Haftu Kiros, deputy president of the Democratic Solidarity Tigray (Solidarity) Party, speaks to The Reporter’s Amanuel Jemberu in an extensive interview examining the political, legal, and institutional crisis unfolding in post-war Tigray. In the wide-ranging discussion, Haftu argues that the region has descended into a state of lawlessness and constitutional breakdown, contending that the mandate of the administration elected in 2020 has long expired and can no longer claim legitimacy.
He calls for new regional elections, questions the legal standing of the TPLF, critiques the structure and inclusiveness of the Interim Administration, and reflects on the political consequences of the Pretoria Agreement.
The interview also explores shrinking civic space in Tigray, media restrictions, alleged tactical alignments with Eritrea, and the broader geopolitical tensions shaping the Horn of Africa. EXCERPTS:
The Reporter: How do you assess the current situation in Tigray and the region’s political condition after the war?
Haftu Kiros: Tigray today is a region whose condition is clear to everyone. There is very little hidden about what is happening there. Historically, Tigray has been known as a place distinguished by adherence to law and constitutional order, especially in implementing systems of governance. It was also known as a region where people of different faiths coexisted with mutual respect.
The people traditionally possessed a strong sense of statehood, constitutional culture, and civic morality. However, despite that history, what we see today in Tigray is a situation dominated by lawlessness. It has become a place where any gangster can come and claim governmental authority, confiscate citizens’ property, violate their rights, or declare territory as their own. If there is any place today where the fundamental rights of people are openly violated, it is Tigray.
At this point, Tigray has become a place where it is difficult to think confidently about tomorrow because people are uncertain about today’s reality. Tigrayan youth are leaving the region almost entirely. Except for those who may have no means of escape, very few people genuinely wish to remain living in Tigray under the current conditions.
What is your view of the 2020 Tigray regional election and the legitimacy of the government formed through it?
Elections were held in Tigray in 2012 E.C., and I was personally there at the time. If I remember correctly, around 2.8 million Tigrayans participated in that election. I considered that election legitimate because it was conducted constitutionally.
The Ethiopian Constitution clearly states that citizens must renew the mandate of a governing authority every five years through elections. That is the constitutional contract between citizens and government. Therefore, any government elected through that process receives a mandate only for five years. There is no constitutional provision allowing that mandate to continue indefinitely or to be renewed automatically without another election.
The conflict that later emerged in Tigray had many causes. It is difficult to identify a single fundamental cause because there were political, economic, and security-related problems both nationally and within Tigray itself. However, disputes surrounding governance legitimacy and elections became one of the immediate causes of the conflict.
What is your interpretation of the Pretoria Agreement and its political implications?
The Pretoria Agreement was signed only after immense destruction had already occurred, after many Ethiopian and Tigrayan youths had died, and after extensive property damage. The fundamental result and purpose of the agreement was peace—stopping the war and ending hostilities. Beyond that, it did not create an entirely new political arrangement.
In my view, the agreement effectively dissolved the government that had been elected in 2012 E.C. There is no such thing as a government being stored somewhere for four or five years and later “reactivated.” Sometimes even the TPLF itself refers to the matter as “unfinished” or “suspended” work, but I do not understand that characterization.
A governmental mandate is limited to five years. There is no constitutional mechanism that allows a government to pause its authority and later resume it after years have passed. Therefore, it is not possible to say that the government elected in 2012 E.C. can now simply be restored or reactivated.
As far as I understand, some people wanted to extend the TPLF’s mandate by another five years, but the question is: until when would that continue? The election was held six years ago. The political context has now completely changed.
What should happen politically in Tigray now?
What should happen now is very clear: a new election must be conducted in Tigray.
Even if we assume that the Pretoria Agreement never existed, the legal mandate of the previous administration has already expired. Therefore, constitutionally, a fresh election is necessary.
An election is not merely a formality or a procedural exercise. Elections are meant to capture new political voices, new alternatives, and the evolving interests of the people. Over the course of five years, major socioeconomic and political transformations take place, especially in a country like Ethiopia.
Generational changes also occur. Young people who were not eligible to vote five years ago are now voters. That means new political voices have emerged. Elections at both the federal and regional levels are supposed to reflect these changing realities and allow the public’s evolving interests and political preferences to be heard.
You have argued that Tigray’s current political structure no longer reflects public opinion. Why do you believe the existing administration lacks legitimacy and representation?
Whether at the federal or regional level, elections are meant to hear new political voices, alternatives, and the interests of the people; they are not merely procedures.
Let me state one fact. I was formerly the administrator of the Southern Tigray Zone, before I was forced out at gunpoint. I was literally removed under the barrel of a gun. Prior to that, I was serving there.
At the time, there were 16 representatives from that zone. How many of them are still participating now? Fewer than four; definitely fewer than four. As far as I know, only two are still there. The remaining 12 elected public representatives have either been replaced by other individuals, and that is precisely why I said lawlessness exists. They can appoint or select whomever they want—it doesn’t matter—but it is not the voice of the people. They are simply filling seats with individuals to occupy positions.
I am certain that if we examine the other zones, the situation is no better. First of all, Tigray currently has no rule of law and no functioning system. If there is any region today where someone can arrive carrying a gun and strip you of your rights through force, it is Tigray.It saddens me deeply.
What is your assessment of the Tigray Interim Administration and its ability to function independently?
Even from the beginning, the Interim Administration was never an independent institution. That was one of our main criticisms. According to the Pretoria Agreement, the Interim Administration was supposed to be inclusive. It was meant to incorporate different political voices and stakeholders.
But the reality on the ground was different. The Interim Administration was not inclusive at all. In fact, the same group—the TPLF—completely dominated it. For example, if you were to tell Debretsion today to continue in power, there would be nothing difficult about simply continuing with the same cabinet that exists under the current Interim Administration. That is because the Interim Administration itself functioned like a puppet structure from the start.
What I mean is that it was the TPLF leadership that determined the cabinet. They would say, “appoint this person as deputy,” and it would happen; “appoint that person as bureau head,” and it would happen. So even previously, the Interim Administration was never truly alive or independent, and now its weaknesses have become even more apparent.
Was this also the case during Getachew Reda’s presidency?
Not entirely. It is true that even during that period the group created many difficulties. However, during Getachew’s time, there were many new developments inside Tigray. For example, there was greater freedom of speech. Media outlets expanded significantly. Leaders could be criticized, evaluated, and questioned publicly. Different sectors could openly discuss issues. These were developments that had not existed under the previous system in Tigray.
Previously, such things were simply not allowed. Power was concentrated within the TPLF central committee and executive committee–and I say this as someone who was also part of the TPLF Central Committee myself. That is where the problems began.
When you are a leader in public administration, you are supposed to be a servant of the people. I have said this before: some people think being a president is something grand. It is not. Literally, being a president means carrying the people’s chair. It means serving the public and delivering services to society. Before Getachew, the system did not function in that spirit.
So during Getachew’s period, there were meaningful changes. But now, the media outlets that had newly emerged and opened up have all relocated to Addis Ababa because they were told there would be “zero tolerance.” Most independent media have left. The only outlets remaining there now are DimtsiWeyane and Television Tigray, which function as instruments of the TPLF.
That said, even during Getachew’s presidency, I cannot say the administration was inclusive to the extent it should have been. There were signs and indications of change, yes, but I would not describe it as fully inclusive. Nor can I say it was fully functional. From the lower levels up to the top leadership, the institutional structure was still not operating at the level it was supposed to.
Ethiopia is located in a highly turbulent region marked by proxy conflicts and shifting alliances. There are also discussions surrounding historical ties between the TPLF and Eritrea, as well as what some describe as emerging regional alignments. At the same time, the TPLF appears to send mixed signals, on one hand expressing willingness to negotiate with the federal government, while on the other advancing narratives that seem to regionalize the issue beyond Ethiopia. What is your assessment of these developments?
What you said is true. First of all, we need to clarify what kind of force this actually is. For that matter, I do not even call it the TPLF anymore, because the TPLF is no longer a legally recognized political organization. It no longer has legal standing. They may claim to be legal, but they are not, and that is precisely why I say lawlessness exists in Tigray today.
Fundamentally, we are one country. I believe Tigray is a regional state within Ethiopia, and Ethiopia is its country. Tigray is part of the federation. Since we are governed under a federal system, every region operates within that framework. Even if the system were unitary rather than federal, Ethiopia would still be one country and Tigray would remain part of it.
When the TPLF was a legal political actor and occupied a strong position within Ethiopia’s political order, it operated under the Constitution adopted at that time. That constitutional framework legally defined the political system. But now, they are no longer operating within that constitutional framework.
Under the Constitution, there are institutions established at the national level, and every regional state is part of those institutions. The Pretoria Agreement itself also says governance should proceed according to law and the Constitution. Some political ideas were included in the agreement, but fundamentally it is centered on constitutional order and legality. That is where legitimacy comes from. One cannot simply stand up and declare oneself a legal organization.
Whether it is a political organization or even a business organization, legitimacy in Ethiopia comes through Ethiopian law and legal procedures. What currently exists in Tigray does not derive its legitimacy from that framework. That is why I refer to the TPLF as a “group.”
You seem to suggest that the group now views itself as operating outside Ethiopia’s constitutional framework. Why do you believe that?
What this group is doing now reflects a mindset in which Ethiopia, a country it once embraced while it held strong political influence, is now being treated almost like a neighboring state rather than its own country.
The Ethiopian public needs to understand this clearly. In the thinking of this group today, Ethiopia is viewed as a neighbor, while Tigray is being treated as though it were already a sovereign state.
One reason for this is the statements they themselves have made. They have said they have “suspended” relations with the federal government, while simultaneously saying, “if the federal government wants to talk to us, we are ready.” There are many contradictions in these positions.
This group currently lacks legal legitimacy. Political authority must come from a legitimate legal body, and political power ultimately originates from the people. The TPLF’s authority today no longer comes from the people.
Even the so-called regional council currently operating in Tigray is illegal. I have already explained how people are inserted into the council arbitrarily rather than through lawful representation. The group claims legal status both as a governing body and as a political organization, but where does that legality come from?
You also raised concerns about the group’s external engagements and regional posture. What specifically worries you?
This issue goes beyond internal politics. One cannot simply declare statehood overnight. Sovereignty involves international legal and diplomatic dimensions.
What the TPLF is effectively doing now is behaving as though Tigray can independently suspend relations with the federal government and function as a separate entity. But foreign policy is a matter of state sovereignty; it is the responsibility of a country, not a regional administration.
Some TPLF elites attempt to frame Tigray’s situation through comparisons with Somaliland, but I do not believe Tigray should be viewed through a Somaliland lens. Tigray must be seen through the lens of Ethiopia.
Historically, invasions into Ethiopia have largely come through the northern corridor, and the people of Tigray have historically fought and sacrificed in defense of Ethiopian sovereignty and identity. Yet now, the TPLF is effectively telling the people that Tigray may not continue within Ethiopia if the group decides otherwise.
The group now signals that it can simultaneously maintain relations with Eritrea, Sudan, Egypt, and others, while also negotiating with the Ethiopian federal government whenever it chooses.
What is your view of the alleged alignment between the TPLF and Eritrea despite the destruction caused during the war?
When we observe current developments, there appears to be some form of alignment emerging between the TPLF and the Eritrean government. As both an Ethiopian and a Tigrayan, this deeply saddens me.
During the conflict, I myself was a combatant. Tigray experienced immense destruction during the war. I do not say this to compare suffering, but serious abuses and destruction occurred in Tigray. Those responsible, whether the TPLF itself, the federal government, Eritrea, or any other actor, should all be held accountable.
However, I do not believe any external actor caused more destruction in Tigray than Eritrea did. That is why I find the current relationship so troubling.
Even those advocating for the current alignment admit privately that the relationship is tactical rather than genuine. Their reasoning is essentially that the alliance with Eritrea exists only as long as it serves the purpose of weakening the federal government and influencing power in Addis Ababa. Beyond that, they themselves believe Eritrea would not remain aligned with them permanently.
Even Eritrea’s own history does not support the idea of a stable or lasting alliance of this kind.
