurring conflicts continue to plague areas such as Ambo, Metasbeia, Chobi, Jeldu, Ginde Beret, and Meta Robi.<\/p>\n

For the past five or six years, a mafia-like group\u2014allegedly involving elements of the government and other entities\u2014has been operating in the Ambo area. This group has been responsible for shocking public killings and the mistreatment of civilians. The formation of this group and its recent activities have caused significant outcry across Oromo areas.<\/p>\n

Given these prevailing conditions, a “green light” from the government or the Election Board does not reflect the actual security environment. The reality on the ground is well-known to the public and the government alike. While these facts may be obscured from the international community, the government remains fully aware of the situation; it is not a secret.<\/p>\n

The OFC recently also stated it would not field candidates in active conflict zones in Oromia. But beyond that, what specific alternative negotiation framework does your party propose to halt the violence in the region?<\/strong><\/p>\n

We have tried a lot to bring a lasting solution to the problems both locally and internationally. Several international organizations\u2014including the Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy (NIMD), the National Democratic Institute (NDI), and various South African institutions\u2014have facilitated extensive training for both government officials and opposition leaders. These high-level study tours to The Hague, Belfast, and Robben Island focused on democratic transitions, conflict resolution, and the dismantling of systemic oppression. These programs were designed to share global experiences on how other nations have successfully navigated long-standing internal conflicts and established democratic systems.<\/p>\n

Beyond international efforts, numerous domestic forums have been held across Ethiopia, from Adama to Arba Minch, involving political leaders at all levels. During the transition of power from the EPRDF era, current ministers and high-level officials participated in collective planning in Bishoftu to establish a unified vision for the country\u2019s future. Despite this wealth of training, planning, and shared knowledge, the core obstacle remains a lack of political commitment.<\/p>\n

I would say the government appears more focused on suppressing opposition than on maintaining stability through the promotion of democratic processes in the country.<\/p>\n

Security challenges\u2014including armed conflicts in multiple regions\u2014have raised concerns about voter access and electoral legitimacy. To what extent do you believe the current security environment could affect voter turnout and the legitimacy of the electoral process?<\/strong> What is your party\u2019s position on the ongoing tensions and how should the federal government manage relations with regional armed actors?<\/strong><\/p>\n

We have consistently informed the government, through public statements and various other channels, that the current situation requires a resolution. For instance, last year at Elilly Hotel, we held a week-long convention with the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF), prominent intellectuals, university professors, and Abba Gadaas. This gathering also included religious leaders, such as priests and sheikhs, who met for several days to deliberate on necessary actions for the Oromia region. Following these discussions, we submitted a formal proposal outlining sixteen key solutions; however, the government has since failed to respond or engage further.<\/p>\n

Throughout this period, we have remained vocal, expressing our concerns through both direct and indirect means. Our evaluation remains that the primary obstacle is the government\u2019s lack of political commitment. Until this fundamental issue is addressed, there is little hope for meaningful progress.<\/p>\n

The intensified political tensions, recent clashes, and internal divisions within the proscribed Tigray People’s Liberation Front, including the term extension of the Interim Administration of Tigray, have raised fears of renewed conflict despite the Pretoria Agreement. How do you assess the current relationship between the federal government and Tigray forces?<\/strong><\/p>\n

As you know, within the movement we call the Medrek Coalition, Arena Tigray is included. We maintain a collaborative approach; for example, we recently joined Arena Tigray in issuing a critique of the National Dialogue Commission. Our joint conclusion was that the current issues cannot be resolved through existing methods, as they lack the necessary political commitment. We must determine how to apply lessons from the past to move forward effectively, as continuing with outdated strategies will only hinder progress.<\/p>\n

Based on my observations and assessments, Tigray has essentially achieved a state of de facto<\/em> independence. It is an area where the federal government cannot exercise authority at will and where the Ethiopian National Defense Force lacks freedom of movement. Furthermore, the federal government’s claims of “enforcing the rule of law” are not recognized there. This situation has persisted for some time\u2014not through constitutional means, but in practice\u2014and it remains uncertain how much longer this lack of central control will continue.<\/p>\n

As the situation escalates, there appears to be a lack of sincere effort to alleviate the underlying problems, which are ultimately rooted in a struggle for power. The primary focus seems to be on maintaining dominance: whether the TPLF will retain its authority or whether the federal government will succeed in bringing the region under the same level of control as other states. Consequently, I see no genuine commitment to fully implementing the Pretoria Agreement or resolving negotiations regarding constitutional and territorial matters.<\/p>\n

As I have previously stated on social media, the region is currently characterized by a “witch politics of blame,” where each side holds the other responsible for the ongoing crisis. I leave it to the people of Tigray to determine which party\u2014the federal government or the TPLF\u2014bears the true responsibility for being the witch.<\/p>\n

What would be the most possible solutions to resolve these disputes?<\/strong><\/p>\n

The most viable path forward is to engage in negotiations rooted in democratic principles. To that end, the parties reached and signed the Pretoria Agreement. However, instead of prioritizing the implementation of this accord at every opportunity, there appears to be a consistent effort to undermine it. While both sides publicly affirm their commitment to the Pretoria Agreement, they simultaneously accuse one another of violating its terms.<\/p>\n

This contradiction is compounded by the fact that the full details of what was negotiated behind closed doors remain unknown to the public.<\/p>\n

While the signing of the agreement was publicized, the specific terms and the process by which they were reached remain opaque. For instance, the Ethiopian government negotiated and signed the accord directly with the TPLF, rather than with any other entity. It is therefore contradictory that the federal government, upon returning to Addis Ababa, demanded the TPLF obtain new legal certification from the Election Board. After negotiating with an entity previously designated as illegal, turning around to demand its re-legalization appears to be a vague and inconsistent stance.<\/p>\n

From my perspective, these shifting demands seem to be a search for excuses to stall the process. Similarly, while the TPLF officially accepted the various stages of disarmament requested by the federal government, the reality on the ground does not show that their forces are actually disarming. Consequently, it appears that both sides are engaging in political posturing rather than genuine implementation.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

As Ethiopia moves toward its seventh National Election on June 1, 2026, the country finds itself at a high-stakes crossroads where democratic aspirations collide with deep-seated security challenges. While the government frames the upcoming vote as a milestone for institutional maturity, highlighting the introduction of digital voter registration and a surge of thousands of candidates, […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":64,"featured_media":50263,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"editor_plus_copied_stylings":"{}","ngg_post_thumbnail":0,"footnotes":""},"categories":[1933,2078],"tags":[],"class_list":{"0":"post-50262","1":"post","2":"type-post","3":"status-publish","4":"format-standard","5":"has-post-thumbnail","7":"category-interview","8":"category-election-2026"},"acf":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.thereporterethiopia.com\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/50262","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.thereporterethiopia.com\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.thereporterethiopia.com\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.thereporterethiopia.com\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/64"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.thereporterethiopia.com\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=50262"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.thereporterethiopia.com\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/50262\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.thereporterethiopia.com\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/50263"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.thereporterethiopia.com\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=50262"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.thereporterethiopia.com\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=50262"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.thereporterethiopia.com\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=50262"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}