{"id":50609,"date":"2026-05-09T11:27:39","date_gmt":"2026-05-09T08:27:39","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.thereporterethiopia.com\/?p=50609"},"modified":"2026-05-09T11:27:52","modified_gmt":"2026-05-09T08:27:52","slug":"return-to-square-one-tigrays-parallel-administrations-bode-ill-for-fragile-horn","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.thereporterethiopia.com\/50609\/","title":{"rendered":"Return to Square One: Tigray\u2019s Parallel Administrations Bode Ill for Fragile Horn"},"content":{"rendered":"<p>On Tuesday, the newly reinstated Tigray regional council elected the TPLF chairman as president. The development means the region now has two presidents: Lt. General Tadesse Werede, who heads the Tigray Interim Administration (TIA), and Debretsion Gebremichael (PhD), who chairs the proscribed TPLF.<\/p>\n<p>Tuesday\u2019s voting also saw Kiros Hagos sworn in as speaker of the regional council, which had been suspended since the two-year war.<\/p>\n<p>During the discussions that led up to the appointment of Debretsion, council members and TPLF leaders criticized the federal government for failing to implement the terms of the 2022 Pretoria Agreement, which ended the war, and accused it of cutting Tigray off from federal budget subsidies and fuel supply networks.<\/p>\n<p>The vote came just a couple of weeks after TPLF, which was struck off the political party registry last year, held a general assembly in Axum. That meeting also featured criticism of the federal government, and TPLF leaders had hinted at their intentions to remove the \u201cunilaterally elected\u201d TIA president.<\/p>\n<p>Tadesse took over at the helm of the interim administration from Getachew Reda in April 2025, and last month the federal government announced its decision to extend the TIA\u2019s mandate, and Tadesse\u2019s presidency, by one year.<\/p>\n<p>However, the reinstatement of the regional council and the swearing in of the TPLF chairman are the culmination of a political leadership crisis that has been haunting Tigray since the war ended in late 2022. This week\u2019s developments have essentially created two separate regional administrations, once again stoking fears that Tigray might soon find itself embroiled in conflict.<\/p>\n<p>While these concerns are widely shared, political observers note the TPLF has maintained its control of the region throughout the tenure of the TIA, arguing that Getachew Reda and Tadesse Werede held no real power over Tigray\u2019s military apparatus and its zonal and woreda administrations.<\/p>\n<p>The TPLF\u2019s decision to revitalize the pre-war council and elect its president without the federal government\u2019s blessing seemingly brings everything back to square one. In 2020, the regional administration\u2019s decision to hold elections without federal approval was among the key events that led to war.<\/p>\n<p>What is more striking is that this time around, the TPLF is not even recognized as a political party as the National Election Board of Ethiopia (NEBE) revoked its license last year. Furthermore, the terms of the Pretoria Agreement grant the federal government the power to appoint the TIA president.<\/p>\n<p>This week\u2019s development could therefore have far-reaching implications for peace and security in the region, including the prospect of another bloody conflict that could feature the involvement of an array of foreign actors.<\/p>\n<p>The federal government has not yet broken its silence over the reinstatement of the Tigray regional council. Sources in Tigray told <em>The Reporter<\/em> that a fighter jet was spotted over Mekelle on Tuesday in what they believe was a reconnaissance mission.<\/p>\n<p>\u201cTadesse could have asserted his power and stopped both the federal government and TPLF before things got worse. But Tadesse remained silent, creating a conducive environment for both sides to pursue their divergent interests,\u201d said one insider, speaking anonymously.<\/p>\n<p>Multiple inside sources who spoke to <em>The Reporter<\/em> said the TPLF\u2019s move to elect its own regional president three years after the Pretoria Agreement is based on precise calculations. It coincides with the rebuilding and rearmament of its military force, and is linked to domestic and external alliances, they argue.<\/p>\n<p>High on the list of TPLF\u2019s priorities is the return of territories like Wolkait, Humera, and Raya, which are the subject of heated contention with the neighboring Amhara regional administration.<\/p>\n<p>\u201cTPLF believes the federal government intentionally denied the return of these territories to Tigray. They believe the informal forces controlling those disputed areas now are working with the federal government. TPLF will use any means, including armed conflict, to reassert control of these areas. It might then sit for negotiations with the federal government, with better bargaining power,\u201d said the leader of an opposition party in Tigray, who spoke to <em>The Reporter <\/em>anonymously.<\/p>\n<p>The region\u2019s opposition parties have been engaged in closed meetings in the days following Debretsion\u2019s appointment as president, analyzing whether to side with the federal government or the regional council.<\/p>\n<p>Meanwhile, the TPLF is reportedly moving to cement alliances with newly emerging forces in the region in its bid to wrest control of the disputed territories, according to people familiar with the situation.<\/p>\n<p>These forces include the Agaw Democratic Movement and the Kimant Democratic Movement. The first has a presence in Wag Hemra, and despite having previously come to an agreement with the Amhara regional administration and laid down its arms, has since resumed armed struggle, according to inside sources. The latter is linked to aspirations for the creation of a separate regional state for the Kimant ethnic group.<\/p>\n<p>Both groups operate in the disputed territories separating northern Gonder and western Tigray.<\/p>\n<p>\u201cThese forces have been supported financially and trained by TPLF forces. Some of them were trained by TPLF\u2019s Army 70, which is also active in Sudan. There are also other armed militants who are being supported by TPLF. These forces are now reviving in Benishangul and Gambela. TPLF has an alliance with OLA in Oromia and Fano in Amhara. Additionally, TPLF is seeking to initiate an armed struggle in the Somali region if ONLF gains land, and also backing another armed group in southern Ethiopia,\u201d said one source keeping a close eye on the developments.<\/p>\n<p>The source posits TPLF is leaning on these alliances for two reasons.<\/p>\n<p>\u201cFirst, TPLF knows it cannot win a war against the federal government alone. Secondly, TPLF has assessed that the Tigray public is not willing to mobilize for another bloody war alone. Therefore, TPLF is mobilizing other militants across the country, and from abroad,\u201d the source told <em>The Reporter<\/em>.<\/p>\n<p><img decoding=\"async\" class=\"alignnone size-full wp-image-50610\" src=\"https:\/\/www.thereporterethiopia.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/05\/IN-DEPTH-22.jpg\" alt=\"| The Reporter | #1 Latest Ethiopian News Today\" width=\"1200\" height=\"630\" title=\"| The Reporter | #1 Latest Ethiopian News Today\" srcset=\"https:\/\/www.thereporterethiopia.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/05\/IN-DEPTH-22.jpg 1200w, https:\/\/www.thereporterethiopia.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/05\/IN-DEPTH-22-300x158.jpg 300w, https:\/\/www.thereporterethiopia.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/05\/IN-DEPTH-22-686x360.jpg 686w, https:\/\/www.thereporterethiopia.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/05\/IN-DEPTH-22-150x79.jpg 150w, https:\/\/www.thereporterethiopia.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/05\/IN-DEPTH-22-768x403.jpg 768w, https:\/\/www.thereporterethiopia.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/05\/IN-DEPTH-22-696x365.jpg 696w, https:\/\/www.thereporterethiopia.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/05\/IN-DEPTH-22-1068x561.jpg 1068w\" sizes=\"(max-width: 1200px) 100vw, 1200px\" \/><\/p>\n<p>Others argue the TPLF\u2019s primary objective is to create immense pressure on the federal government from all directions, and force it to sign a new agreement.<\/p>\n<p>\u201cTPLF does not want the Pretoria Agreement. TPLF wants a new agreement, which reinstates its license, returns western Tigray to pre-war territorial status, and brings everything back to normal,\u201d said another political party leader from the region.<\/p>\n<p>TPLF\u2019s newfound appetite for alliances is not confined to Ethiopia\u2019s borders. The group has forged strong links with external actors, including Sudan, Egypt, and Eritrea. Eritrea was a key federal ally during the two-year war, and Eritrean troops stand accused of committing grave rights violations in Tigray. The Eritrean government also continues to maintain control of territories within Tigray.<\/p>\n<p>Meanwhile, TPLF\u2019s regional elections coincided with flaring tensions between Ethiopia and Sudan. Earlier this week, the federal government accused the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and Sudan\u2019s military government of providing support to \u201cTPLF mercenaries\u201d and violating Ethiopia\u2019s territorial integrity.<\/p>\n<p>The accusations were levied in a statement issued by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on Tuesday, and came a day after the Sudanese government accused Ethiopia and the UAE of orchestrating drone attacks on Khartoum International Airport and military sites.<\/p>\n<p>\u201cThe people of Ethiopia and Sudan share a historic and enduring bond of friendship. In recognition of the fraternal ties between the two nations, the Government of Ethiopia has exercised restraint and refrained from publicizing the grave violations of Ethiopia\u2019s territorial integrity and national security committed by some belligerents in the Sudanese civil war. These violations include, among others. The extensive use of TPLF mercenaries in the conflict,\u201d reads the statement.<\/p>\n<p>\u201cThe Sudanese armed forces have also provided arms and financial support to these mercenaries, thereby facilitating their incursions along Ethiopia\u2019s western frontier. The activities of TPLF mercenaries in Sudan are a matter of public record, and there is simple and credible evidence showing that Sudan is serving as a hub of various anti-Ethiopian forces. It is evident that these hostile actions, as well as the recent and earlier series of allegations by officials of Sudanese Armed Forces, are undertaken at the behest of external patrons seeking to advance their own nefarious agenda,\u201d it continues.<\/p>\n<p>Late Monday night, the Sudanese Foreign Minister and military spokesperson held a press conference where they stated they had \u201cconclusive evidence\u201d that drone attacks on Khartoum International Airport and several Sudanese military sites earlier in the day were launched from Bahir Dar.<\/p>\n<p>The Sudanese Foreign Minister said his country is \u201cready to enter into an open confrontation with Ethiopia.\u201d The Sudanese government has since recalled its ambassador to Ethiopia.<\/p>\n<p>The TPLF has issued a response to the federal government\u2019s accusations.<\/p>\n<p>\u201cAt a moment when the region demands restraint and constructive engagement, such claims serve only to inflame tensions and obscure the urgent need for accountability and genuine peace efforts, the TPLF has never engaged in, nor supported, any activities that undermine regional stability. The people of Tigray have been waiting for the full and faithful implementation of the CoHA, including the safe, voluntary and dignified return of IDPs to their homes. Our forces, including those in western Tigray, remain committed to ensuring that these returns are carried out peacefully, securely and in an orderly manner,\u201d it reads.<\/p>\n<p>The statement also reflected on the regional aspect of re-emerging conflicts.<\/p>\n<p>\u201cWe are deeply concerned by a consistent pattern of conduct that risks dragging Ethiopia \u2013 and by extension the wider region \u2013 into renewed instability and conflict. Escalatory rhetoric, external entanglements, opportunistic alignments with competing regional agendas reflect short-sighted calculations that endanger long-term peace. Such actions not only strain relations with neighboring countries but also risk entrenching Ethiopia in conflict that does not serve the interests of its people,\u201d it reads.<\/p>\n<p>Regarding Eritrea, the federal government of Ethiopia has repeatedly accused Asmara of supporting TPLF and anti-Ethiopian mercenaries. During the 2020-2022 war, Asmara was a staunch supporter of the Ethiopian government, but relations quickly soured after the peace deal.<\/p>\n<p>Today, TPLF and a faction dubbed \u2018Tsimdo\u2019 are alleged to be working closely with Asmara.<\/p>\n<p>Eritrea might also soon see sanctions levied on its leaders and military by the US under President Joe Biden in 2021 lifted as the Trump administration considers a rapprochement with Asmara in light of concerns about maritime routes.<\/p>\n<p>Reports over the past weeks indicate the US government is weighing the lifting of sanctions in return for a strategic alliance on the Red Sea, where Yemen\u2019s Houthis have threatened to shut down maritime traffic as a response to Washington\u2019s invasion of Iran.<\/p>\n<p>As a result, Eritrea could see itself break out of decades-long isolation and sanctions and transition into an important US ally in the region.<\/p>\n<p>Analysts warn this could have detrimental effects on Ethiopia.<\/p>\n<p>\u201cThe US is looking to relieve Eritrea of its sanctions following Egypt\u2019s lobbying for Asmara. Eritrea, Al-Burhan\u2019s SAF, and Egypt are working together against Ethiopia. They are also supporting armed forces and proxies against Ethiopia. They seek to stop Ethiopia from advancing its sea access agenda and force the country to negotiate over GERD. The US might even move to install a military base on the Eritrean coast in exchange for lifting sanctions. This will deter Ethiopia\u2019s efforts to gain access to the Red Sea,\u201d said a diplomat and geopolitical analyst who spoke to <em>The Reporter<\/em> anonymously.<\/p>\n<p>The diplomat asserts that with this external support, TPLF could be emboldened to push for Tigray\u2019s secession.<\/p>\n<p>\u201cThe ultimate move for TPLF, if it runs out of options to pressure the federal government, will be to announce Tigray as a de facto state. If this happens, its foreign allies will have a pretext to officially support the TPLF. Turkiye, Somalia, Egypt, Sudan, and Eritrea will use this pretext to stop Ethiopia from recognizing Somaliland, creating a tit-for-tat scenario,\u201d said the diplomat.<\/p>\n<p>Analysts agree that the situation in Sudan is also critical for what happens next in Ethiopia as well as the Horn of Africa.<\/p>\n<p>\u201cAddressing the forces behind Sudan\u2019s warring parties is critical to address issues in the Horn of Africa. Ethiopia is highly concerned that Al-Burhan\u2019s SAF is supported by the Muslim Brotherhood and Egypt. If this force becomes Sudan\u2019s government, Sudan will become a harbor for Islamic extremists forces while relentlessly attacking Ethiopia,\u201d said one analyst. \u201cThe US could stop the forces behind Sudan\u2019s warring parties, however Washington does not want to upset Egypt by opposing SAF. Trump continues appeasing El-Sisi to secure Egypt\u2019s backing in the way out of the Gaza crisis. The US also believes that as long as Eritrea is contained, what happens in Ethiopia is a domestic issue.\u201d<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>On Tuesday, the newly reinstated Tigray regional council elected the TPLF chairman as president. The development means the region now has two presidents: Lt. General Tadesse Werede, who heads the Tigray Interim Administration (TIA), and Debretsion Gebremichael (PhD), who chairs the proscribed TPLF. Tuesday\u2019s voting also saw Kiros Hagos sworn in as speaker of the [&hellip;]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":42,"featured_media":50611,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"editor_plus_copied_stylings":"{}","ngg_post_thumbnail":0,"footnotes":""},"categories":[1957],"tags":[],"class_list":{"0":"post-50609","1":"post","2":"type-post","3":"status-publish","4":"format-standard","5":"has-post-thumbnail","7":"category-in-depth"},"acf":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.thereporterethiopia.com\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/50609","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.thereporterethiopia.com\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.thereporterethiopia.com\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.thereporterethiopia.com\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/42"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.thereporterethiopia.com\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=50609"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/www.thereporterethiopia.com\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/50609\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":50612,"href":"https:\/\/www.thereporterethiopia.com\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/50609\/revisions\/50612"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.thereporterethiopia.com\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/50611"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.thereporterethiopia.com\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=50609"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.thereporterethiopia.com\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=50609"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.thereporterethiopia.com\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=50609"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}