As war escalates in the Middle East and tensions involving Iran deepen, global attention is shifting—rapidly and predictably—away from Sudan. This is familiar terrain. Sudan has long suffered from cycles of visibility and abandonment—noticed only at moments of extreme crisis, then eclipsed as geopolitical priorities shift.
But this time, the cost of neglect may be irreversible.
Nearly three years into this devastating war, Sudan is no longer simply in conflict. It is in the process of disintegration. Millions have been displaced. Famine is spreading. Civilians are systematically targeted. The institutions of the state are collapsing in real time.
And yet—precisely at this moment of global distraction—a narrow but real window of opportunity has opened.
Paradoxically, the very crises drawing attention away from Sudan may also be creating space for movement. The middle powers deeply entangled in Sudan’s war are now increasingly preoccupied with conflicts closer to home in the broader Middle East.
And yet, importantly, they have not disengaged.
Indications suggest that cooperation within the Quad framework continues. The United States remains actively engaged, working to secure a humanitarian truce through direct engagement with the belligerents and within the United Nations Security Council framework.
There are other encouraging developments.
The United Nations has appointed a new envoy, bringing renewed diplomatic energy. Multilateral coordination mechanisms are aligning better, even if more is expected. International NGOs engaged in Track II diplomacy continue their support. Sudanese civic formations are sustaining their organizing for peace.
All of these strands are now converging.
They converge at the international conference on Sudan in Berlin on April 15. This is why Berlin matters. It is not just another diplomatic meeting. It is a moment where Sudanese political coherence and international convergence may finally meet.
The central question is not whether the world will save Sudan—it will not—but whether Sudanese themselves can rise to this moment with the clarity and courage required to save their country.
It should be recalled that South Sudan seceded because of the failure of the Sudanese to agree on a governance framework that would ensure inclusivity, equality of citizenship and dignity for all Sudanese. But even with the secession of South Sudan, that failed vision has inspired marginalized regions of the country and patriotic Sudanese throughout the country. The failure that led to the secession of South Sudan threatens to repeat itself. That must be prevented.
Sudan’s war has gone too far to be treated as business as usual. It is no longer a conventional civil war. It has evolved into a regionalized system of conflict. Diplomacy that treats it as purely internal has failed. But external convergence alone is not enough. Without Sudanese political coherence, every diplomatic effort will fail.
Berlin must not become a stage for political theater. What is required is a minimum national consensus anchored in survival.
This demands operational patriotism. Not rhetorical patriotism. Not symbolic patriotism.
Operational patriotism.
A patriotism that places the survival of the state above factional interests and prioritizes civilian protection.
At its core, this means three commitments:
First, an immediate humanitarian truce. Second, guaranteed humanitarian access and civilian protection. Third, a serious political pathway toward civilian-led transition within a constitutional framework that ensures inclusivity and equality for all citizens without discrimination..
These are the minimum conditions for Sudan’s survival. Without them, Sudan will not hold.
The international community must also confront its failures: too many actors, too little coordination. Berlin must mark a break. But even a coordinated effort will fail without Sudanese convergence.
This must change. Now.
Sudan is at a moment where delay equals defeat.
What is being lost is not only lives, but the idea of Sudan as a shared political community. Berlin is a dividing line between two futures. The difference will not be decided in conference rooms alone. It will depend on whether Sudanese actors act with unity of purpose.
That is the challenge. That is the opportunity. The war must end. Not someday. Not eventually. Now.
Francis Deng (PhD) is a former UN Special Representative on Internally Displaced Persons. Abdul Mohamed is a former senior UN official who has been involved in mediation efforts in the Horn of Africa for many years.
Contributed by Francis Deng & Abdul Mohamed
