Nearly four years after the signing of the Pretoria Cessation of Hostilities Agreement (CoHA), the Tigray region remains trapped in a fragile “no-war, no-peace” stasis. While the silence of heavy weaponry is a reprieve, the primary bottlenecks to lasting stability—namely the continued presence of Eritrean forces in border territories and the incomplete restoration of Tigray’s constitutional boundaries—persist.
Experts like Muauz Gidey (PhD), a researcher specializing in political science and peace, noted that this lingering ambiguity offers a tactical pause but risks a strategic disaster.
As the mandate of the Tigray Interim Administration (TIA) nears its expiration, the region faces a looming institutional vacuum. Without a permanent governance structure, the expert posits that a unified Tigray will severely be diminished, leaving the door open for external actors to plunge more damage to the local population.
The geopolitical map of the Horn of Africa has also been further redrawn by Ethiopia’s vocal pursuit of sovereign sea access, a move that has transformed the 2018 alliance between Addis Ababa and Asmara into one of visible, high-stakes tension. According to the expert, this rift heightens the risk of Tigray becoming a perennial battleground for proxy interests, especially as Eritrean troops remain entrenched in constitutionally defined areas of the region.
Internally, Tigrayan elites increasingly view the upcoming national elections as “non-democratic”, signaling that the possibility of holding a credible, inclusive election in the region remains virtually non-existent. Instead, political actors prioritize the withdrawal of foreign forces and the full implementation of the Pretoria framework towards stability.
Muauz is currently the lead researcher at the Tigray Institute of Policy Studies (TIPS) and a scholar at Mekelle University. He has also served as an Assistant Professor of Political Science at Aksum, Wollo, and Mekelle Universities.
In addition to his academic roles, he works as a consultant on peace and security matters and previously served as an Associate Professor at TIPS until the end of the war in Tigray. From 2024 to 2025, he worked as a Project Specialist for the UNDP Governance Reform Program.
Muauz describes a region trapped in a profound state of limbo that has left the Tigray population in a fractured state of mind, uncertain of their heading or what the future holds. According to him, this sense of drift is exacerbated by the looming end of the Interim Administration’s mandate and the presence of foreign forces, creating an institutional and psychological vacuum.
With the shifting rift between Addis Ababa and Asmara and the impracticality of upcoming elections, he added that the people remain caught in a geopolitical transition that offers no clear remedy or predictable path forward.
In an interview with Abraham Tekle of The Reporter, Muauz highlighted the fragility of the post-Pretoria landscape and several other critical issues grappling Tigray and its people. EXCERPTS:
The Reporter: As a university lecturer and political analyst closely following developments in Tigray, how do you assess the overall situation in the region?
Muauz Gidey (PhD): While there are many ways to describe the present moment, a defining feature is the emergence of a level of moral anxiety and instability that the region has not experienced before. By any standard, Tigray is undergoing a period of profound confusion that appears unprecedented in its history. Although the effects of the post-war period remain visible, there is a growing sense that direction has been lost. This uncertainty has reached a point where concerns are rising about whether people can still clearly recognize what serves their own interests.
The region’s political standing, social fabric, and overall outlook for the future are all under considerable strain. Beyond post-war challenges, this period stands out as a distinct historical phase marked by conditions not previously witnessed in Tigray’s past experience.
Nearly four years on from the Pretoria Agreement, many argue that a “no-war, no-peace” state persists. In your view, what are the primary bottlenecks preventing the full implementation of the agreement?
At the center of the current situation are three principal actors: the Ethiopian government, the Eritrean government, and the Tigray forces. Within the TPLF, a division has emerged between political and military wings, further complicating the landscape. Additional actors, including the Fano forces, also play a role. However, the primary parties remain the Ethiopian government and the TPLF, as they are the main signatories to the Pretoria Agreement.
From the perspective of the federal government, there appears to be a lack of practical commitment to implementing the Pretoria Agreement in good faith. Instead, there are patterns of deliberate and systematic postponement—delays, stalling, weakening, and gradual alteration of the agreement’s original intent. This is significant because peace agreements do not automatically produce peace. Even what is termed “sustainable peace” requires consistent, incremental progress built on trust and tangible actions.
The agreement itself also carries structural limitations, including elements of power assimilation. At the same time, delays and internal divisions within Tigray—exacerbated by federal actions—have hindered implementation. Key provisions remain unfulfilled, preventing the existence of national cohesion including the return of territories to regional administration, the resettlement and rehabilitation of displaced populations, and the application of transitional justice mechanisms for accountability and reconciliation. Rather than advancing these commitments, actions taken have contributed to undermining the legitimacy and public standing of Tigray’s political leadership, particularly the interim administration, thereby deepening internal tensions.
Within Tigray, divisions inside the TPLF, especially among those identifying as a “political-military wing,” have also shaped the current situation. A focus on power and internal positioning, alongside concerns over governance and accountability, has created vulnerabilities that external political maneuvers have exploited. This has further complicated the political environment.
As a result, Tigray’s political forces now face a fragmented reality. The interim administration led by Getachew Reda had been expected to facilitate political transition, open dialogue, and expand media space. But since it was forced out by power, Tigray is now split—one side looking toward the north, the other toward the south; one centered in Addis Ababa, and the other centered in the Amhara region and Asmara.
By creating this environment, where the military wing has also emerged, Tigray is in a state of internal division. Because of the problems created primarily by the federal government and secondary actors within the TPLF’s political-military wing and the former interim administration, forces that were once marginalized have now become the center of gravity, both locally and nationally.
So, the fate of the continuation of the Pretoria agreement is being decided by these people, and an environment has been created where Fano and Shabia (Eritrea) are returning to the center of the stage
What is the underlying advantage for the federal government in this scenario?
If you take the federal government as an actor that felt a sense of responsibility and accountability, it would have taken actions that were beneficial. However, the federal government is not like that. This is because, after looking at Tigray as an enemy for a long time, it has not viewed Tigray as an actor that is returning to reconstruction and reconciliation based on the peace agreement or an international process. Instead, it views Tigray as an existential threat.
Looking at conflicts in different parts of the country, the approach of the federal government—particularly under Abiy Ahmed—appears increasingly personalized. The objective of weakening Tigray and rendering it politically irrelevant has been a recurring theme. During the Pretoria process, Tigray’s representatives, including Getachew Reda and Tadesse Werede, adopted an open and conciliatory stance. Their willingness to engage drew criticism from some quarters, who questioned how they could embrace a process following the scale of violence experienced.
Despite this, they approached the negotiations with a forward-looking, cooperative posture.
In contrast, remarks attributed to the Prime Minister—characterizing such engagement as “prisoner behavior”—have been perceived as dismissive and diminishing. This reflects a broader tendency to frame the situation through suspicion and adversarial thinking. In this context, the absence of good faith from the outset has contributed to the creation of internal friction.
The Pretoria Agreement, in principle, establishes parity between its signatories. However, in practice, this balance has been strained. Tigray’s political actors have, over time, been repositioned from equal partners to increasingly subordinate roles within the evolving political framework. This shift has been reinforced by internal fragmentation, as competing alignments emerged, including links toward Isaias Afwerki and other external or federal centers of influence.
These dynamics are not solely attributable to the federal government. Divisions within Tigray’s own leadership, marked by limited coordination, internal rivalry, and concerns over accountability, have also played a role. Such conditions have reduced collective agency and made political actors more vulnerable to external pressures.
There is a saying that ‘those who seek to save the fish by taking it out of the sea have already failed to drain the sea.’ Having failed to break the spirit of the Tigrayan people, as genocide powerhouse, Isaias Afwerki said after the signing of the Pretoria Agreement “Tekolifna” (an expression used for an “entrapped” progress), the current strategy appears to be one of fragmentation, driving one faction toward the influence of Asmara while the other retreats into a ‘prisoner’ mindset.
As a result, Tigray has experienced a decline in cohesion, unity, and political leverage. It is increasingly perceived less as a central actor and more as a marginalized force, struggling to maintain basic governance and services. This weakening has broader implications, as it is seen by some as a signal to other regions. In this framing, Tigray’s trajectory is used as an example within a wider effort to consolidate power and deter similar challenges in the Amhara Regional State or elsewhere.
The mandate of the Interim Administration of Tigray is nearing its end. What are the legal and political risks of an institutional vacuum if a permanent governance structure is not established soon?
What’s taken as a mistake by the Tigrayan political figures is mixing the interim government for an interim state, as there is no interim state in Tigray but an interim government. This is because restoring Tigray to its constitutional status implies that the Tigray Regional State is a state. Unless you change or revise the constitution, that state is a valid entity and continues to exist.
What was dismantled? The government that was formed following that election, which was cited as the trigger for the war, was the one deemed illegal. However, the constitutional foundation of Tigray cannot be dissolved or overturned. Therefore, until a legal government is established based on the constitution, having a “government” is a necessity.
But what is being done now? As I said before, the goal seems to be ensuring Tigray lacks any political posture or cohesion. This format, which is different from all other regions, was created by the political elite that established this constitutional order. While it’s thought to share equal rights and status with other regions on paper, the current design for Tigray is intended to keep it from having a stable government.
Now, when you consider the issue of Tigray, whether this interim government continues its power or not, or whether it’s changed, the core issue is that Tigray has already lost its agency. Particularly the current situation with the reigning president, Tadesse. The situation between Tadesse and the TPLF is different; Tadesse is an army man, and he was in the army during the struggle. He has a certain portion of the political elite and the politico-military wing behind him. So, further, this is divided between the two. There is a major division playing out between Addis Ababa and Asmara. Now, there is also a present dynamic, an emerging fault line. If the TPLF appoints someone else next time, what will that bring? It will bring further factionalism, splitting like an amoeba that brings another factionalism.
And another possibility is the recent formation of the TPF [Tigray Peace Forces] and there was also a new military force that recently joined the TPF that was previously unknown. In addition, other new military elements could also continue to emerge. This is all within the making and deliberate design of the federal government
In your expertise, what possible measures would the federal government take in this regard? How does it affect the region’s ability to negotiate with the federal government?
I think it would continue to escalate the situation by assigning one controversial person to do the dirty job exactly like what the colonial powers used to do. They sit in the metropolis and appoint someone who has no legitimacy and is controversial. That person’s existence depends entirely on the presence of those who appointed them and their loyalty to them. Therefore, the source of power, influence, legitimacy, and strength comes from somewhere else rather than from the people.
This is exactly what they did with Tadesse when they gave him eight executing points to fulfill and in evaluating him in their completion. So, the appointee says, “It’s the federal government that appointed me,” just as Getachew has been doing. He cannot do anything differently because he’s stuck in a trap.
But I can say with 100 percent certainty that they appoint someone without legitimacy or acceptance, whose group is coerced, who cannot mobilize a dominant force, who cannot unite Tigray, or who cannot initiate stability. By doing so, they perpetuate the problem. Otherwise, if you think a military force will be stationed there, I think that would be damaging to the federal government itself, and it would only transition Tigray into a worse cycle of war.
The current military force in Tigray, its strength, form, and stance, is divided; half is with Fano, half is with the Eritrean government but this would lead to a full-fledged war. I don’t think this path will be chosen because there is no international support for it right now, as the world faces a fuel crisis. So, given the current situation, that’s not a foreseeable future. However, what they are doing instead is political manipulation.
If there were a healthy mindset, what would be better is not to marginalize the TPLF, but to restore their legal status and re-engage them. Re-engagement is key. Their alignment with Eritrea is a re-engagement by its nature as part of an existential necessity. So, the federal government should build a pact to remove their reason for working against it. Then, since the federal government is for everyone, you create a new council where its members, people in Addis Ababa, and Tigrayans everywhere have an equal voice, and then work toward a future election.
If this kind of work is done, it could at least bring a model of stability to Ethiopia and give the government some breathing room. But they aren’t giving it any breathing room as it didn’t seem to need it.
As a nation, we are months away from holding a general election. There is also a question of whether elections are the “remedy” in addressing the country’s issues. Can we take the national election as the Alpha and Omega of all the solutions and bring a lasting peace to the country?
It never happened before and it will not happen now. For example, in this process called National Dialogue and Reconciliation—they talk about transitional justice, reconciliation, and the old way of doing things. Then they bring in international mediation. Beyond those who were displaced, persecuted, and harmed by this war and genocide, they try to fix the structures that caused the harm. They try to dress it up in democratic institutions, changing their scent, color, and appearance through a process. But this won’t solve the problems from the root.
During the EPRDF era, elections were treated like a political ritual. After four or five years of governing, they’d reach the end of their term, and instead of genuinely addressing the public’s concerns or the weaknesses seen over those years, they’d just put on a new mask and start the process over again. A true election should be a time to remove those who failed over five years, learn from mistakes, and create new political alternatives, strategies, leadership, and ideas. But instead, it was just a political ritual.
In this current era, they’ve taken this process of ritualization and added extremely massive violence. In the current situation, holding an election is just a way to create a high-level distraction and take things to another level. Look at the results they produce—they look at the results of the genocide and say, “Look, what we did here and there after committing similar genocide in Amhara and ritualize it with grand resort projects.
They don’t base anything on reality. In practical terms, is the issue of the ballot what the people of Amhara, Tigray, or Afar need right now? Or is it an engagement that can solve the issue of living in peace, economic issues, health issues, and social issues, putting many young people in the deepest trouble. So, elections, in and of themselves, aren’t noble; they are a tool. They are an instrument meant to bring public safety, security, and greater happiness for the people.
Democracy isn’t some sacred, holy thing—it’s a means to an end. In a situation where those goals can’t be met, even if you hold the “most democratic” election, we already know the results. The same people will just elect themselves. What does that achieve? It just ritualizes tyranny and dictatorship under the guise of democracy for the sake of propaganda consumption.
The National Dialogue Commission recently announced it is gathering agenda items from the Tigrayan community in Addis Ababa. Do you see it as a possible solution for the existing problems surrounding the region?
I took the calling as a sort of forming a government-in-exile or a cabinet formation type of thing. First of all, under what legal mechanism is this National Dialogue empowering and establishing the Tigray interim government? Who gave them this responsibility? Under what authority or mandate did this come? It’s actually quite laughable. Because the reason a National Dialogue Commission is needed is to reconcile Tigray with Ethiopia, and Ethiopia with itself.
While we are still in a process where we haven’t even begun to reconcile these issues, I don’t understand where the authority or the power to form a government comes from. Secondly, the fact is that the Tigray that the constitution recognizes, the Tigray where elections are held, why is that? It’s because of law, order, and a law-enforcement body guided by law and order. That law-enforcement body, in turn, is meant to ensure the universal application of laws, regulations, and authority over all citizens across the entire territory of Tigray. This is what authority and law mean.
If this is the case, the territory of Tigray is not “fully secured”, the people are not “fully settled”, so who is “constituting” the election to be held? This is the first thing. Secondly, there is a military force within Tigray, and another military force supported by the federal government has been created. Therefore, in a situation where there is no legitimate monopoly of violence, where a region does not have full control over its territory, where there is a crisis of legitimacy or a crisis of government acceptance, where national consensus and unity are lacking, and where basic human security and basic needs are not met in Tigray—how can an election be held?
This is simply “white-washing” the crisis to prevent another Pretoria Agreement type of situation from happening and just pushing an agenda. The real issue that needs to be asked for the people of Tigray and the people of Ethiopia is that an election is needed for a reason, for a purpose. That purpose, however, is a human rights issue that involves people who are suffering and being counted in the hundreds of thousands; that is what needs to be delivered first.
Are you suggesting that there is no possibility of holding elections in Tigray?
Yes, there is no chance of holding an election in the region given the current situation.I would say it is impossible.
Reportedly, the relationship between Addis Ababa and Asmara has shifted from “alliance” to visible tension. How does this rift between change the security calculus for the Tigray region?
Any alliance with Eritrea puts Tigray into entanglement. So, what’s happening now is that we’ve entered into a “multiple entanglement” and Tigray has become stuck in something we didn’t even want. Notably, Tigray is entangled with Eritrea in terms of geography, in climate, and also entangled in war, culture, and life—and even in the economy. Now, taking a stance with your genocider adversary by itself brings multiple crises. It brings a crisis of identity and also a moral crisis. Doing this is also a process of erasing the things we use to define as part of our history.
So, bringing all these things together is very dangerous and totally suicidal. This is because they are a force that has committed a historic betrayal and treason over Tigray. And, looking back to the dispute Shabia has with Abiy Ahmed is because he isn’t able to finish destroying Tigray from the collective frustration it causes by tearing Tigray’s land apart, which is what he’s currently expressing it in various ways.
When you look at his rhetoric, we are Ethiopians and he doesn’t have any affection for Ethiopia. And for him, the worst form of Ethiopianism is being Tigrayan. And again, the worst expression of “Tigray-ness” is the TPLF. So, through these overlapping lenses, there is an insatiable desire to eliminate Tigray. So, you’re projecting this through these overlapping lenses—what are you trying to achieve or prove? It’s very dangerous.
No matter what happens, an “inter-corridor rebellion” or external issues won’t help or support you. They want to break you down, use your strength, and then break you again in the way that you cannot return to what you were before. So, the alliance is totally suicidal. However, you have to go in a way that maximizes your own interests without completely subduing them there. To move within that framework is a logical trap. It creates a “hermeneutics of despair”—leading people down a path followed by those who have lost all hope. And that is very dangerous.
What realistic diplomatic pathways exist to ensure their withdrawal as per the Pretoria Agreement or other means? And, what is the way out in general?
The current political landscape between the TPLF and the federal government requires a dialectical transcendence to move beyond existing hostilities toward a constructive transformation. This shift necessitates an all-inclusive “New Deal” or negotiation platform that integrates all major actors, including Eritreans and Fano, to ensure no single group remains a potential spoiler. Moving from an “either/or” binary to a “both/and” logic is essential for creating a political reality where diverse interests are recognized and integrated rather than being manipulated against one another.
Furthermore, leverage preservation through cohesive internal unity is required to strengthen bargaining power and increase the ability to influence national outcomes. Internal structures must be strengthened to allow for strategic pivoting while ensuring the region maintains its own political agency rather than becoming a messenger for external interests.
Finally, clear international signaling must project that the region is not a pawn to be moved at will. Systematically implementing these strategies serves as the primary entry point for a dialectical transformation, forcing a shift from divide and rule tactics toward genuine, balanced engagement. By projecting strong political agency, the region can ensure that international and domestic actors view it as an indispensable partner in any lasting settlement.
Finally, based on your understanding of the region’s geopolitics and Ethiopia’s ambition for sea access, how do you see Tigray’s role within this evolving geopolitical landscape?
Geography offers strategic advantage, but if mismanaged it turns into a point of collision where competing forces converge, making the region a central battleground. The current situation reflects what is described as “ambiguous realism,” where engagement is neither idealistic nor destructive, but shaped by uncertainty and calculation. Within this context, key actors are compelled to interact—whether openly or indirectly—creating space for political maneuvering. This dynamic presents an opportunity, but it requires moving beyond narrow interests and individual ambitions.
Ethiopia’s debate over Red Sea access illustrates this ambiguity, with positions oscillating between outright rejection and highly charged nationalist rhetoric. Meanwhile, Tigray has maintained historical continuity on territorial issues, using silence or neutrality as a strategic signal. At the same time, this moment is seen as a critical turning point.
If the current period of relative peace is not utilized, both internal and external threats may intensify. There is a perception that Eritrean leadership is pursuing a calculated strategy to capitalize on this window to weaken and destroy Tigray, viewing it as a rare historical opportunity. The same is true with the federal government using the opportunity to dismantle TPLF and crushing Tigray at the very beginning of the outbreak of the war. So, this creates a scenario in which Tigray risks being crushed by both sides for a similar objective.
